LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War

by George C. Herring

Decades later, the Vietnam War remains a divisive memory for American society. Partisans on all sides still debate why the war was fought, how it could have been better fought, and whether it could have been won at all.In this major study, a noted expert on the war brings a needed objectivity to these debates by examining dispassionately how and why President Lyndon Johnson and his administration conducted the war as they did. Drawing on a wealth of newly released documents from the LBJ Library, including the Tom Johnson notes from the influential Tuesday Lunch Group, George Herring discusses the concept of limited war and how it affected President Johnson's decision making, Johnson's relations with his military commanders, the administration's pacification program of 1965-1967, the management of public opinion, and the "fighting while negotiating" strategy pursued after the Tet Offensive in 1968.The author's in-depth analysis exposes numerous flaws in Johnson's management of the war. In Herring's view, the Johnson administration lacked any overall strategy for conducting the war. No change in approach was ever discussed, despite popular and even administration dissatisfaction with the progress of the war, and no oversight committee coordinated the activities of the military services and various governmental agencies, which were left to follow their own, often conflicting, agendas.

244 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1994

About the author

A specialist in the history of American foreign relations, George C. Herring was Alumni Professor of History Emeritus at the University of Kentucky. Herring received a bachelor's degree from Roanoke College and after service in the U.S. Navy he earned both master's (1962) and doctorate (1965) degrees in History from the University of Virginia. After teaching for four years at Ohio University, Herring joined the faculty of the University of Kentucky in 1969, where he taught until his retirement in 2005.

Reviews

[Betsy · Rating 4 out of 5]

LBJ wanted to be known for his Great Society programs, instead he will always be remembered for his part in the Vietnam War. This book discusses why that is so.

For someone who cast her first vote for President during that war, the names and events are all too familiar. I can't pretend that I understood all that was going on in those two warring countries so far away, but I certainly understood that it was not a war like WWII, but one more similar to Korea. At night you'd see the scenes on television, you'd hear the propganda, and the predictions of victory. It was a heady time of hawks and doves. Indeed, it was hard to believe we could get ourselves into another such war--one we couldn't win.

This book has an excellent epilogue which summarizes what went wrong for LBJ, and how he contributed to the mistakes. He was a man known for his mastery of congress and all of its intricacies, but he knew little of how to fight a 'limited' war in Asia. That very type type of war seemed necessary since the threat of nuclear holocaust haunted our actions when it seemed possible that China or Russia might become involved as in Korea. But no one knew how to fight such a war or how far the envelope could be pushed.

Another problem was Johnson's micromanaging between the military who knew how to fight Germany/Japan, but not a war in Vietnam, and the civilians who came up with plan after plan to 'win' the war. Men like McNamara, Rusk, and Westmoreland plus countlesx others all took their best shot at victory to no avail. The quagmire became deeper and deeper until LBJ just gave up.

I enjoyed this book. It explained some things that I didn't understand in real time. It's just unfortunate that history can't have a Photoshop capability for its mistakes. All those young men on the Vietnam Wall would appreciate that.

[Cori-Rose]

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[CR]

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