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The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914
Jack Snyder's analysis of the attitudes of military planners in the years prior to the Great War offers new insight into the tragic miscalculations of that era and into their possible parallels in present-day war planning. By 1914, the European military powers had adopted offensive military strategies even though there was considerable evidence to support the notion that much greater advantage lay with defensive strategies. The author argues that organizational biases inherent in military strategists' attitudes make war more likely by encouraging offensive postures even when the motive is self-defense. Drawing on new historical evidence of the specific circumstances surrounding French, German, and Russian strategic policy, Snyder demonstrates that it is not only rational analysis that determines strategic doctrine, but also the attitudes of military planners. Snyder argues that the use of rational calculation often falls victim to the pursuit of organizational interests such as autonomy, prestige, growth, and wealth. Furthermore, efforts to justify the preferred policy bring biases into strategists' decisions―biases reflecting the influences of parochial interests and preconceptions, and those resulting from attempts to simplify unduly their analytical tasks.The frightening lesson here is that doctrines can be destabilizing even when weapons are not, because doctrine may be more responsive to the organizational needs of the military than to the implications of the prevailing weapons technology. By examining the historical failure of offensive doctrine, Jack Snyder makes a valuable contribution to the literature on the causes of war.
272 pages, Paperback
First published October 1, 1984
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
July 23, 2018
2.5/5: The offense/defense stuff is worth putting up with for considering how Snyder analyzes the determinants of military strategy.
August 8, 2012
Why attack? Well, for one thing, it seemed to be the only way to win.
July 23, 2017
When war broke out in 1914, the armies of all of the major powers sought to secure victory through rapid offensive operations. Jack Snyder seeks to show that this approach was not based on a sound appreciation of the situation, but was instead driven by a range of factors separate from the task of those armies, such that the offensive was more a question of ideology than of rational analysis. This is demonstrated, he argues, by the fact that all of the armies had, at some point or other during the 44 years of peace prior to the outbreak of war, focused on defensive strategies, even though the political / military situation at those times had not been dramatically different from what it had been immediately prior to 1914. Snyder focuses on three armies, being those of France, Germany and Russia. Like (I suspect) many readers, I focused on the first two of these.
In brief, he argues that the French Army had switched to the philosophy of 'the offensive at all costs' in large measure due to a sense that the values and status of the army was under threat from left wing politicians following the Dreyfus scandal. A focus on the central importance of morale, which could only be created and sustained through long periods of service, led to an emphasis on the need for a professional army, with soldiers serving for an extended time and officers forming a cohesive and self-sustaining brotherhood, both in many respects separated from the softening influence of civilian society. Snyder, interestingly, suggests that the causality may have been the reverse from that usually presented, in that an officer corps desparate to maintain its standing and role, may have been drawn to the offensive philosophy precisely because it demanded the sort of exclusive military culture that they yearned for. He argues that, had the French Army been less obsessed by this approach, it might have been more willing to consider seriously the employment of its reserve formations in the frontline, and hence recognised that the Germans might do likewise. This, in turn, might have led to a more cautious posture in August 1914. Not only, suggests Snyder, would this have reduced the appalling butcher's bill that resulted when smartly-dressed French units sought to charge German machine guns, but it might also have halted the German advance through Belgium far earlier.
Equally, Snyder argues that the drive that led to the Schlieffen Plan, and the pressure win a rapid victory over France before turning on Russia before it could mobilise its massive army, was based on a narrowly-military perception of international relations and a need to retain the staus of the German officer corps. First, he suggests that the generals proved themselves unable to see relations between countries as anything other than a struggle for survival, where the losers would be swallowed up, thereby requiring the army to seek decisive victories. By contrast, Bismarck recognised that great power politics need not be a zero sum game and that compromise could allow all to prosper. Second, Snyder argues that the status of the German officer corps rested on the stunning rapid victories of 1866 and 1870, such that the army thereafter felt compelled to plan for operations that repeated these successes, despite the changing geo-political and military situation.
Although Snyder's work is now more than 30 years old, it still has many important lessons to teach us. Central to these is his almost post-modernist recognition that we often see the world, not as it really is but as our context and experience encourages us to see it. While we may compliment ourselves on the rigour and rational basis of our analysis, all too often we are the prisoners of our unrecognised biases. Alongside this, we must recognise that all organisations develop strong tendencies towards self-preservation (indeed, an organisation without such tendencies is unlikely to survive long, which may itself be a weakness). This can have negative consequences, when the drive to self-preservation invisibly diverts the thinking of its members along routes that run contrary to the ostensible purpose of the organisation and the intentions of its sponsors. While Snyder has focused on armies, the principles apply to all organisations, and to private bodies as much as to public ones.
In short, while in some ways a little overtaken by more recent scholarship, Snyder's book remains well worth reading and pondering.
In brief, he argues that the French Army had switched to the philosophy of 'the offensive at all costs' in large measure due to a sense that the values and status of the army was under threat from left wing politicians following the Dreyfus scandal. A focus on the central importance of morale, which could only be created and sustained through long periods of service, led to an emphasis on the need for a professional army, with soldiers serving for an extended time and officers forming a cohesive and self-sustaining brotherhood, both in many respects separated from the softening influence of civilian society. Snyder, interestingly, suggests that the causality may have been the reverse from that usually presented, in that an officer corps desparate to maintain its standing and role, may have been drawn to the offensive philosophy precisely because it demanded the sort of exclusive military culture that they yearned for. He argues that, had the French Army been less obsessed by this approach, it might have been more willing to consider seriously the employment of its reserve formations in the frontline, and hence recognised that the Germans might do likewise. This, in turn, might have led to a more cautious posture in August 1914. Not only, suggests Snyder, would this have reduced the appalling butcher's bill that resulted when smartly-dressed French units sought to charge German machine guns, but it might also have halted the German advance through Belgium far earlier.
Equally, Snyder argues that the drive that led to the Schlieffen Plan, and the pressure win a rapid victory over France before turning on Russia before it could mobilise its massive army, was based on a narrowly-military perception of international relations and a need to retain the staus of the German officer corps. First, he suggests that the generals proved themselves unable to see relations between countries as anything other than a struggle for survival, where the losers would be swallowed up, thereby requiring the army to seek decisive victories. By contrast, Bismarck recognised that great power politics need not be a zero sum game and that compromise could allow all to prosper. Second, Snyder argues that the status of the German officer corps rested on the stunning rapid victories of 1866 and 1870, such that the army thereafter felt compelled to plan for operations that repeated these successes, despite the changing geo-political and military situation.
Although Snyder's work is now more than 30 years old, it still has many important lessons to teach us. Central to these is his almost post-modernist recognition that we often see the world, not as it really is but as our context and experience encourages us to see it. While we may compliment ourselves on the rigour and rational basis of our analysis, all too often we are the prisoners of our unrecognised biases. Alongside this, we must recognise that all organisations develop strong tendencies towards self-preservation (indeed, an organisation without such tendencies is unlikely to survive long, which may itself be a weakness). This can have negative consequences, when the drive to self-preservation invisibly diverts the thinking of its members along routes that run contrary to the ostensible purpose of the organisation and the intentions of its sponsors. While Snyder has focused on armies, the principles apply to all organisations, and to private bodies as much as to public ones.
In short, while in some ways a little overtaken by more recent scholarship, Snyder's book remains well worth reading and pondering.
November 27, 2022
This book crystallized the reason why I dislike armies, hierarchies, states, corporations, police departments, justice departments, bureaucracies, basically anything that restricts freedom. The situation of 1914 is very telling. Even though there was no one who declared that their army and vision was offensive, therefore willing to invade other country, the three case studies of France, Germany and Russia explain very easily that France and Germany at least only by deductive logic of "the best defense is offense" managed to start the biggest war of all times.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews