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Civil War America
Mutiny at Fort Jackson: The Untold Story of the Fall of New Orleans
New Orleans was the largest city—and one of the richest—in the Confederacy, protected in part by Fort Jackson, which was just sixty-five miles down the Mississippi River. On April 27, 1862, Confederate soldiers at Fort Jackson rose up in mutiny against their commanding officers. New Orleans fell to Union forces soon thereafter. Although the Fort Jackson mutiny marked a critical turning point in the Union's campaign to regain control of this vital Confederate financial and industrial center, it has received surprisingly little attention from historians. Michael Pierson examines newly uncovered archival sources to determine why the soldiers rebelled at such a decisive moment.The mutineers were soldiers primarily recruited from New Orleans's large German and Irish immigrant populations. Pierson shows that the new nation had done nothing to encourage poor white men to feel they had a place of honor in the southern republic. He argues that the mutineers actively sought to help
264 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2009
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
February 16, 2018
It seems like Pierson started this work trying to find an answer he had already agreed upon: the Fort Jackson mutiny was a political act of protest against the Confederacy and for the Union. He did not find the smoking gun, but quite a bit of compelling circumstantial evidence. Pierson's account is good in that he discusses the importance of class in the Civil War, as well as the divisions in New Orleans. His prose is easy and he is persuasive.
There are holes. For one thing, there are errors, such as Camp Street being in the French Quarter, that indicate a lack of direct experience with a city who's natives are quick to notice such mistakes. These mistakes are not enough to sink the book but they do lead to some leaks.
New Orleans' pro-Confederate elements are not well discussed, leaving one wondering who they are and what motivates them outside of slavery. It reminds me of how recent scholarship on the war makes the Union complex heroes (or sometimes just plain heroes), but the Confederates are penny dreadful villains. Indeed, the "oppressiveness" of the New Orleans Confederate government towards white residents was no worse than what the Union did in Maryland and elsewhere. The elitism that Pierson condemns among Confederates was not universal; the South was divided between democrats like Jefferson Davis, who felt every white man deserved a vote, and the faux-aristocrats of the George Fitzhugh variety. Yet, that same elitism was in the North and Fitzhugh after the war was impressed by the ability of Yankee capitalists to control their workers.
The detailing of the political leanings of the populace might be overstated. After all, most of the mutineers did not opt to join the Union army (Pierson contradicts himself here). Their act seems less political and more like the "please God I do not want to die in this stupid war" variety. We cannot say, but most of my Confederate ancestors (my people shot on both sides) were deserters. Family legend indicates several simply lost faith in the cause, but that did not make them hardcore Unionists. Ideology is important, but we should never forget that family, money, pleasure, and preserving your life will always count for more in explaining why people do what they do. In general, wars typically go from the excited to the disheartened phase. Even the Fort Jackson mutineers were generally getting good marks for discipline in 1861. New Orleans though lost heart a lot faster than most.
The book offered a chance to discuss the mixed quality of New Orleans units. Those that went to fight elsewhere had reputations second to none: Washington Artillery, 6th Louisiana, Tiger Battalion, 13th Louisiana, etc. The units that defended New Orleans fled. One angle not discussed was that they were militia. Such units have a spotty combat record, and tended only to do well under good leaders who understood their limitations, men such as Prescott, Morgan, Harrison, and Jackson. Mansfield Lovell (a Washington DC native from a Massachusetts family) was certainly none of the above.
Oddly enough, the best chapter was the one about Butler and how he controlled the city. Pierson ignores Butler's less savory actions such as buying cotton from Confederates and some of his financial schemes. However, he shows that Butler was a formidable politician who was perfectly suited to his job. The real question though is why did the Unionist sentiment collapse after the soldiers left? Were they only strong with bayonets and rigged elections? One is reminded of anytime people declare victory. The people you have defeated are not dead, but waiting to exploit your weaknesses while they change their tactics. The New Orleans mobs of Reconstruction were far more violent than anything John T. Monroe and the Nativists had ever conjured up. In the end, Butler's regime worked, but it was a brief success.
So why 4 stars? Because it was a pleasant read that got me thinking. Pierson brings in issues of class, immigration, and the importance of American democracy in a world dominated by aristocrats (real European ones not Southerners pretending to be aristocrats). All of the above is lacking in current scholarship that is often limited to race, race, race, race, and some more race. Not that race was not important, but the men of the time had other things on their mind in addition to slavery. Our obsession with race is a sign of our times, just as the previous generation's obsession with war and economics, for they were children of the Great Depression and the world wars. Pierson book straddles a line between the current, sometimes monotone scholarship, and a world where the era can be seen in more than one or two ways.
PS: Pierson is very much of the South vs. South school, with a heavy dose of Confederate incompetence thrown in to explain defeat. The former is good stuff, but the later ignores the disparity in numbers, even if the slaves were freed, and more importantly in material. In musket combat, rarely has an army as out-numbered as the Confederates, done quite so well.
There are holes. For one thing, there are errors, such as Camp Street being in the French Quarter, that indicate a lack of direct experience with a city who's natives are quick to notice such mistakes. These mistakes are not enough to sink the book but they do lead to some leaks.
New Orleans' pro-Confederate elements are not well discussed, leaving one wondering who they are and what motivates them outside of slavery. It reminds me of how recent scholarship on the war makes the Union complex heroes (or sometimes just plain heroes), but the Confederates are penny dreadful villains. Indeed, the "oppressiveness" of the New Orleans Confederate government towards white residents was no worse than what the Union did in Maryland and elsewhere. The elitism that Pierson condemns among Confederates was not universal; the South was divided between democrats like Jefferson Davis, who felt every white man deserved a vote, and the faux-aristocrats of the George Fitzhugh variety. Yet, that same elitism was in the North and Fitzhugh after the war was impressed by the ability of Yankee capitalists to control their workers.
The detailing of the political leanings of the populace might be overstated. After all, most of the mutineers did not opt to join the Union army (Pierson contradicts himself here). Their act seems less political and more like the "please God I do not want to die in this stupid war" variety. We cannot say, but most of my Confederate ancestors (my people shot on both sides) were deserters. Family legend indicates several simply lost faith in the cause, but that did not make them hardcore Unionists. Ideology is important, but we should never forget that family, money, pleasure, and preserving your life will always count for more in explaining why people do what they do. In general, wars typically go from the excited to the disheartened phase. Even the Fort Jackson mutineers were generally getting good marks for discipline in 1861. New Orleans though lost heart a lot faster than most.
The book offered a chance to discuss the mixed quality of New Orleans units. Those that went to fight elsewhere had reputations second to none: Washington Artillery, 6th Louisiana, Tiger Battalion, 13th Louisiana, etc. The units that defended New Orleans fled. One angle not discussed was that they were militia. Such units have a spotty combat record, and tended only to do well under good leaders who understood their limitations, men such as Prescott, Morgan, Harrison, and Jackson. Mansfield Lovell (a Washington DC native from a Massachusetts family) was certainly none of the above.
Oddly enough, the best chapter was the one about Butler and how he controlled the city. Pierson ignores Butler's less savory actions such as buying cotton from Confederates and some of his financial schemes. However, he shows that Butler was a formidable politician who was perfectly suited to his job. The real question though is why did the Unionist sentiment collapse after the soldiers left? Were they only strong with bayonets and rigged elections? One is reminded of anytime people declare victory. The people you have defeated are not dead, but waiting to exploit your weaknesses while they change their tactics. The New Orleans mobs of Reconstruction were far more violent than anything John T. Monroe and the Nativists had ever conjured up. In the end, Butler's regime worked, but it was a brief success.
So why 4 stars? Because it was a pleasant read that got me thinking. Pierson brings in issues of class, immigration, and the importance of American democracy in a world dominated by aristocrats (real European ones not Southerners pretending to be aristocrats). All of the above is lacking in current scholarship that is often limited to race, race, race, race, and some more race. Not that race was not important, but the men of the time had other things on their mind in addition to slavery. Our obsession with race is a sign of our times, just as the previous generation's obsession with war and economics, for they were children of the Great Depression and the world wars. Pierson book straddles a line between the current, sometimes monotone scholarship, and a world where the era can be seen in more than one or two ways.
PS: Pierson is very much of the South vs. South school, with a heavy dose of Confederate incompetence thrown in to explain defeat. The former is good stuff, but the later ignores the disparity in numbers, even if the slaves were freed, and more importantly in material. In musket combat, rarely has an army as out-numbered as the Confederates, done quite so well.
July 26, 2016
The lack of actual evidence from the mutineers at Fort Jackson forces this author to guess and speculate based on other contemporary evidence about other phenomena besides the mutiny, such as life in New Orleans and other instances in which confederate troops threw in the towel. It appears there was a reason no other writer addressed the topic of the mutiny: because there isn’t enough evidence to put together a convincing case to back a thesis one way or the other -- and virtually nothing to indicate the mutineers’ motives or sympathies.
Ultimately, the book devolves into a mass of maybes and guesses and conclusions that are poorly supported with evidence. For example, the author seemed particularly intent on showing that the residents of New Orleans were not uniformly or enthusiastically behind the confederate cause, but the stats cited (7.5% of Union recruits in New Orleans were southern born) did not seem to support the case and, in fact, seemed to suggest strong support for the Confederate cause. Further, the author drew the conclusion that there must have been sympathy for the Union and its philosophy when the facts cited equally supported a different conclusion: that the actions cited by the author showed a populace driven by hunger and poverty, not politics.
The book's one distinguishing feature was the defense of Benjamin Butler as a ruler over captured New Orleans. Butler is nearly uniformly presented as an overly harsh disciplinarian. Pierson persuasively argues that Butler's dispensation of patronage, his focus on the under classes, and his use of political theater (however brutal) was effective in firming the Union hold on New Orleans with far-reaching consequences on the outcome of the war.
Ultimately, the book devolves into a mass of maybes and guesses and conclusions that are poorly supported with evidence. For example, the author seemed particularly intent on showing that the residents of New Orleans were not uniformly or enthusiastically behind the confederate cause, but the stats cited (7.5% of Union recruits in New Orleans were southern born) did not seem to support the case and, in fact, seemed to suggest strong support for the Confederate cause. Further, the author drew the conclusion that there must have been sympathy for the Union and its philosophy when the facts cited equally supported a different conclusion: that the actions cited by the author showed a populace driven by hunger and poverty, not politics.
The book's one distinguishing feature was the defense of Benjamin Butler as a ruler over captured New Orleans. Butler is nearly uniformly presented as an overly harsh disciplinarian. Pierson persuasively argues that Butler's dispensation of patronage, his focus on the under classes, and his use of political theater (however brutal) was effective in firming the Union hold on New Orleans with far-reaching consequences on the outcome of the war.
August 13, 2015
In my opinion the author had a poor understanding of the battle or the times and the text is filled with inaccuracies. The obvious is restated page after page for him to make some point that few would dispute. Yes, the troops left to defend New Orleans were not first line troops those had long ago departed for the fronts in Tennessee or Virginia. New Orleans was the least Southern city in the confederacy, it was filled with recent foreign immigrants and northerners, it was also very dependent on trade which dried up with the onset of the blockade. We can agree not all people in the region supported the Confederacy and when times got tough many more loss faith in the Southern cause.
But the mutiny was strategically unimportant as once the forts were past there was no defense of the city. Contrary to his assertions the CSS Louisiana was not a threat to the northern fleet and it was never going to become one, it was at best a poorly positioned gun platform. There were no facilities at Fort Jackson to get it seaworthy and carpenters could not fix the problems it had.
Inaccuracies abound, there was no road north of Fort Livingston to surrender on as Fort Livingston was and is on an Island, no road has ever gone there; Camp Street has never been in the French Quarter, his dates and service of the few soldiers mentioned are often in conflict with the "Records of Louisiana Soldiers and Commands" which I believe are accurate.
Uninteresting, tedious and uninformative. If there was any value it was in the footnotes which provide references to materials that may be of some interest in their own right.
But the mutiny was strategically unimportant as once the forts were past there was no defense of the city. Contrary to his assertions the CSS Louisiana was not a threat to the northern fleet and it was never going to become one, it was at best a poorly positioned gun platform. There were no facilities at Fort Jackson to get it seaworthy and carpenters could not fix the problems it had.
Inaccuracies abound, there was no road north of Fort Livingston to surrender on as Fort Livingston was and is on an Island, no road has ever gone there; Camp Street has never been in the French Quarter, his dates and service of the few soldiers mentioned are often in conflict with the "Records of Louisiana Soldiers and Commands" which I believe are accurate.
Uninteresting, tedious and uninformative. If there was any value it was in the footnotes which provide references to materials that may be of some interest in their own right.
February 23, 2013
I think Pierson provides a detailed account of a war that is still a point of division in some parts of the United States. His focus on a major Southern city and its Unionist ties is fascinating and provides a different perspective of regular Southerners during the Civil War. Although repetitive far too often the above points rescue Mutiny at Fort Jackson, but I do have one issue with the book: it would have made a great paper instead of a book.
Pierson repeats himself so often because he doesn't have enough to talk about, the evidence he provides proves his point perfectly because he chose ideal pieces, but because of this he feels the need to repeat them over and over again to the point that it becomes irritating to continue reading. Each chapter overlaps with those previous and subsequent which makes parts of this a bit tedious at times.
All of that said though, I think this is a great book about the American Civil War and how one event can change everything.
Pierson repeats himself so often because he doesn't have enough to talk about, the evidence he provides proves his point perfectly because he chose ideal pieces, but because of this he feels the need to repeat them over and over again to the point that it becomes irritating to continue reading. Each chapter overlaps with those previous and subsequent which makes parts of this a bit tedious at times.
All of that said though, I think this is a great book about the American Civil War and how one event can change everything.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews