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- GenresEconomics
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Published November 1, 2016
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About the author
Loukas Tsoukalis
23 books3 followersLoukas Tsoukalis (Greek: Λουκάς Τσούκαλης) is a Greek political economist and European public intellectual with a long experience in EU affairs. He is a Professor (Professeur affilié) at the Paris School of International Affairs, Sciences Po, Emeritus Professor at the University of Athens, and President of the Board of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).
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July 3, 2023
Review written in November 2017
In recent years the European Union has endured a number of difficult predicaments which have given the entire European Project an existential crisis. Loukas Tsoukalis’ In Defence of Europe attempts to address these predicaments, and potential ways of moving past these troubled times.
The opening chapter gives us a swift introduction to the political change that transpired in Europe during the second half of the 20th century. The enduring peace, rising standards of living, and rapid modernisation gave rise to emphatic support of the European project amongst its citizens. For the most part, this ‘permissive consensus’ for further integration continued until the turn of the 21st century. Since then, a succession of crises has pushed pro-European support to an all-time low. Tsoukalis asks the reader several questions, perhaps the most pertinent being “Can Europe overcome its internal divisions and face a growing number of challenges?” (17). Chapter two introduces the concept of the EU’s piecemeal growth and the complexities that come with it. The concept of Britain as a reluctant partner is introduced, as well as the notion that the introduction of the monetary union was the most daring act of integration in the project’s history. Chapter three and four deeply analyse the fallout of the Eurozone crisis. These chapters lay down the conditions that allowed the global financial crisis to affect the Eurozone so deeply, and the reasons why Europe was so slow to react efficiently to it. Chapter five paints a grim picture of Europe today. A Europe where Germany reluctantly leads, Greece is constantly on the verge of economic and political collapse, and the dangers of a ‘potential’ Brexit. The penultimate chapter explores some of the other troubles that have befallen Europe such as the refugee crisis, the instability in the regions surrounding the Union, and the rise of populist Eurosceptic political parties within the Union’s borders. In concluding the book, the final chapter looks toward the future, with Tsoukalis listing several policies that may need to be implanted/enforced if the European project wants to survive.
In Defence of Europe is a thought provoking and honest analysis of the European Union today. It is clear that Tsoukalis did not write this book in the spirit of Euroscepticism, but in a way to address real apprehensions concerning the future of the Union. In analysing the current state of the Union, A number of key themes appear, which can help explain why Europe has become so fractured. These are; European overstretch, the unintended consequences of globalism, and external threats on the borders of Europe.
Tsoukalis gives a number of examples of when the EU has ‘overstretched’ itself. Perhaps the most obvious is the rate at which the EU has expanded over history. What started as a treaty between 6 countries in the 1950s has today mushroomed into a collective of (currently) 28 member states. Enlargement has often been described as the most successful foreign policy of the European Union (Schimmelfennig, 2008) and despite the recent crises there is no shortage of candidates wishing to join (Cini, 2016). With an ever-increasing union came ever increasing diversity, but as Tsoukalis points out “it is the kind of diversity that often clashes with the objective of common policies and closer integration” (38). This issue, coupled with the fact that the EU is still seen to have a weak legitimacy base (149; Schmidt, 2004) results in a stretched mandate. Tsoukalis presents a Europe where policy integration has occurred at a much quicker rate than political integration (103). While policy is now decided at a supranational level, politics is still played out on a national and local level. The stretch between deciding policy on a supranational level and implementing it on a local level is a recurring theme across the book.
European integration has gradually increased in speed over its history and Tsoukalis pinpoints the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as the time when European integration began to overstretch itself (25). The UK, Denmark, and later Sweden negotiated opt-out clauses in the ratification of treaty. Instead of waiting for these nations to ‘catch-up’ per se, integration proceeded at an increased rate and ultimately led to the adoption of the Euro currency, described as “the crowning act of European integration” (31). However, this ‘crowning act’ was seen by some economists as a step too far, certainly when a pan-Euro fiscal policy was lacking (Hix & Høyland, 2011). Tsoukalis dedicates much of the early chapters to the Eurocrisis as “The euro is clearly the most extreme form of European overstretch:” (149).
In Defence of Europe condenses the Eurocrisis into a ‘perfect storm’ of conditions that led to such prolonged difficulty. The three conditions that led to this are; the Euro’s poor design, bad luck, and poor policies implemented during the crisis. Tsoukalis is quick to point out that the Euro was designed as a French reaction to German reunification. At the time of the Berlin wall’s collapse, German reunification was inevitable (supposedly to the chagrin of France’s President Mitterand). The diplomatic alternative to preventing German reunification was to “integrate a bigger Germany into a stronger union” (25). In order for France to fully endorse reunification, the Germans were told to abandon the Deutschmark and adopt the Euro (Vaubel, 2010). From this, the Maastricht treaty for EMU was ratified and the path toward the adoption of the Euro began. Thus, Tsoukalis asserts that the implementation of the Euro did was not necessarily shaped by economic necessity, but by political bargaining. Economists at the time such as Krugman (1992), and Vinals (1996) were sceptical of the design of the EMU. Much doubt lay on the fact that the EU was not a fiscal union. Thus, while Europe would enter a monetary union, taxes and spending would still predominantly remain at a national level. Robert F. Graboyes ominously noted that the Union “has limited ability to tap the wealth of, say, Germany, to ameliorate economic difficulties in, say, Greece or Ireland” (Graboyes, 1990, p.16). Despite these reservations Tsoukalis notes that “political will prevailed over economic scepticism” (31). Measures were put in place to ensure any country wanting to adopt the Euro had to possess a stable economy. Greece failed this entrance exam in 1998 yet by 2001 it had ‘miraculously’ stabilised its economy (Ross, 2001). Tsoukalis’ ease at explaining the political motivations behind the induction of the Euro bring a more defined understanding of why it was so poorly designed.
Whilst the Euro may have been badly designed, Tsoukalis acknowledges that bad luck played a part too. The first test the young Euro faced was the largest financial crash in 80 years. It was indeed a combination of bad design and bad luck, but Tsoukalis believes the reaction to the developing crisis only made things worse. Chapter four is scathingly critical of the EU’s reaction to the growing crisis. Tsoukalis describes Europe’s slow response to the crisis as a result of “the way decisions were (and still are) taken (or not taken) at EU level: too cumbersome a process and with too many veto players” (87). Tsoukalis questions whether the German ordoliberal strategy of austerity and fiscal constraint were the best approaches to adopt for certain states. This assessment is “an almost consensus view among economists, while most of the exceptions are to be found among German economists” (94). Tsoukalis’ argument is a credible one. He points out the unjustness of austerity measures in Ireland and Spain, where debt was not caused by the public sector, but the private one. Ultimately, the Eurocrisis is succinctly explained by Tsoukalis, who gives a simple, yet critical before, during, and after analysis of “the most extreme but also the most important example of overstretch” (178).
Another trend Tsoukalis has observed is the ever increasing ‘collateral damage’ from globalization. Tsoukalis has previously commented on how increased integration has led to economic divergence between member states, as well as economic inequalities within states (Tsoukalis, 2003). Instead of analysing the potential dangers of these disparities, Tsoukalis evaluates the results of these differences. ‘Losers’ of this globalisation are identified and these ‘losers’ are barriers for any future attempts at deepening European integration. To further examine how Tsoukalis comes to this conclusion, we are brought back to the 1980s, where the European market began to get increasingly liberal. Tsoukalis ascribes this as “part of the ongoing globalization process” (34). With economic borders being dismantled across the EU, capital became more mobile whilst labour remained relatively static. As economic integration continued, the discord between capital and labour became more pronounced. Distributional effects became quite unbalanced and regional disparities began to grow. Despite being the cause of the unequal distributional effects, the EU institutions contributed very little in terms of redistribution (aside from the Common Agricultural Policy). Tsoukalis concludes that “the burden of redistribution fell on the nation state, itself operating in a much more challenging economic environment” (35). This is a viewpoint shared by Geppert and Stephan (2008) who identify the catch-22 of the economic integration of the EU - “European integration foster the catching-up of lagging countries but at the same time forces for agglomeration of economic activities tend to increase disparities within countries... [For the EU] to counter these forces for the sake of more convergence would almost certainly come at the expense of economic growth.” (Geppert & Stephan, 2008, p.19). Tsoukalis refers to the people who feel the effects of these disparities as ‘losers’ of globalization. These losers have become increasingly Eurosceptic over the last 30 years. In the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, the losers have turned their back on Europe and have sought “protection under the national umbrella” (152). A link is drawn between the increasing number of losers and the rise in populism across Europe. Although Tsoukalis gives equal analysis to left and right-wing populist parties across Europe, political scientists have predominantly focused on the relative successes of the right (Otjes & Louwerse, 2015). Common themes amongst the European far right parties are a desire to have “no Europe and a return to the nation state behind protective barriers” (173). Therefore, the rise in populism is a self-evident threat to the European project. The last number of general elections across Europe have seen a steady rise of support in populist right-wing parties. In 2015 Finland and Denmark elected far right parties as the second biggest parties in government whilst 2017 saw significant support for the right in Germany and Austria. While none of these elections saw a far-right party win a majority, the trends are worrying for those who support the European project. Although the rise of populism can find some of its roots in the economic disparity within the union, other external factors have also cultivated its growth. These external factors are issues Tsoukalis does not disregard.
Tsoukalis shows a clear ability to identify issues within Europe. His is not confined to within the borders of the EU however. In looking beyond the European boundary, Tsoukalis is not an optimistic observer: “Large parts of Europe’s neighbourhood are now in turmoil” he notes (11). It is true to say stability is seldom found in the European hinterland. To the south, the Arab Spring has dragged many North African nations into years of violent turmoil. The Palestinian-Israeli peace talks have been stalled since 2014. The Syrian civil war has dramatically unstabilised the region. Whilst the Arab and Islamic world undergoes deep instability, Russia has begun to fortify its sphere of influence by annexing Crimea, and strengthening its military presence in the EU surrounded exclave of Kaliningrad (Daalder, 2017). Tsoukalis pays heed to three consequences of these events: the refugee crisis, the rise in terrorism, and the prospect of a neo-cold war with Russia.
The refugee crisis is perhaps the most clear-cut example of an external crisis affecting Europe. At the height of the crisis in 2015/16, 2.3 million individuals were caught illegally attempting to enter the EU (European parliament, 2017). Tension between member states can be rooted in the Dublin Regulation, which states that asylum seekers must be processed in the country they are first registered in (Brekke & Brochmann, 2015). Most refugees make their way into Europe via Greece or Italy, countries already unbalanced from the Eurozone crisis. Others have found their way into the EU through the ‘western Balkan’ route or Eastern Europe. Countries on this route “want nothing to do with [migrants]…and their leaders have said so in no uncertain terms” (160). The refugee crisis has already seen the weakening of one of the EU’s symbols of integration. The traditionally free flowing Schengen area has seen increased restrictions with border crossings between member areas since 2015 (Guild et al.,2016).
Concerns over the influx of refugees have often been expressed hand in hand with concerns in the rise of terrorism in Europe (Maria, 2017). Tsoukalis points out that “The link with the rising threat of imported terrorism hardly made things any easier” for the EU (6). Although Tsoukalis does not appear to endorse this viewpoint, he does not critique it either. Several researchers have found very little links between the rate of immigration and the rate of terrorist activity (Bove & Böhmelt, 2016; Brady, 2017). Many Islamic terror attacks in recent years have been perpetrated by EU citizens (Bakker & De Bont, 2016). Although Tsoukalis’ quote is vague, the ‘imported terrorism’ may refer to the act of EU citizens travelling to war torn areas as jihadist foreign fighters and returning as more radicalised individuals. de Kerchove and Höhn (2016) have emphasized the importance of preventing individuals from travelling to conflict areas. Bhui (2016) cites the UK as an example of a state which has imposed relatively draconian laws in order to quickly deal with the threat of this ‘imported terrorism’. However, Bakker et al. (2014) have shown that attempts to restrict liberties to individuals suspected of engaging in terrorism have often resulted in criticism from those who espouse the EU’s liberal values.
The final external threat that Tsoukalis alludes to is the strengthening of Russia in recent years. Tsoukalis laments that “Putin refuses to behave according to norms and standards set by the West” (12) which has resulted in friction between the EU and Russia, certainly amongst the EU’s eastern border. Since joining the EU, the Baltic nations’ relations with Russia have deteriorated significantly. Raik (2016) described Lithuania as a ‘new cold-warrior’ after their critical rhetoric directed toward Russian policies. Duke and Gebhard (2017) identified the increasing role of NATO as a protective shield over the Baltics rather than the EU. Tsoukalis agrees with this statement, asserting that “[for the Baltics] Washington is a more relevant reference point than Brussels, Berlin, or Paris” (183). Another key area of Russo-EU tension lies in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The annexing of Crimea has placed EU foreign policy under the microscope, with Karolewski and Cross (2017) quick to point out that the EU’s slow response to the situation enabled Russia to get a strategic advantage in the region. The Russian question is a complicated one, especially considering the energy dependence the EU has on Russia (Dannreuther, 2016). Due to the inherent nature of the EU, the member states have varying degrees of relations with Russia, some are amicable, and some are antagonistic. The challenge for the EU is consolidating these differing viewpoints into a concrete policy on Russia. This will be no easy feat as Tsoukalis points out “forging unity out of diverse interests and perceptions [regarding Russia] is bound to be a long and painful process” (204). If the Russian situation continues to escalate, the EU may find itself a reluctant actor in a ‘neo-Cold War’ (Stepanenko & Pylynskyi, 2015).
Although In Defence of Europe gives an excellent account of the troubled times the EU has had to endure, future editions would require analysis on the seismic events of 2016/17. Since publication three events have occurred which will have massive effects on the future of the European Union. These are; Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and the election of Emmanuel Macron. At first glance, Brexit can be seen as a cataclysmic event for the future of the EU. Despite these concerns, some scholars believe Brexit will serve as a unifying factor for the remaining EU27 (Collins, 2017). In similar circumstances, the election of Donald Trump could also act as the impetus the EU needs to galvanise, as Trump’s rhetoric has been decidedly anti-EU (Novotna, 2017). In more straightforward terms, the election of Emmanuelle Macron can certainly be seen in a positive light for the future of the EU. His victory over the Eurosceptic Marine Le Pen was a much-needed boost to Europhiles across the union. Although Tsoukalis could not have been aware of these developments at the time of writing, it would be beneficial in any future editions of the book to include these events.
In conclusion, In Defence of Europe is a robust analysis of the numerous crises which have plagued the EU over the last decade. Tsoukalis identifies overstretch, ‘collateral damage’ from integration and globalisation, and external crises as the three key problems the EU faces today. It is refreshing to see a Europhile critique the complex and oftentimes sluggish behemoth that is the European Union. Is there a resolution to this existential European crisis? Tsoukalis’ proposed solution is a vague one, but it seems to lie in a multi-speed Europe approach. He advocates for a ‘new pact’ where “There will be more Europe in some policy areas, less in others, and of course differentiated membership options on offer.” (210). In a Europe with rising levels of Eurosceptic populism can this be achieved? “We simply cannot afford to let it fail” Tsoukalis tells us, “Just think of the alternative” (210).
In recent years the European Union has endured a number of difficult predicaments which have given the entire European Project an existential crisis. Loukas Tsoukalis’ In Defence of Europe attempts to address these predicaments, and potential ways of moving past these troubled times.
The opening chapter gives us a swift introduction to the political change that transpired in Europe during the second half of the 20th century. The enduring peace, rising standards of living, and rapid modernisation gave rise to emphatic support of the European project amongst its citizens. For the most part, this ‘permissive consensus’ for further integration continued until the turn of the 21st century. Since then, a succession of crises has pushed pro-European support to an all-time low. Tsoukalis asks the reader several questions, perhaps the most pertinent being “Can Europe overcome its internal divisions and face a growing number of challenges?” (17). Chapter two introduces the concept of the EU’s piecemeal growth and the complexities that come with it. The concept of Britain as a reluctant partner is introduced, as well as the notion that the introduction of the monetary union was the most daring act of integration in the project’s history. Chapter three and four deeply analyse the fallout of the Eurozone crisis. These chapters lay down the conditions that allowed the global financial crisis to affect the Eurozone so deeply, and the reasons why Europe was so slow to react efficiently to it. Chapter five paints a grim picture of Europe today. A Europe where Germany reluctantly leads, Greece is constantly on the verge of economic and political collapse, and the dangers of a ‘potential’ Brexit. The penultimate chapter explores some of the other troubles that have befallen Europe such as the refugee crisis, the instability in the regions surrounding the Union, and the rise of populist Eurosceptic political parties within the Union’s borders. In concluding the book, the final chapter looks toward the future, with Tsoukalis listing several policies that may need to be implanted/enforced if the European project wants to survive.
In Defence of Europe is a thought provoking and honest analysis of the European Union today. It is clear that Tsoukalis did not write this book in the spirit of Euroscepticism, but in a way to address real apprehensions concerning the future of the Union. In analysing the current state of the Union, A number of key themes appear, which can help explain why Europe has become so fractured. These are; European overstretch, the unintended consequences of globalism, and external threats on the borders of Europe.
Tsoukalis gives a number of examples of when the EU has ‘overstretched’ itself. Perhaps the most obvious is the rate at which the EU has expanded over history. What started as a treaty between 6 countries in the 1950s has today mushroomed into a collective of (currently) 28 member states. Enlargement has often been described as the most successful foreign policy of the European Union (Schimmelfennig, 2008) and despite the recent crises there is no shortage of candidates wishing to join (Cini, 2016). With an ever-increasing union came ever increasing diversity, but as Tsoukalis points out “it is the kind of diversity that often clashes with the objective of common policies and closer integration” (38). This issue, coupled with the fact that the EU is still seen to have a weak legitimacy base (149; Schmidt, 2004) results in a stretched mandate. Tsoukalis presents a Europe where policy integration has occurred at a much quicker rate than political integration (103). While policy is now decided at a supranational level, politics is still played out on a national and local level. The stretch between deciding policy on a supranational level and implementing it on a local level is a recurring theme across the book.
European integration has gradually increased in speed over its history and Tsoukalis pinpoints the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as the time when European integration began to overstretch itself (25). The UK, Denmark, and later Sweden negotiated opt-out clauses in the ratification of treaty. Instead of waiting for these nations to ‘catch-up’ per se, integration proceeded at an increased rate and ultimately led to the adoption of the Euro currency, described as “the crowning act of European integration” (31). However, this ‘crowning act’ was seen by some economists as a step too far, certainly when a pan-Euro fiscal policy was lacking (Hix & Høyland, 2011). Tsoukalis dedicates much of the early chapters to the Eurocrisis as “The euro is clearly the most extreme form of European overstretch:” (149).
In Defence of Europe condenses the Eurocrisis into a ‘perfect storm’ of conditions that led to such prolonged difficulty. The three conditions that led to this are; the Euro’s poor design, bad luck, and poor policies implemented during the crisis. Tsoukalis is quick to point out that the Euro was designed as a French reaction to German reunification. At the time of the Berlin wall’s collapse, German reunification was inevitable (supposedly to the chagrin of France’s President Mitterand). The diplomatic alternative to preventing German reunification was to “integrate a bigger Germany into a stronger union” (25). In order for France to fully endorse reunification, the Germans were told to abandon the Deutschmark and adopt the Euro (Vaubel, 2010). From this, the Maastricht treaty for EMU was ratified and the path toward the adoption of the Euro began. Thus, Tsoukalis asserts that the implementation of the Euro did was not necessarily shaped by economic necessity, but by political bargaining. Economists at the time such as Krugman (1992), and Vinals (1996) were sceptical of the design of the EMU. Much doubt lay on the fact that the EU was not a fiscal union. Thus, while Europe would enter a monetary union, taxes and spending would still predominantly remain at a national level. Robert F. Graboyes ominously noted that the Union “has limited ability to tap the wealth of, say, Germany, to ameliorate economic difficulties in, say, Greece or Ireland” (Graboyes, 1990, p.16). Despite these reservations Tsoukalis notes that “political will prevailed over economic scepticism” (31). Measures were put in place to ensure any country wanting to adopt the Euro had to possess a stable economy. Greece failed this entrance exam in 1998 yet by 2001 it had ‘miraculously’ stabilised its economy (Ross, 2001). Tsoukalis’ ease at explaining the political motivations behind the induction of the Euro bring a more defined understanding of why it was so poorly designed.
Whilst the Euro may have been badly designed, Tsoukalis acknowledges that bad luck played a part too. The first test the young Euro faced was the largest financial crash in 80 years. It was indeed a combination of bad design and bad luck, but Tsoukalis believes the reaction to the developing crisis only made things worse. Chapter four is scathingly critical of the EU’s reaction to the growing crisis. Tsoukalis describes Europe’s slow response to the crisis as a result of “the way decisions were (and still are) taken (or not taken) at EU level: too cumbersome a process and with too many veto players” (87). Tsoukalis questions whether the German ordoliberal strategy of austerity and fiscal constraint were the best approaches to adopt for certain states. This assessment is “an almost consensus view among economists, while most of the exceptions are to be found among German economists” (94). Tsoukalis’ argument is a credible one. He points out the unjustness of austerity measures in Ireland and Spain, where debt was not caused by the public sector, but the private one. Ultimately, the Eurocrisis is succinctly explained by Tsoukalis, who gives a simple, yet critical before, during, and after analysis of “the most extreme but also the most important example of overstretch” (178).
Another trend Tsoukalis has observed is the ever increasing ‘collateral damage’ from globalization. Tsoukalis has previously commented on how increased integration has led to economic divergence between member states, as well as economic inequalities within states (Tsoukalis, 2003). Instead of analysing the potential dangers of these disparities, Tsoukalis evaluates the results of these differences. ‘Losers’ of this globalisation are identified and these ‘losers’ are barriers for any future attempts at deepening European integration. To further examine how Tsoukalis comes to this conclusion, we are brought back to the 1980s, where the European market began to get increasingly liberal. Tsoukalis ascribes this as “part of the ongoing globalization process” (34). With economic borders being dismantled across the EU, capital became more mobile whilst labour remained relatively static. As economic integration continued, the discord between capital and labour became more pronounced. Distributional effects became quite unbalanced and regional disparities began to grow. Despite being the cause of the unequal distributional effects, the EU institutions contributed very little in terms of redistribution (aside from the Common Agricultural Policy). Tsoukalis concludes that “the burden of redistribution fell on the nation state, itself operating in a much more challenging economic environment” (35). This is a viewpoint shared by Geppert and Stephan (2008) who identify the catch-22 of the economic integration of the EU - “European integration foster the catching-up of lagging countries but at the same time forces for agglomeration of economic activities tend to increase disparities within countries... [For the EU] to counter these forces for the sake of more convergence would almost certainly come at the expense of economic growth.” (Geppert & Stephan, 2008, p.19). Tsoukalis refers to the people who feel the effects of these disparities as ‘losers’ of globalization. These losers have become increasingly Eurosceptic over the last 30 years. In the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, the losers have turned their back on Europe and have sought “protection under the national umbrella” (152). A link is drawn between the increasing number of losers and the rise in populism across Europe. Although Tsoukalis gives equal analysis to left and right-wing populist parties across Europe, political scientists have predominantly focused on the relative successes of the right (Otjes & Louwerse, 2015). Common themes amongst the European far right parties are a desire to have “no Europe and a return to the nation state behind protective barriers” (173). Therefore, the rise in populism is a self-evident threat to the European project. The last number of general elections across Europe have seen a steady rise of support in populist right-wing parties. In 2015 Finland and Denmark elected far right parties as the second biggest parties in government whilst 2017 saw significant support for the right in Germany and Austria. While none of these elections saw a far-right party win a majority, the trends are worrying for those who support the European project. Although the rise of populism can find some of its roots in the economic disparity within the union, other external factors have also cultivated its growth. These external factors are issues Tsoukalis does not disregard.
Tsoukalis shows a clear ability to identify issues within Europe. His is not confined to within the borders of the EU however. In looking beyond the European boundary, Tsoukalis is not an optimistic observer: “Large parts of Europe’s neighbourhood are now in turmoil” he notes (11). It is true to say stability is seldom found in the European hinterland. To the south, the Arab Spring has dragged many North African nations into years of violent turmoil. The Palestinian-Israeli peace talks have been stalled since 2014. The Syrian civil war has dramatically unstabilised the region. Whilst the Arab and Islamic world undergoes deep instability, Russia has begun to fortify its sphere of influence by annexing Crimea, and strengthening its military presence in the EU surrounded exclave of Kaliningrad (Daalder, 2017). Tsoukalis pays heed to three consequences of these events: the refugee crisis, the rise in terrorism, and the prospect of a neo-cold war with Russia.
The refugee crisis is perhaps the most clear-cut example of an external crisis affecting Europe. At the height of the crisis in 2015/16, 2.3 million individuals were caught illegally attempting to enter the EU (European parliament, 2017). Tension between member states can be rooted in the Dublin Regulation, which states that asylum seekers must be processed in the country they are first registered in (Brekke & Brochmann, 2015). Most refugees make their way into Europe via Greece or Italy, countries already unbalanced from the Eurozone crisis. Others have found their way into the EU through the ‘western Balkan’ route or Eastern Europe. Countries on this route “want nothing to do with [migrants]…and their leaders have said so in no uncertain terms” (160). The refugee crisis has already seen the weakening of one of the EU’s symbols of integration. The traditionally free flowing Schengen area has seen increased restrictions with border crossings between member areas since 2015 (Guild et al.,2016).
Concerns over the influx of refugees have often been expressed hand in hand with concerns in the rise of terrorism in Europe (Maria, 2017). Tsoukalis points out that “The link with the rising threat of imported terrorism hardly made things any easier” for the EU (6). Although Tsoukalis does not appear to endorse this viewpoint, he does not critique it either. Several researchers have found very little links between the rate of immigration and the rate of terrorist activity (Bove & Böhmelt, 2016; Brady, 2017). Many Islamic terror attacks in recent years have been perpetrated by EU citizens (Bakker & De Bont, 2016). Although Tsoukalis’ quote is vague, the ‘imported terrorism’ may refer to the act of EU citizens travelling to war torn areas as jihadist foreign fighters and returning as more radicalised individuals. de Kerchove and Höhn (2016) have emphasized the importance of preventing individuals from travelling to conflict areas. Bhui (2016) cites the UK as an example of a state which has imposed relatively draconian laws in order to quickly deal with the threat of this ‘imported terrorism’. However, Bakker et al. (2014) have shown that attempts to restrict liberties to individuals suspected of engaging in terrorism have often resulted in criticism from those who espouse the EU’s liberal values.
The final external threat that Tsoukalis alludes to is the strengthening of Russia in recent years. Tsoukalis laments that “Putin refuses to behave according to norms and standards set by the West” (12) which has resulted in friction between the EU and Russia, certainly amongst the EU’s eastern border. Since joining the EU, the Baltic nations’ relations with Russia have deteriorated significantly. Raik (2016) described Lithuania as a ‘new cold-warrior’ after their critical rhetoric directed toward Russian policies. Duke and Gebhard (2017) identified the increasing role of NATO as a protective shield over the Baltics rather than the EU. Tsoukalis agrees with this statement, asserting that “[for the Baltics] Washington is a more relevant reference point than Brussels, Berlin, or Paris” (183). Another key area of Russo-EU tension lies in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The annexing of Crimea has placed EU foreign policy under the microscope, with Karolewski and Cross (2017) quick to point out that the EU’s slow response to the situation enabled Russia to get a strategic advantage in the region. The Russian question is a complicated one, especially considering the energy dependence the EU has on Russia (Dannreuther, 2016). Due to the inherent nature of the EU, the member states have varying degrees of relations with Russia, some are amicable, and some are antagonistic. The challenge for the EU is consolidating these differing viewpoints into a concrete policy on Russia. This will be no easy feat as Tsoukalis points out “forging unity out of diverse interests and perceptions [regarding Russia] is bound to be a long and painful process” (204). If the Russian situation continues to escalate, the EU may find itself a reluctant actor in a ‘neo-Cold War’ (Stepanenko & Pylynskyi, 2015).
Although In Defence of Europe gives an excellent account of the troubled times the EU has had to endure, future editions would require analysis on the seismic events of 2016/17. Since publication three events have occurred which will have massive effects on the future of the European Union. These are; Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and the election of Emmanuel Macron. At first glance, Brexit can be seen as a cataclysmic event for the future of the EU. Despite these concerns, some scholars believe Brexit will serve as a unifying factor for the remaining EU27 (Collins, 2017). In similar circumstances, the election of Donald Trump could also act as the impetus the EU needs to galvanise, as Trump’s rhetoric has been decidedly anti-EU (Novotna, 2017). In more straightforward terms, the election of Emmanuelle Macron can certainly be seen in a positive light for the future of the EU. His victory over the Eurosceptic Marine Le Pen was a much-needed boost to Europhiles across the union. Although Tsoukalis could not have been aware of these developments at the time of writing, it would be beneficial in any future editions of the book to include these events.
In conclusion, In Defence of Europe is a robust analysis of the numerous crises which have plagued the EU over the last decade. Tsoukalis identifies overstretch, ‘collateral damage’ from integration and globalisation, and external crises as the three key problems the EU faces today. It is refreshing to see a Europhile critique the complex and oftentimes sluggish behemoth that is the European Union. Is there a resolution to this existential European crisis? Tsoukalis’ proposed solution is a vague one, but it seems to lie in a multi-speed Europe approach. He advocates for a ‘new pact’ where “There will be more Europe in some policy areas, less in others, and of course differentiated membership options on offer.” (210). In a Europe with rising levels of Eurosceptic populism can this be achieved? “We simply cannot afford to let it fail” Tsoukalis tells us, “Just think of the alternative” (210).
February 9, 2017
Very well written piece. Succinctly encapsulated the crux of the Euro crisis and the other challenges facing Europe.
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