The Concept of Miracle

by Richard Swinburne

Swinburne'e göre, herhangi bir şeyin var olmuş olması yani varlığın yokluğa tercih edilmesinin bizzat kendisi olağanüstü bir durumdur. Böylesi büyük bir evrenin içerisinde küçük bir noktadan daha küçük durumda olan güneş sistemi içerisindeki dünyamızda var olan küçük bir sinek, bütün elektronik aksamıyla ıssız bir arazide karşılaştığımız en gelişmiş uçaktan daha harikuladedir. Çölde gördüğümüz uçak hakkında düşündüğümüz şeyleri neden küçük bir sinek, arı, insan ve bütün ihtişamıyla karşımızda duran evren hakkında düşünmeyelim?

Genres: Theology

92 pages, Paperback

First published January 21, 1971

About the author

Richard G. Swinburne is an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford. Over the last 50 years Swinburne has been a very influential proponent of natural theology, that is, philosophical arguments for the existence of God. His philosophical contributions are primarily in philosophy of religion and philosophy of science. He aroused much discussion with his early work in the philosophy of religion, a trilogy of books consisting of The Coherence of Theism, The Existence of God, and Faith and Reason.

Reviews

[BlackOxford · Rating 1 out of 5]

The Dirty Christian Secret

Richard Swinburne is a stalwart of Christian apologetics. His apparent aim over a long career is to convince the world that the Christian God is the only deity that makes and sense, and that the 17th century philosopher Leibniz was correct about this being the best of all possible worlds. He wrote The Concept of Miracle in 1970. Yet this week he is giving a lecture at my old Oxford College on related topics. In preparation for his talk, I took time to read this book again after many years. Swinburne, I discover, is not only long-lived, he is also consistent, still peddling the same ideas, largely to the already converted. I think his impact on the rest of us is minimal.

Swinburne defines a miracle as “the violation of a law of nature by a god.” This is in line with the thought of Thomas Aquinas and other important theologians who have considered the topic. But Swinburne takes it almost verbatim from Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, presumably to give it the appearance of enlightened secular modernity.

This definition in itself is revelatory. Like the religion from which it emanates, Christianity, it makes the standard of the miraculous the linguistic coherence of an event. If we can explain it, it’s not miraculous.

But any law of nature is necessarily a statement or formula about the world, in natural or scientific language. The only thing we know for certain about any such statement or formula is that it is unstable; it will change. A miracle therefore is that which doesn’t make sense to those who perceive it as such. So at any point in time, the best that can be said of the miraculous is that it is a tentative conclusion. Swinburne calls this issue a matter of different Weltanschauungen, or world-views and leaves the matter open as an epistemological issue of fact-finding.

But such a concept of miracle has more profound implications than the probability of its verification. The consequence of such a definition is that, by current theoretical standards, the world as we know it is a continuous infinite series of miracles. Quantum Theory very clearly makes no sense. Its verified claim of instantaneous action at a distance, for example, suffers from the same defect as Newton’s theory of gravity. And every prior natural theory had equivalent unexplainable phenomena. According to Swinburne, therefore, all of the phenomena which compromise these theories are miraculous.

And this consequence, of course, is a product of Christianity’s linguistic idolatry. As a dogmatic religion, Christianity is fundamentally dependent upon its interpretations of scriptures and its doctrinal pronouncements. That is, Christianity is a purely literary religion. Unlike Judaism, which is also a religion of the book, Christian creeds constitute the substance of redeeming faith. Behaviour is of secondary importance if it matters at all. And even behaviour is supposedly generated by faith through the confession of the correct words. Language has always been the Christian standard of membership and salvation.

In the same vein, Swinburne’s mention of ‘a god’ is a disingenuous linguistic ploy. The only god capable of altering natural laws is one which created natural laws. Such a god, as for example with various pagan gods, does not merely use its power within the bounds of natural law to ease human life or make it more miserable. This is a god that is not simply inconceivably powerful but one that essentially defines what power means. This is, in other words, the god of language. Or, less theologically, it is Language itself. This then is the Christian God - Language.

Swinburne spends the bulk of his essay dissecting the evidence for and against his Humean definition of miracle. The fact that he is doing nothing more than sharpening the linguistic tool of Christianity doesn’t bother him in the least. He probably doesn’t even notice what he’s up to. He is after all rationalising the irrationalities of faith by building up faith’s linguistic pedigree even more solidly than the Church has done over millennia.

In Christianity ethics is subsidiary to faith. What Swinburne does not even touch upon is the ethical aspect of miracles. In particular the theodicy of miracles, that is, God’s ethics in changing the laws of nature, doesn’t even get a mention. This is a subject universally avoided by philosophical theologians. The issue is this: if the world created by God is ‘good’ as biblically claimed, then why would it be necessary to alter natural laws? Does such alteration make the world an even better place? If so why not make such changes permanent, not just physical laws, but also the laws of human cognition and behavioural response?

The biblical tales of vengeful floods, fiery destruction, and the sending of a redeemer do suggest that the Christian God did take a somewhat experimental punt in the business of creation. Even with several iterations he has failed to get the hang of it. Meanwhile the magnitude of such intense suffering caused by his actions continues to increase daily. No, I’m afraid that if this Christian God exists, he is hardly a benevolent, much less a competent, entity. And the idea of miracles contains that dirty little secret within it.

[Lucas G. · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a short book - about 70 pages - with a modest goal. First, Swinburne outlines the various ways of understanding what a miracle is and presents his own working definition. Second, he evaluates whether or not one could, in principle, be justified in believing that a given event was a miracle.

One of the most common ways to define a miracle is as a violation of the laws of nature. Another common way is a special act of a god. Swinburne suggests that a true miracle must have religious significance, but ultimately adopts a working definition of miracle as "a violation of a law of nature by a god." (p. 11)

Swinburne then takes aim at David Hume's argument against miracles. Hume, in effect, argued that no amount of evidence in support of a miracle claim could be sufficient to outweigh the evidence against such a claim provided by the universality of whatever law of nature would have to be violated for the miracle to occur.

In order to respond to Hume, Swinburne dives into an explanation of what it would look like for something to be evidence that a law of nature had been violated. In part this depends on whether the law is universal or statistical in nature. Violations of statistical laws aren't truly violations, but rather counter-instances to the law.

Of importance to miracles, however, is the evidence we can obtain from history. Swinburne outlines four categories: our own apparent memories, testimony of others, physical traces, and our understanding of what is impossible or improbable (p. 33). It is worth noting that while Hume addresses the second and fourth categories, he largely ignores the first and third categories.

The rest of the book contains Swinburne's analysis of how to weigh competing categories of evidence, in particular when some forms stand to support the claim that a law of nature was violated. Furthermore, he presents an argument in favor of the conclusion that any such violation would be the result of an agent, such as a god, and therfore most properly understood as a miracle.

In the end, Swinburne argues that we do not have sufficient evidence to determine whether or not a miracle has occurred without also considering the evidence for or against the existence of a god. To this end, he identifies several major arguments in favor of the existence of a god and concludes that if any of them carry any weight, then we have reason enough to believe in miracles.

While this is a short book, it is highly informative. Swinburne's arguments are clear and concise. He is able to provide clarity on the topic of miracles without getting too deep into debates on the topic. This is a good book to set the stage for a more in depth study on miracles.