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The Tragedy of the Vietnam War: A South Vietnamese Officer's Analysis
What Americans call the Vietnam War actually began in December 1946 with a struggle between the communists and the French for possession of the country--but Vietnam's strategic position in southeast Asia inevitably led to the involvement of other countries. Written by an officer in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, this poignant memoir seeks to clarify the nuances of South Vietnam's defeat. From the age of 12, Van Nguyen Duong watched as the conflict affected his home, family, village and friends. He discusses not only the day-to-day hardships of wartime but his postwar forced relocation and eventual imprisonment. A special focus is on the anguish caused by the illusive reality of Vietnamese independence. The political forces at work north and south, the hardships suffered by RVNAF soldiers after the 1975 U.S. withdrawal, and the effects of reunification on the Vietnamese people are discussed.
280 pages, Paperback
First published August 30, 2008
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
June 25, 2025
There has been a lot written about the Vietnam war, but the voices of those who served in the South Vietnamese military have been largely absent. It was with that thought in mind that I had really high hopes for this book, and in some ways, I think it set me up to judge it not by what it IS but what I was hoping it would be.
By judging it solely on what it is, this book is definitely a 4 star - a good book that is informative. It can be frustrating at times because it needed a better editor in sections, but the fact that he uses more recent research, that he includes elements of the history that are often overlooked, and the way he walks you from point A to point B to develop his arguments and his conclusions is very well done.
The real strength of the book is in his story, which comes up in the early opening chapters, as well as during the later battle of An Loc. He makes some excellent and insightful points about the role of the French education system and the way it was utilized to oppress the Vietnamese from advancing, as well as in driving many to the communist side in two waves. Few other books mention the Saigon student demonstrations and how many of those who the french brutally cracked down on ended up as political ministers for the communist side. He also details how after the war, these educated ministers were then brutally oppressed by the communists as part of their reforms.
His writings about the 1940s and 50s village and city life in the South is really something to read, especially when compared to Luan and Kien Do's writings of growing up in North Vietnam during the same time frame, before the two came south. In this way you get a fuller image of life in two of the main centers of Vietnam, with only the Central Highlands missing.
The book does a great job of walking the reader through the history of US involvement in Vietnam, with each successive president having a different policy, a different priority, and different goals, which he argues is the main reason for failure. He discusses Roosevelt's idea of Neutrality in Indochina which led to the Pearl Harbor attack. He discusses the Japanese massacre of the Vichy, and how Roosevelt's anti-french colonialism policies were even discussed at Yalta - something few books mention.
Another excellent aspect is his use of recent research to discuss the role of China and it's generals in the battle of Dien Bien Phu and other early Viet Minh successes. He delves into the general dysfunction of the French military and govt and the animosity between the French and US and how that shaped foreign Policy.
Perhaps the most insightful aspect has been regarding what the South Vietnamese government wanted vs what the American's bullied and forced upon them, starting with Kennedy. In his writing he shows that Diem and others were nationalists first, and foremost, and wanted the tools and support to win by themselves. But America, and especially Kennedy saw the area as a test for his new concepts, and imposed its will and military onto the country - the exact opposite of what was wanted or needed.
I've yet to find anyone who was a Diem apologist or fan, but everyone seems to agree that the coup was the worst thing that could have happened, and this author goes into some detail on just how destabilizing and disgustingly dirty handed the whole situation was. His timelines, and look into the roles of the CIA, State, and Kennedy is very much worth reading.
The thing is, this is a book that is focused on American policy and politics and the main actors. While he'll sometimes add in some insight from the Vietnamese perspective, which is what the main crux of the book should be, it's sorely lacking throughout much of the book. Instead, you get a damning insight, page after page, of how American ego's, whether Kennedy or Harriman or Lodge, McNamara or Westmoreland or Sullivan affected the Vietnamese people and the war. You get an excellent account of the "Lunch Bunch" and the "carrot and stick" approach of Rolling Thunder, as well as how Kissinger was completely incompetent in all of his roles. His coverage of Tet is decent, but drops the ball by not recognizing how much it meant to the South Vietnamese, and that there was no general uprising. He doesn't mention the feeling of pride, community, and success that flourished throughout the people, both rural and city, and how that was crucial for setting the stage for Vietnamization.
Overall though, he does an excellent job tying all of the policies to subsequent failures and outcomes, and while not as transformative of a work as Luan's, it's a good book worth reading.
By judging it solely on what it is, this book is definitely a 4 star - a good book that is informative. It can be frustrating at times because it needed a better editor in sections, but the fact that he uses more recent research, that he includes elements of the history that are often overlooked, and the way he walks you from point A to point B to develop his arguments and his conclusions is very well done.
The real strength of the book is in his story, which comes up in the early opening chapters, as well as during the later battle of An Loc. He makes some excellent and insightful points about the role of the French education system and the way it was utilized to oppress the Vietnamese from advancing, as well as in driving many to the communist side in two waves. Few other books mention the Saigon student demonstrations and how many of those who the french brutally cracked down on ended up as political ministers for the communist side. He also details how after the war, these educated ministers were then brutally oppressed by the communists as part of their reforms.
His writings about the 1940s and 50s village and city life in the South is really something to read, especially when compared to Luan and Kien Do's writings of growing up in North Vietnam during the same time frame, before the two came south. In this way you get a fuller image of life in two of the main centers of Vietnam, with only the Central Highlands missing.
The book does a great job of walking the reader through the history of US involvement in Vietnam, with each successive president having a different policy, a different priority, and different goals, which he argues is the main reason for failure. He discusses Roosevelt's idea of Neutrality in Indochina which led to the Pearl Harbor attack. He discusses the Japanese massacre of the Vichy, and how Roosevelt's anti-french colonialism policies were even discussed at Yalta - something few books mention.
Another excellent aspect is his use of recent research to discuss the role of China and it's generals in the battle of Dien Bien Phu and other early Viet Minh successes. He delves into the general dysfunction of the French military and govt and the animosity between the French and US and how that shaped foreign Policy.
Perhaps the most insightful aspect has been regarding what the South Vietnamese government wanted vs what the American's bullied and forced upon them, starting with Kennedy. In his writing he shows that Diem and others were nationalists first, and foremost, and wanted the tools and support to win by themselves. But America, and especially Kennedy saw the area as a test for his new concepts, and imposed its will and military onto the country - the exact opposite of what was wanted or needed.
I've yet to find anyone who was a Diem apologist or fan, but everyone seems to agree that the coup was the worst thing that could have happened, and this author goes into some detail on just how destabilizing and disgustingly dirty handed the whole situation was. His timelines, and look into the roles of the CIA, State, and Kennedy is very much worth reading.
The thing is, this is a book that is focused on American policy and politics and the main actors. While he'll sometimes add in some insight from the Vietnamese perspective, which is what the main crux of the book should be, it's sorely lacking throughout much of the book. Instead, you get a damning insight, page after page, of how American ego's, whether Kennedy or Harriman or Lodge, McNamara or Westmoreland or Sullivan affected the Vietnamese people and the war. You get an excellent account of the "Lunch Bunch" and the "carrot and stick" approach of Rolling Thunder, as well as how Kissinger was completely incompetent in all of his roles. His coverage of Tet is decent, but drops the ball by not recognizing how much it meant to the South Vietnamese, and that there was no general uprising. He doesn't mention the feeling of pride, community, and success that flourished throughout the people, both rural and city, and how that was crucial for setting the stage for Vietnamization.
Overall though, he does an excellent job tying all of the policies to subsequent failures and outcomes, and while not as transformative of a work as Luan's, it's a good book worth reading.
October 23, 2017
Excellent information and analysis. Yankees played war game in this region during the cold war but after Nixon's Watergate and Kissinger's jew-deals with Mao Zedong, USA started to let this region (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma) falling to the communists Soviet and China ... then the disaster failure of Jimmy Carter and USA going down the hill until God bless USA with Donald Reagan and his competent team to make the communist countries collapsed except China, North Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and countries depended on China currently.
February 16, 2017
Not a bad summary of the events of the wars in Vietnam. Definitely worth reading for those interested in the view from the ARVN perspective. The author was an officer (probably one of the "young Turks") in intelligence who had access to many "behind the scenes" political and military activities that were taking place. He strongly defends the fighting ability of the ARVN with good descriptions of firefights in which they were involved. He is highly critical of the hubris of American politicians in directing the war.
The author assumes the reader has a solid knowledge of the geography, provinces, and towns in Vietnam. It helps to use Google Maps to identify where events he describes are occurring.
His conclusion is:
"...it would have been too ambiguous if we had said that the United States lost the war. It is better for me to say that, for some reason, the American leaders of the time did not want militarily to defeat the communists of North Vietnam and win the war. A military victory would create more problems because the United States would then have to defend Vietnam and other prosperous countries in Southeast Asia. Although South Vietnam was lost to the Vietnamese communists, the United States achieved it long-term goal of deterring Chinese aggression toward other countries in the region." (221)
"We must affirm that 'those who really lost the war were the South Vietnamese people.' We suffered deeply from the effects of the loss because we were betrayed by our ally. That was the real fact of history." (227)
In my opinion, 'those who really lost the most in the war in Vietnam' were the all the people involved: the South Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese during the intense bombings (equivalent of three nuclear bombs), and the American military casualties, including veterans and their families.
The only winners were the "military-industrial-complex" (the war cost taxpayers bewteen $109-236 billion) and, who the author identifies as "the Red-Capitalists" - some of whom are communist party leaders, who are getting rich in the booming economy in Vietnam today. Ho Chi Minh City is the second most dynamic city in the world in 2016 according to international business studies. Hanoi is No. 8. http://www.jll.com/cities-research/ci...
As the saying says: War is a racket.
The author assumes the reader has a solid knowledge of the geography, provinces, and towns in Vietnam. It helps to use Google Maps to identify where events he describes are occurring.
His conclusion is:
"...it would have been too ambiguous if we had said that the United States lost the war. It is better for me to say that, for some reason, the American leaders of the time did not want militarily to defeat the communists of North Vietnam and win the war. A military victory would create more problems because the United States would then have to defend Vietnam and other prosperous countries in Southeast Asia. Although South Vietnam was lost to the Vietnamese communists, the United States achieved it long-term goal of deterring Chinese aggression toward other countries in the region." (221)
"We must affirm that 'those who really lost the war were the South Vietnamese people.' We suffered deeply from the effects of the loss because we were betrayed by our ally. That was the real fact of history." (227)
In my opinion, 'those who really lost the most in the war in Vietnam' were the all the people involved: the South Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese during the intense bombings (equivalent of three nuclear bombs), and the American military casualties, including veterans and their families.
The only winners were the "military-industrial-complex" (the war cost taxpayers bewteen $109-236 billion) and, who the author identifies as "the Red-Capitalists" - some of whom are communist party leaders, who are getting rich in the booming economy in Vietnam today. Ho Chi Minh City is the second most dynamic city in the world in 2016 according to international business studies. Hanoi is No. 8. http://www.jll.com/cities-research/ci...
As the saying says: War is a racket.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews