This selection of Professor Mellor's work gathers together sixteen major papers on related topics written over the past fifteen years. Together they form a complete modern metaphysics. The book starts with the mind: the subjectivity of the self, consciousness, how like computers we are, and how psychology relates to physics. It then tackles dispositions, natural kinds, physical necessity, objective chances, laws of nature, and the relation of properties to predicates. From this it moves on to causation: what it relates, how it works, how it accomodates chance and defines one definition of time. Finally, the author shows how chance should affect our expectations and decisions, and how it solves the notorious problem of induction.
David Hugh Mellor, also known as Hugh Mellor and usually cited as D. H. Mellor, is a British philosopher. He is a former Professor of Philosophy and Pro-Vice-Chancellor, now Professor Emeritus, of Cambridge University. Mellor was born in London. After studying chemical engineering at university, he took up philosophy.
His primary work is metaphysics, although his philosophical interests include philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, probability, time and causation, laws of nature and properties, and decision theory. Mellor was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge and Fellow of Darwin College from 1971 to 2005. As a professor, he was the subject of extensive media coverage as the main opponent of the conferment of an honorary degree in philosophy to the French philosopher Jacques Derrida.
He was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1992 to 1993, a member of the Humanist Philosophers' Group of the British Humanist Association and Honorary Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities. He was a Fellow of the British Academy between 1983 and 2008. In retirement, Mellor now holds the title of Emeritus Professor.
‘The warrant of induction’ Nice, easy to read (possibly because it was origianlly a lecture?), and does provide quite a decent justification for induction. Externalist one, which I automatically think of as... well, somewhat unconvincing given G. E. Moore's justification of the world, but better than a purely regressive argument for induction by induction.