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Some Dogmas Of Religion
This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the original. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment for protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature in affordable, high quality, modern editions that are true to the original work.
320 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1906
About the author
J.M.E. McTaggart
44 books13 followersJohn McTaggart Ellis McTaggart, English philosopher.
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July 11, 2024
A KEY HISTORICAL WORK IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart (1866-1925), was an idealist metaphysician and lecturer in philosophy at Trinity College, Cambridge.
He wrote in the first chapter of this 1906 book, “By metaphysics I mean the systematic study of the ultimate nature of reality, and by dogma I mean any proposition which has a metaphysical significance. This may seem at first sight a paradoxical definition. For dogmas are held, and disputed, by many people to whom metaphysics are absolutely unknown.” (Pg. 1)
He states, “How then shall we define religion? Religion is clearly a state of mind. It is also clear that it is not exclusively the acceptance of certain propositions as true. It seems to me that it may best be described as an emotion resting on a conviction of a harmony between ourselves and the universe at large.” (§3) He continues, “If the word is used in this way, it is clear that no one dogma can be regarded as essential to religion. For example, the cases of Buddhism and of Spinoza would prevent us from regarding belief in a personal God or in personal immortality as essential to it.” (§4)
He elaborates, “If religion is to be defined as resting on a conviction of the harmony of ourselves with the universe, the question arises of how much harmony is necessary. If complete harmony were necessary, no one could be called religious except the few mystics who deny the existence of any evil… We must say, I think, that religion is a matter of degree. The more complete the harmony it asserts, the more completely religious will it be.” (§10) Later, he suggests, “the God of theology is not the only alternative to the God of science, since it is quite possible to have a religion without a God at all.” (§18)
He points out, “assuming that [a] miracle could prove the special interference of the supreme being, so that the religion connected with it could be accepted as his revelation, should we then be safe in accepting it as true? We should not be justified, I submit, unless we had previously proved that the supreme being was good. For we have no reason to suppose that he will tell the truth except that it would not be a good act to deceive us… It is obviously impossible to trust to the revelation to tell us that he is good, since we have no reason to trust the revelation at all unless we know that he is good. This goodness must be proved independently.” (§42) Later, he notes, “a corresponding faith in God will not enable us to determine whether we are immortal, whether our wills are undetermined, or similar questions of dogma. It will only give us light on one particular dogma---that the world is wisely and righteously ordered.” (§55)
[See my review of McTaggart’s Human immortality and Pre-existence; chapters III and IV in this book are reproduced therein.]
He observes, “It is perfectly impossible for any one to explain why a particular drop of rain falls where it does rather than half an inch away. Yet no one supposes that this event is not completely determined. We all conclude that the series of events is so complicated, so numerous, and so unfavorably placed for observation, that our intellects are not able to follow it. It is clear, therefore, that we cannot logically come to a different conclusion with regard to our volitions unless we have already reason to think that the case for the complete determination is less strong than the case for the complete determination of the falling raindrop. And therefore such a conclusion must rest on a proof of free will, and cannot itself be used as such a proof.” (§120)
He comments, “It has sometimes been held that the freedom of the human will was the only way in which the goodness of God could be made compatible with the evil in the universe… But… if God is omnipotent, it is impossible to account for the evil of the universe in this way. Indeed, if God is omnipotent, it is impossible that he can be good at all. This would not be affected by the freedom of the human will, since the gratuitous permission of evil would be as fatal to the divine goodness as the gratuitous creation of evil. On the other hand, if God is not omnipotent, his goodness would not be impossible… For a being of limited power but perfect goodness might well create evil, and not merely allow it, supposing that the creation of the evil was the only way of avoiding a greater evil or attaining a greater good.” (§136)
He explains, “By God I mean a being who is personal, supreme, and good. In calling him personal, I mean to assert that he is self-conscious, that he has awareness of his own existence… The usage in philosophy, however, is sometimes different from the usage in theology… If the usage of theology and philosophy differ, which ought to give way? It seems to me that it should be philosophy. It is … impossible to change the meaning of so common a word as God in popular usage.” (§152, 153)
He argues, “[If] God exists in time… we have a substance which has persisted through an infinite past time. Now if one substance is admitted to exist in time without being caused, why should not other substances do so too? And, if any other substance than God can be uncreated, then the necessity of assuming the existence of a God to create them has disappeared. I cannot see why it should be said… that God did not need a creator, but that a man and a pebble did.” (§158)
He rejects the argument from Design: “It would be impossible to base any valid argument on the assertion that all we observe is worthy to be itself a divine end. For such a conclusion would be absolutely unsupported by the facts. Very much of what we observe in the universe is of such a nature that we cannot conceive that it should have intrinsic worth in the sight of a wise and good being. How could we suppose that such a being should find the existence of one hair more or less on a man’s head to have intrinsic worth?... And then there is much in the universe which is positively bad, and this certainly cannot have any intrinsic worth for him… It seems to me that, whatever worth the argument from design may have to prove the existence of a God who is not omnipotent, it is quite useless as a proof of the existence of an omnipotent God.” (§162)
He returns to the Free Will argument: “It seems to me rather difficult to see such supreme value in free will that it would be worth more than the absence of all the present evil in the universe… it is quite evident that a God who cannot create a universe in which all men have free will, and which is at the same time free from all evil, is not an omnipotent God, since there is one thing which he cannot do. IN the same way, a God who cannot ordain a series of general laws, the uniform working of which would exclude all evil from the universe, is not an omnipotent God.” (§178) He adds, “when believers in God save his goodness by saying that he is not really omnipotent, they are taking the best course open to them… it is less depressing and less revolting than the belief that the destinies of the universe are at the mercy of a being who, with the resources of omnipotence at his disposal, decided to make a universe no better than this.” (§179)
He notes, “We now pass to the theory that God is neither omnipotent nor creative… [But] God is conceived to be so much more perfect in goodness than his fellow persons, that the due attitude of all of them, even the highest, towards him is that of reverence and adoration… His position towards us is that of a schoolmaster toward his scholars. He does not create us. He cannot destroy us. His power over us is limited. And we can resist his power… But, on the other hand, his power is greater than the power of any one of us, and is so great that it can do much, though not all, of what he wishes throughout the universe… Of the three theories of God’s nature which we have to consider, this seems to me by far the most tenable.” (§193, 194)
He suggests, “if the director of the universe is finite, why should we be certain that there is only one? Many of the facts of experience… suggest at least as strongly the idea of several such beings, working in opposition, or possibly… partly in harmony and partly in opposition… There is nothing, perhaps, which should prevent us from giving the name of God to each of several being simultaneously existing… who equal him in wisdom and power, but not in goodness.” (§213)
He summarizes, “That is all that the doctrine of a non-omnipotent God can give us---a person who fights for the good and who may be victorious… Indeed, when the non-omnipotent God is also taken as non-creative, there seems to me… only one reason why we should not believe in his existence---namely, that there is no reason why we SHOULD believe in it.” (§215)
He suggests, “Love will not cease… And the non-existence of God would leave it as possible as it was before that love should be the central fact of all reality. It might still be true that nothing else had value… Whether the friends whom all men may find could compensate for the friend whom some men thought they had found is a question for each man to answer.” (§240)
McTaggart is, these days, often cited simply to suggest that “an atheist CAN believe in immortality.” (He is more a Hegelian, than an “atheist,” however.) But this book still has great value for serious students of the philosophy of religion.
John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart (1866-1925), was an idealist metaphysician and lecturer in philosophy at Trinity College, Cambridge.
He wrote in the first chapter of this 1906 book, “By metaphysics I mean the systematic study of the ultimate nature of reality, and by dogma I mean any proposition which has a metaphysical significance. This may seem at first sight a paradoxical definition. For dogmas are held, and disputed, by many people to whom metaphysics are absolutely unknown.” (Pg. 1)
He states, “How then shall we define religion? Religion is clearly a state of mind. It is also clear that it is not exclusively the acceptance of certain propositions as true. It seems to me that it may best be described as an emotion resting on a conviction of a harmony between ourselves and the universe at large.” (§3) He continues, “If the word is used in this way, it is clear that no one dogma can be regarded as essential to religion. For example, the cases of Buddhism and of Spinoza would prevent us from regarding belief in a personal God or in personal immortality as essential to it.” (§4)
He elaborates, “If religion is to be defined as resting on a conviction of the harmony of ourselves with the universe, the question arises of how much harmony is necessary. If complete harmony were necessary, no one could be called religious except the few mystics who deny the existence of any evil… We must say, I think, that religion is a matter of degree. The more complete the harmony it asserts, the more completely religious will it be.” (§10) Later, he suggests, “the God of theology is not the only alternative to the God of science, since it is quite possible to have a religion without a God at all.” (§18)
He points out, “assuming that [a] miracle could prove the special interference of the supreme being, so that the religion connected with it could be accepted as his revelation, should we then be safe in accepting it as true? We should not be justified, I submit, unless we had previously proved that the supreme being was good. For we have no reason to suppose that he will tell the truth except that it would not be a good act to deceive us… It is obviously impossible to trust to the revelation to tell us that he is good, since we have no reason to trust the revelation at all unless we know that he is good. This goodness must be proved independently.” (§42) Later, he notes, “a corresponding faith in God will not enable us to determine whether we are immortal, whether our wills are undetermined, or similar questions of dogma. It will only give us light on one particular dogma---that the world is wisely and righteously ordered.” (§55)
[See my review of McTaggart’s Human immortality and Pre-existence; chapters III and IV in this book are reproduced therein.]
He observes, “It is perfectly impossible for any one to explain why a particular drop of rain falls where it does rather than half an inch away. Yet no one supposes that this event is not completely determined. We all conclude that the series of events is so complicated, so numerous, and so unfavorably placed for observation, that our intellects are not able to follow it. It is clear, therefore, that we cannot logically come to a different conclusion with regard to our volitions unless we have already reason to think that the case for the complete determination is less strong than the case for the complete determination of the falling raindrop. And therefore such a conclusion must rest on a proof of free will, and cannot itself be used as such a proof.” (§120)
He comments, “It has sometimes been held that the freedom of the human will was the only way in which the goodness of God could be made compatible with the evil in the universe… But… if God is omnipotent, it is impossible to account for the evil of the universe in this way. Indeed, if God is omnipotent, it is impossible that he can be good at all. This would not be affected by the freedom of the human will, since the gratuitous permission of evil would be as fatal to the divine goodness as the gratuitous creation of evil. On the other hand, if God is not omnipotent, his goodness would not be impossible… For a being of limited power but perfect goodness might well create evil, and not merely allow it, supposing that the creation of the evil was the only way of avoiding a greater evil or attaining a greater good.” (§136)
He explains, “By God I mean a being who is personal, supreme, and good. In calling him personal, I mean to assert that he is self-conscious, that he has awareness of his own existence… The usage in philosophy, however, is sometimes different from the usage in theology… If the usage of theology and philosophy differ, which ought to give way? It seems to me that it should be philosophy. It is … impossible to change the meaning of so common a word as God in popular usage.” (§152, 153)
He argues, “[If] God exists in time… we have a substance which has persisted through an infinite past time. Now if one substance is admitted to exist in time without being caused, why should not other substances do so too? And, if any other substance than God can be uncreated, then the necessity of assuming the existence of a God to create them has disappeared. I cannot see why it should be said… that God did not need a creator, but that a man and a pebble did.” (§158)
He rejects the argument from Design: “It would be impossible to base any valid argument on the assertion that all we observe is worthy to be itself a divine end. For such a conclusion would be absolutely unsupported by the facts. Very much of what we observe in the universe is of such a nature that we cannot conceive that it should have intrinsic worth in the sight of a wise and good being. How could we suppose that such a being should find the existence of one hair more or less on a man’s head to have intrinsic worth?... And then there is much in the universe which is positively bad, and this certainly cannot have any intrinsic worth for him… It seems to me that, whatever worth the argument from design may have to prove the existence of a God who is not omnipotent, it is quite useless as a proof of the existence of an omnipotent God.” (§162)
He returns to the Free Will argument: “It seems to me rather difficult to see such supreme value in free will that it would be worth more than the absence of all the present evil in the universe… it is quite evident that a God who cannot create a universe in which all men have free will, and which is at the same time free from all evil, is not an omnipotent God, since there is one thing which he cannot do. IN the same way, a God who cannot ordain a series of general laws, the uniform working of which would exclude all evil from the universe, is not an omnipotent God.” (§178) He adds, “when believers in God save his goodness by saying that he is not really omnipotent, they are taking the best course open to them… it is less depressing and less revolting than the belief that the destinies of the universe are at the mercy of a being who, with the resources of omnipotence at his disposal, decided to make a universe no better than this.” (§179)
He notes, “We now pass to the theory that God is neither omnipotent nor creative… [But] God is conceived to be so much more perfect in goodness than his fellow persons, that the due attitude of all of them, even the highest, towards him is that of reverence and adoration… His position towards us is that of a schoolmaster toward his scholars. He does not create us. He cannot destroy us. His power over us is limited. And we can resist his power… But, on the other hand, his power is greater than the power of any one of us, and is so great that it can do much, though not all, of what he wishes throughout the universe… Of the three theories of God’s nature which we have to consider, this seems to me by far the most tenable.” (§193, 194)
He suggests, “if the director of the universe is finite, why should we be certain that there is only one? Many of the facts of experience… suggest at least as strongly the idea of several such beings, working in opposition, or possibly… partly in harmony and partly in opposition… There is nothing, perhaps, which should prevent us from giving the name of God to each of several being simultaneously existing… who equal him in wisdom and power, but not in goodness.” (§213)
He summarizes, “That is all that the doctrine of a non-omnipotent God can give us---a person who fights for the good and who may be victorious… Indeed, when the non-omnipotent God is also taken as non-creative, there seems to me… only one reason why we should not believe in his existence---namely, that there is no reason why we SHOULD believe in it.” (§215)
He suggests, “Love will not cease… And the non-existence of God would leave it as possible as it was before that love should be the central fact of all reality. It might still be true that nothing else had value… Whether the friends whom all men may find could compensate for the friend whom some men thought they had found is a question for each man to answer.” (§240)
McTaggart is, these days, often cited simply to suggest that “an atheist CAN believe in immortality.” (He is more a Hegelian, than an “atheist,” however.) But this book still has great value for serious students of the philosophy of religion.
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