Originally published forty years ago, Bell Irvin Wiley’s The Road to Appomattox marked one of the first efforts by a Civil War scholar to identify the internal causes of the South’s defeat. Today this elegant little book remains one of the most penetrating, thought-provoking works on the subject.
In the book’s three chapters, Wiley treats three broad reasons for the failure of the weak political leadership, low morale among the populace, and four “internal influences” in the South. Those four shortcomings stemmed from traits apparently endemic to southerners in general, Wiley explains, and they included disharmony among and between political and military leaders; the government’s failure to provide adequate public information systems; rigidity in outlook and course of action; and poor judgment, especially of the North’s strength, the South’s own strength, and Europe’s dependence on cotton.
Recent years have witnessed a number of significant studies dealing with Confederate defeat, particularly with the failings of Davis as war leader and with the complex issue of the South’s dedication to the cause. Wiley was one of the first historians to raise these issues and discuss them trenchantly. Those familiar with The Road to Appomattox will cheer the reissue of this resonant work; first-time readers will see why.
Born into rural Tennessee and schooled at Asbury College (BA, 1928) and Yale University (PhD, 1933), Bell Irvin Wiley became a historical officer of the Second Army in World War II and taught history the University of Mississippi, Louisiana State University, Oxford University, and Emory University. He published groundbreaking works, such as Southern Negroes, 1861-65 (1938), was named President of the Southern Historians Association (1955), and became chairman of President Eisenhower's National Civil War Centennial Commission (1961). He died in 1980.
Read for book club. While most works might focus on the industrial and economic advantages of the Union states, the author presented aspects of the Confederate leadership that lead to their failure. Lots of disagreement and pettiness between Davis and the generals and Davis and the legislature, conscription but those with money could hire a substitute and those with more than 20 slaves were exempt, and lack of news about what was going on. Wiley describes the time frame as one of big drops in morale with slight, shorter peaks of improvement.
The author does offer one very interesting "What if" question for thought. What would the outcome of the war had been if General Joseph Johnston had returned to command the Army of Northern Virginia in December, 1862 and Robert E. Lee had gone to command the Confederate forces in the West? Would Lee had made a better defense at Vicksburg and would Johnston had listened to Longstreet at Gettysburg? Interesting to contemplate.
I find it difficult to agree with the concepts proposed by the author as to why the Confederacy lost the war. I enjoyed his arguements, but find the conclusions too stretched to be believable. His three main precepts for failure are a reluctant President, loss of morale, and poor understanding of administration and the outside world. I don't understand how he thought morale was a factor. The supporting facts did not sway me. Jeff Davis might have been relucant to serve, but I think the author's arguements showed he administered with anything that might have suggested reluctance. The last arguement makes more sense and is probably more likely a stronger reason for the failure of the Confederacy to win. The book was well-written and easily understood. It did show a point of view that made me think about non-traditional ideas on how the war was fought and administered.