US-Singapore Relations, 1965-1975: Strategic Non-alignment in the Cold War

by Daniel Wei Boon Chua

During the Vietnam War, the newly-independent Singapore struck the position of being non-aligned. It maintained an anti-communist stance while, at least initially, criticizing the United States’ intervention into Vietnam. Yet Singapore might not have achieved its post-colonial success so rapidly without the support of the United States. As the war in Vietnam raged on, Singapore became a critical refueling point, also providing ship and aircraft repair for the US military. Commercial and strategic support from the United States lifted Singapore out of the economic doom predicted for the city-state after secession from Malaysia. Without this strategic and economic assistance, Singapore’s history might have been different. By considering the importance of the role of the United States in Singapore’s nation-building, this book provides an important supplement to the well-trodden narrative that attributes Singapore’s success solely to good governance.

304 pages, Paperback

Published October 15, 2017

Reviews

[Gin]

It you want to understand why Singapore (and also the rest of Southeast Asia) seems to be particularly close to the United States, Chua’s book provides a good background to why. Covering ten years from Singapore’s independence to the complete withdrawal of the US from Vietnam, it traces the role that the United States play in the development of Singapore post-independence, and also the wider region of Southeast Asia.

In fact, Chua made the credible claim that while Singapore’s success is attributed to its good leadership in the form of its so-called first generation politicians (the likes of Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee and S Rajaratnam came up the most), not enough attention and credence has been given to the role that the United States play in terms of military assistance and economic investment. It is this fortuitous timing that enabled Singapore’s leaders to take advantage of the US’s interest in the region that led to the constant engagement of its leaders, notably the three administrations that straddled the ten years. For sure, the United States did not do so out of good will but because its interests coincided with Singapore’s. If nothing, it is a reminder of the cliche that there are no permanent friends among countries, only permanent interests. For those familiar with Singapore’s foreign policy approaches, they will be able to see how this continues to be the case today.

The attempts by Singapore to navigate between the US and China today and wanting the former around, is reminiscent of that period Chua covered. Then Singapore used the Soviet Union as a way to get the US to stay in the region, because it the United States that Singapore saw as a counterbalance and a force for stability in the region. It was wary of China as the latter was then engaged in the export of its revolutionary activities across the region, and Singapore saw the US (and the UK to a lesser degree) as a means to prevent that.

One fact that I didn’t realised then and do so now, was how much Singapore and also its neighbours wanted the US to stay for as long as possible in Vietnam. Not out of malice but rather the fear that a Vietnamese would lead to the spread of communism across Southeast Asia. Lee Kuan Yew was a believe in the Domino Theory. And the continued US presence allowed for the regional countries to build up its economic and military capabilities so that they will be able to resist any intended Vietnamese expansion.

But the cost is that of a devastated country, and Chua acknowledges that in the last two pages of the book. The notion that the rest of Southeast Asia owe a debt to Vietnam in that sense will be one that stays with me for a while. A lot of lessons here to be learnt in this historical account.

[G]

The author draws from American diplomatic sources to argue that US-Singapore relations between 1965 and 1975 can be best characterised as "intimacy at a distance". He contends that Washington and Singapore opted to forge close economic ties at an arm's length, during the period when Singapore's independence intersected with the Vietnam War, because both countries' interests were perceived to be served by Singapore's maintenance of a non-aligned posture amid the global Cold War. 

This book addresses in part Robert McMahon's lamentation that the history of US foreign relations with Southeast Asian countries besides Vietnam and the Philippines remains relatively unexplored. It highlights the extent to which the fates of Singapore, Australia, Britain, the United States, and Vietnam were intertwined in the post-war era. Finally, the book demonstrates that the United States and Singapore's "intimacy at a distance" was a product of a difficult interaction between Washington's containment strategy and Singapore's nation-building project. 

Until such time as Singapore elects to declassify relevant government records, this book will remain an authoritative account of the first decade of US-Singapore relations as Washington saw it.