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Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954
Drawing on a number of recently declassified documents, Lee (history, U. of British Columbia) explores the foreign policy objectives of the US, Great Britain, and Canada and examines the role that economic and military aid played in their attempts to establish pro-Western, anti-Communist governments on the periphery of Communist East Asia. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.
295 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1995
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December 13, 2021
In his book, Steven Hugh Lee examines the two best-known Cold War battlegrounds in Asia – Korea and Vietnam.
In its first years, the Cold War between Capitalist America and Communist Russia raged on the European front, where the two superpowers championed different versions of post-war global order. With the Truman Doctrine and the conflicts in Greece and Turkey, the first "shots" of the Soviet-American confrontation were fired. Then Secretary of State George Marshall launched his renowned Marshall Plan, whose unofficial purpose was preventing a Soviet overtake, whether military or ideological, of Western Europe. Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy all lay in ashes in the aftermath of the War to Start All Wars Again, and the Communist parties of the latter two were growing in strength, so American policy-makers had enough matters to deal with in Europe and would not have turned the bulk of its attention to Asia soon if not for the emergence of the Chinese threat.
Mao Zedong's triumph in 1949 was a heavy blow for the American government, which had been generously supporting the nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek. The fact that the Asian giant went red despite the efforts of the mighty transcontinental superpower, which only two years earlier had pledged to combat evil Communism on all fronts and protect democracy and freedom in the countries of the world, undermined America's standing both at home and abroad. To distract the American public from the debacle in China, the State Department embarked on a search for another noble Cold War cause, and as American policy-makers scanned the map of the world, their eyes fell on a region that had been generally remote from American geostrategic concerns so far – Southeast Asia. Of course, it was not entirely unknown in Washington. Since 1945, American officials had been pestered by their British and French counterparts to extend material support to France's war effort against the nationalist forces in its former colony Indochina. After Truman succeeded the genuinely-or-not-genuinely anti-colonial Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the White House, the Franco-British wish was granted, albeit for no other reason than the Truman administration's incorporation of France into its grand plan for a recovery of free Europe, which centered on the fastest re-building of European economy that could be achieved.
In 1949, however, Southeast Asia acquired a significance in its own right. Its dangerous proximity to Red China justified the American policy-makers worries that it might become the next major Cold War battleground, so they began pumping resources into its countries with the same enthusiasm and generosity they displayed toward Western Europe. China had been lost, yes, but America would not lose another state to Communism.
Indochina was on top of the new Southeast Asian agenda, for, increasing amounts of American assistance notwithstanding, the French forces' alleged short, "cleaning-up" operation was steadily turning into a long, frustrating, and not particularly successful struggle against invisible guerrillas, who preferred to bide their time in the jungle rather than fight a conventional war. A careful analysis of Ho Chi Minh's behavior toward the West and his motivations would have revealed that the Viet Minh's all-overshadowing goal was independence for Vietnam, which was to be achieved by any means available, and that the French imperialists, universally hated by the Vietnamese population, simply could not win a war against a movement that was predominantly loved and supported by the locals. Instead, American policy-makers assumed there was no way for the French army, superior in technology and resources thanks to overly generous aid from America, to be losing a war against a bunch of Third World guerrillas unless those guerrillas were backed by the Communist enemy in the face of Red China, and probably also the Soviet Union. Therefore, long-suffering Vietnam's struggle for independence from almost century-long cruel colonial rule was perceived to be yet another Cold War battleground, similar to Greece, where the forces of good (Capitalism) and evil (Communism) were destined to clash once again, and on went the Truman administration to increase its material aid to the French further, sending 11,000 tons of equipment in 1950 only, and on went America down the road toward the Vietnamese quagmire.
Then, out of the blue, the war in Korea broke out in June 1950, solidifying the worst fears of American policy-makers about the aggressive expansion of Communism into their new protégé region – Southeast Asia. Kim Il-sung was indeed aided by Red China, or rather, since Mao Zedong could not stand him because of his arrogance and stupidity, Stalin had persuaded Mao, who owed him a considerable debt for the success of his revolution, to help the North Koreans financially and militarily.
The Korean War was the first all-out Southeast Asian Cold War conflict, the true first shot of the Cold, and hot, war between American Capitalism and Soviet Communism in the region. What's worse, it became a model according to which the American military and political leaders would build their strategies for Vietnam a decade afterwards, despite the fact that the two conflicts bore few similarities to each other. For instance, unlike the war in Vietnam, the Korean War was a large-scale war fought by conventional armed forces on both sides – the North Koreans had not established a guerrilla movement in South Korea, for the South Koreans were predominantly hostile to the Communists. Furthermore, the relationship between the people of South Korea and their foreign allies was based on a healthy amount of trust. America fought in the war under the aegis of the United Nations, so the South Koreans did not doubt the American motives. They genuinely believed the war was fought and sacrifices were made to allow them to retain their independence. In Vietnam, on the other hand, America came as the ally of the despised French colonialists – basically, one imperialist power succeeding another – so there were grave, and wide-spread doubts, among the South Vietnamese about the authenticity of America's benign intentions. Unlike the South Koreans, they were not so eager to shun the Communists, who were their own compatriots who only a few years ago had fought alongside them to win Vietnam's independence, and cooperate with the foreign superpower.
The aforementioned distinctions were, again, not analyzed and interpreted well by American policy-makers in subsequent administrations, so the Korean War was treated as a sort of proof that the United States could, through an all-out intervention, remedy similar conflicts all over Southeast Asia. It is astonishing how readily Cold War assumptions made during Truman's time were embraced by his successors.
As we know, those flawed assumptions did not age well in the 1960s.
OUTPOSTS OF EMPIRE was so much fun to read. Steven Hugh Lee has written a compelling, well-researched study on a most interesting subject in modern American history. I have developed a special interest in the Cold War in general, but studying the origins of the Cold War in Southeast Asia is fascinating on a whole new level. The European theater was a familiar ground because of the Second World War. Southeast Asia was something far-away, murky, unknown. Reading about American policy-makers's stumbling through it, blundering along the way and nevertheless not giving up on their premature assumptions, for they were the only thing they could hold on to, is truly wonderful, especially when the decision-making is as masterfully chronicled as in this book.
In its first years, the Cold War between Capitalist America and Communist Russia raged on the European front, where the two superpowers championed different versions of post-war global order. With the Truman Doctrine and the conflicts in Greece and Turkey, the first "shots" of the Soviet-American confrontation were fired. Then Secretary of State George Marshall launched his renowned Marshall Plan, whose unofficial purpose was preventing a Soviet overtake, whether military or ideological, of Western Europe. Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy all lay in ashes in the aftermath of the War to Start All Wars Again, and the Communist parties of the latter two were growing in strength, so American policy-makers had enough matters to deal with in Europe and would not have turned the bulk of its attention to Asia soon if not for the emergence of the Chinese threat.
Mao Zedong's triumph in 1949 was a heavy blow for the American government, which had been generously supporting the nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek. The fact that the Asian giant went red despite the efforts of the mighty transcontinental superpower, which only two years earlier had pledged to combat evil Communism on all fronts and protect democracy and freedom in the countries of the world, undermined America's standing both at home and abroad. To distract the American public from the debacle in China, the State Department embarked on a search for another noble Cold War cause, and as American policy-makers scanned the map of the world, their eyes fell on a region that had been generally remote from American geostrategic concerns so far – Southeast Asia. Of course, it was not entirely unknown in Washington. Since 1945, American officials had been pestered by their British and French counterparts to extend material support to France's war effort against the nationalist forces in its former colony Indochina. After Truman succeeded the genuinely-or-not-genuinely anti-colonial Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the White House, the Franco-British wish was granted, albeit for no other reason than the Truman administration's incorporation of France into its grand plan for a recovery of free Europe, which centered on the fastest re-building of European economy that could be achieved.
In 1949, however, Southeast Asia acquired a significance in its own right. Its dangerous proximity to Red China justified the American policy-makers worries that it might become the next major Cold War battleground, so they began pumping resources into its countries with the same enthusiasm and generosity they displayed toward Western Europe. China had been lost, yes, but America would not lose another state to Communism.
Indochina was on top of the new Southeast Asian agenda, for, increasing amounts of American assistance notwithstanding, the French forces' alleged short, "cleaning-up" operation was steadily turning into a long, frustrating, and not particularly successful struggle against invisible guerrillas, who preferred to bide their time in the jungle rather than fight a conventional war. A careful analysis of Ho Chi Minh's behavior toward the West and his motivations would have revealed that the Viet Minh's all-overshadowing goal was independence for Vietnam, which was to be achieved by any means available, and that the French imperialists, universally hated by the Vietnamese population, simply could not win a war against a movement that was predominantly loved and supported by the locals. Instead, American policy-makers assumed there was no way for the French army, superior in technology and resources thanks to overly generous aid from America, to be losing a war against a bunch of Third World guerrillas unless those guerrillas were backed by the Communist enemy in the face of Red China, and probably also the Soviet Union. Therefore, long-suffering Vietnam's struggle for independence from almost century-long cruel colonial rule was perceived to be yet another Cold War battleground, similar to Greece, where the forces of good (Capitalism) and evil (Communism) were destined to clash once again, and on went the Truman administration to increase its material aid to the French further, sending 11,000 tons of equipment in 1950 only, and on went America down the road toward the Vietnamese quagmire.
Then, out of the blue, the war in Korea broke out in June 1950, solidifying the worst fears of American policy-makers about the aggressive expansion of Communism into their new protégé region – Southeast Asia. Kim Il-sung was indeed aided by Red China, or rather, since Mao Zedong could not stand him because of his arrogance and stupidity, Stalin had persuaded Mao, who owed him a considerable debt for the success of his revolution, to help the North Koreans financially and militarily.
The Korean War was the first all-out Southeast Asian Cold War conflict, the true first shot of the Cold, and hot, war between American Capitalism and Soviet Communism in the region. What's worse, it became a model according to which the American military and political leaders would build their strategies for Vietnam a decade afterwards, despite the fact that the two conflicts bore few similarities to each other. For instance, unlike the war in Vietnam, the Korean War was a large-scale war fought by conventional armed forces on both sides – the North Koreans had not established a guerrilla movement in South Korea, for the South Koreans were predominantly hostile to the Communists. Furthermore, the relationship between the people of South Korea and their foreign allies was based on a healthy amount of trust. America fought in the war under the aegis of the United Nations, so the South Koreans did not doubt the American motives. They genuinely believed the war was fought and sacrifices were made to allow them to retain their independence. In Vietnam, on the other hand, America came as the ally of the despised French colonialists – basically, one imperialist power succeeding another – so there were grave, and wide-spread doubts, among the South Vietnamese about the authenticity of America's benign intentions. Unlike the South Koreans, they were not so eager to shun the Communists, who were their own compatriots who only a few years ago had fought alongside them to win Vietnam's independence, and cooperate with the foreign superpower.
The aforementioned distinctions were, again, not analyzed and interpreted well by American policy-makers in subsequent administrations, so the Korean War was treated as a sort of proof that the United States could, through an all-out intervention, remedy similar conflicts all over Southeast Asia. It is astonishing how readily Cold War assumptions made during Truman's time were embraced by his successors.
As we know, those flawed assumptions did not age well in the 1960s.
OUTPOSTS OF EMPIRE was so much fun to read. Steven Hugh Lee has written a compelling, well-researched study on a most interesting subject in modern American history. I have developed a special interest in the Cold War in general, but studying the origins of the Cold War in Southeast Asia is fascinating on a whole new level. The European theater was a familiar ground because of the Second World War. Southeast Asia was something far-away, murky, unknown. Reading about American policy-makers's stumbling through it, blundering along the way and nevertheless not giving up on their premature assumptions, for they were the only thing they could hold on to, is truly wonderful, especially when the decision-making is as masterfully chronicled as in this book.
December 4, 2025
A stimulating read analyzing American (along with Commonwealth countries, especially Britain and Canada) actions and diplomacy when it came to implementing containment in Korea and Vietnam specifically and East Asia more generally in these formative years of the Cold War: 1949-1954.
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