Leadership And Command In The American Civil War

by Steven E. Woodworth

The essays in this volume examine major Civil War generals in the context of their leadership at a specific battle or campaign. Topics include Joseph E. Johnston in 1861-62, James Longstreet and Chattanooga, Edwin Sumner and Antietam, George E. Pickett after Gettysburg, and Pierre Beauregard and the Bermuda Hundred campaign.

256 pages, Hardcover

First published August 21, 1996

About the author

Currently Professor of History at Texas Christian University, Steven E. Woodworth has written several books about the Western Theater of the American Civil War.

Reviews

[Rick Davis · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting study highlighting how character flaws negatively impact operations.

[Steven Peterson · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a set of uneven essays, in a volume edited by well known Civil War historian Steven Woodworth. Some of the essays are more provocative than others, although--overall--the book does make a modest contribution on Civil War scholarship. Chapters (and authors) line up like this:

1. Richard McMurry, Ole Joe [Johnston:] in Virginia
2. Edward Franks, The Detachment of Longstreet [to Knoxville:] Considered
3. Marion Armstrong, A Failure of Command [Sumner at Antietam:]
4. Lesley Gordon, The Seeds of Disaster [Pickett after Gettysburg:]"
5. Steven Woodworth, On Smaller Fields [Beauregard at Bermuda Hundred:]"

A few reflections on three of the chapters. . . .

The first chapter notes how the original interactions between two prickly characters in 1861 and 1862--General Joseph Johnston and President Jefferson Davis--presaged continuing difficulties in their working relationship when Johnston went west. The seeds of their dysfunctional relationship are apparent early on, according to McMurry. This thesis surely makers sense--but it is scarcely original, as other have commented, too, on that issue.

The second chapter is intriguing. Many have looked at Braxton Bragg's dispatching of Longstreet's corps to Knoxville as another example of his crankiness and lack of skills commanding a large army. Franks argues, to the contrary, that we ought to consider this on the merits. He suggests that it was a sound military move. Indeed, a thought-provoking chapter. Not sure I agree, but his thesis got me thinking about the matter, and that is a plus for any author--to get their readers thinking and reflecting.

George Pickett after Gettysburg? He was deeply involved in other campaigns, culminating in his poor leadership at Five Forks (including leaving his troops in their entrenchments for a shad bake, without telling anyone where he was going), but some who read about the Civil War may not be so cognizant of his other actions. In autumn, 1863, Pickett was given the position as head of the Department of North Carolina. He was embittered after the wreckage of his division at Gettysburg occurred. His offensive to retake New Bern came to nothing. After some odd behavior, he was relieved of that command and given the reduced charge of protecting Petersburg. There, his position, held by only a small number of troops, was threatened by gathering Union forces. While some clever stratagems prevented the capture of Petersburg, he fell apart psychologically. He returned as commander of his depleted division and led it with somewhat mixed results until the debacle at Five Forks. A good examination of Pickett's post-Gettysburg career.

So, the book does give some sense of leadership and command. Some chapters are very good; others are okay but don't necessarily reveal anything new.