Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Anscombe's Intention

by Rachael Wiseman

G. E. M. Anscombe’s Intention is a classic of twentieth-century philosophy. The work has been enormously influential despite being a dense and largely misunderstood text. It is a standard reference point for anyone engaging with philosophy of action and philosophy of psychology.
In this Routledge Philosophy GuideBook, Rachael









Ideal for anyone wanting to understand and gain a perspective on Elizabeth Anscombe’s seminal work, this guide is an essential introduction, useful in the study of the philosophy of action, ethics, philosophy of psychology and related areas.

Genres: Philosophy

218 pages, Kindle Edition

First published February 8, 2016

Reviews

[Alina · Rating 4 out of 5]

Wiseman provides a clear and helpful analysis of Anscombe's text. Anscombe's writing can be very dense and obscure; she alternates between different voices or potential interlocutors, without signposting that she is doing so, for example, and this may obscure what her own position is. She also lays out points about seemingly quite unrelated topics, and then makes claims later on which depend on seeing common threads between these points, threads which she does not explain explicitly. Wiseman helps us track these different voices and follow Anscombe's sometimes unstated reasoning.

Wiseman diagnoses the overall uptake of Anscombe's Intention as misguided. Much of the contemporary literature takes Anscombe's distinction between expressions of intention, intentions with which we act, and intentions for the future as referring to three distinct psychologically real phenomena. The literature then asks how the three may be connected, causally or explanatorily. Often the literature will point to one of the three as the ultimate basis of the other two, and much debate as sprung out of differing positions on this.

Wiseman argues that Anscombe in fact intends for these distinctions to be not about real phenomena but rather about patterns of speech, or the ways we use the concept "intention." Likewise, Anscombe's conclusions aren't about intention as a psychologically real entity, but are rather about the grammatical rules of our use of this concept. I'm currently still skeptical about Wiseman's position here; I think Anscombe intends for her arguments to apply to more than just about our language use, and she uses evidence that is not drawn solely from our language use. For example, her key idea of non-observational knowledge seems to refer to our actual experiences; we can know things through different channels. This distinction is not merely about how we talk about knowledge.

I found the most helpful bits of Wiseman to be her discussion on practical reasoning and its relationship with reasons for acting; and also her analysis of practical knowledge. Wiseman argues that reasons for acting exist insofar as we engage in the practice of practical reasoning, which may be formally characterized by our asking ourselves or each other "why are you doing that?" I totally missed this when reading the Anscombe, and Wiseman's argument is compelling. The concept of practical knowledge is very elusive when Anscombe presents it, and Wiseman explicates it and the common misunderstandings we may have of it very clearly.

I'd highly recommend this guide to anyone interested in reading Anscombe's Intention on their own. Sometimes primary texts can be read independently, without a classroom environment or secondary resources; I found Anscombe's Intention as definitely not one of those texts.