Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory

by John Earman

There is currently no viable alternative to the Bayesian analysis of scientific inference, yet the available versions of Bayesianism fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirmation of scientific hypotheses. Bayes or Bust? provides the first balanced treatment of the complex set of issues involved in this nagging conundrum in the philosophy of science. Both Bayesians and anti-Bayesians will find a wealth of new insights on topics ranging from Bayes's original paper to contemporary formal learning theory.

In a paper published posthumously in 1763, the Reverend Thomas Bayes made a seminal contribution to the understanding of "analogical or inductive reasoning." Building on his insights, modem Bayesians have developed an account of scientific inference that has attracted numerous champions as well as numerous detractors. Earman argues that Bayesianism provides the best hope for a comprehensive and unified account of scientific inference, yet the presently available versions of Bayesianisin fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirming of scientific theories and hypotheses. By focusing on the need for a resolution to this impasse, Earman sharpens the issues on which a resolution turns. John Earman is Professor of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh.

Genres: Philosophy, Science

288 pages, Hardcover

First published May 28, 1992

Reviews

[kaelan · Rating 3 out of 5]

As someone with at least some familiarity with mathematical logic, I understood about 10% of this book. I realize that John Earman didn't write it for laypeople. But his argumentation is frustratingly elliptical; and from what I've gathered from other reviews, more qualified readers than me haven't fared much better.

Which raises the critical question: who was Mr. Earman writing for in the first place?

[John Lepp · Rating 4 out of 5]

Wow. Challenging.

Yes, a lot of the book is beyond my comprehension and I am familiar with computational logic and probability theory. That said, it is a book that rewards your struggle. Stay in the fight.

Prerequisites for this book:
"The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" TS Kuhn
You got to know some Bayesian statistics.

I think Earman is dead wrong on "objectivity" and inter-subjective agreement within the Scientific community, but read the book first before we start debating that stuff.

[Alecsphys · Rating 5 out of 5]

It's definitely a difficult read. At the intersection of probability, logic, philosophy of science. There is no 100% winning side, but you will discover how complex the problem of hypothetical deductivism is. And even more the convergence of opinions. Before reading the book I described myself as a Bayesian, and still after this reading I confirm the same but with greater awareness of some existing limits and problems.
To be read again after a while.

[Nathan Schwartz · Rating 1 out of 5]

I thought that with a graduate degree in mathematics, fifteen years experience working in applied probability, a reasonable undergraduate grounding in philosophy, and a strong lay interest in the philosophy of mathematics I would be able to follow this textbook without difficulty. Boy was I wrong. It’s difficult for me to imagine the audience that this book would be useful for. My guess is that anyone who knows enough about this subject to follow all the sloppy notation, random name-dropping, and inside jokes about the history of probability theory would not learn anything from the contents.