John Burdon Sanderson Haldane was a British geneticist, biometrician, physiologist, and popularizer of science who opened new paths of research in population genetics and evolution.
Son of the noted physiologist John Scott Haldane, he began studying science as assistant to his father at the age of eight and later received formal education in the classics at Eton College and at New College, Oxford (M.A., 1914). After World War I he served as a fellow of New College and then taught at the University of Cambridge (1922–32), the University of California, Berkeley (1932), and the University of London (1933–57).
In the 1930s Haldane became a Marxist. He joined the British Communist Party and assumed editorship of the party’s London paper, the Daily Worker. Later, he became disillusioned with the official party line and with the rise of the controversial Soviet biologist Trofim D. Lysenko. In 1957 Haldane moved to India, where he took citizenship and headed the government Genetics and Biometry Laboratory in Orissa.
Haldane, R.A. Fisher, and Sewall Wright, in separate mathematical arguments based on analyses of mutation rates, population size, patterns of reproduction, and other factors, related Darwinian evolutionary theory and Gregor Mendel’s concepts of heredity. Haldane also contributed to the theory of enzyme action and to studies in human physiology. He possessed a combination of analytic powers, literary abilities, a wide range of knowledge, and a force of personality that produced numerous discoveries in several scientific fields and proved stimulating to an entire generation of research workers.
A ‘RE-EXAMINATION OF DARWINISM’ FROM A FOUNDER OF POPULATION GENETICS
John Burdon Sander Haldane (1892-1964) wrote in the Preface of this 1932 book, “This book is based on a series of lectures delivered in January 1931 … entitled ‘A Re-examination of Darwinism.’ … Apart from the Appendix, I have added very little to the lectures as delivered. I doubt whether the time is yet ripe for a really comprehensive book covering the same ground, because our knowledge of the cytological nature of differences between species is increasing so rapidly as to render any account of these difference very provisional… I venture to hope that certain arguments in the body of the book (in particular that which purports to prove that mutation, Lamarckian transformation, and so on, cannot prevail against natural selection of even moderate intensity) will not be rejected unless a fallacy is discovered in the mathematical reasoning on which they rest.”
He states in his Introduction, “Seventy-two years have now elapsed since Darwin and Wallace formulated the theory that evolution had occurred largely as a result of natural selection… But Lamarck and other eminent biologists had failed to convince the scientific world or the general public that evolution had occurred. Darwin contrived to carry a considerable measure of conviction on both these points. The result has been that … most people who believed in evolution held that it had been largely due to natural selection.” (Pg. 1)
He explains, “While the geneticists were disproving many of Darwin’s ideas, the paleontologists were determining the actual historical facts of evolution. Where the data were adequate they were able to verity the law of succession… This would clearly be true on ANY theory of evolution, and probably false on a theory of numerous successive special creations.” (Pg. 11)
He outlines, “In the remaining chapters I shall try to answer the following questions: What is the nature of heritable differences within a species?... Does selection really occur in nature? If so, will it account for the formation of species? Must we allow for other causes of evolutionary change? And, finally, when we have surveyed the process of evolution we shall have to ask what judgment we can make about it… I can, of course, claim no special standing. I can write of natural selection with authority because I am one of the three people who know more about its mathematical theory. But many of my readers know enough about evolution to justify them in passing value judgments upon it which may be different from, and even wholly opposed to, my own.” (Pg. 18)
Of breeding experiments with the tomato, he comments, “we have here a case of the origin… of a variety so different from the original type as either to refuse to hybridize with it or to give sterile hybrids. Such behavior was considered in the past to be the note of a specific difference. Huxley and Romanes lamented that it could not be produced artificially. Today Catholic apologists, whom I sometimes read, because their arguments are at least coherent, still taunt us poor Darwinians with our failure….” (Pg. 31)
He states, “It seems probable, therefore, that in so far as interspecific differences can be analyzed on Mendelian lines they are due to a number of small units of difference rather than a few large ones. It is at least quite certain that Mendelian gene differences, presumably due to mutation, have played a certain part in the origin of species.” (Pg. 40)
He notes experiments on bacteria, and observes, “occasionally a variant appears which gives rather different colonies, is less virulent, and produces much less peroxide. We do not know how these variants arise because the details of the process or reproduction in bacteria are not known. There is no reason to think that bacterial mutation is a phenomenon essentially different from mutation in higher organisms, and it is not even clear that it is commoner.” (Pg. 51)
He acknowledges, “We have seen that natural selection is a reality, that the facts of variation, though different from what Darwin believed them to be, are yet such as to yield a raw material on which natural selection can work. We have also seen that variation directly induced by the environment is not in itself competent to explain the known facts of evolution. But we know very little about what is actually selected, and any attempt to give a concrete account of natural selection at work must be decidedly speculative. Nevertheless such an attempt must be made. I believe that opposition to Darwinism is largely due to a failure to appreciate the extraordinary subtlety of the principle of natural selection.” (Pg. 61)
He explains, “To put the matter in a more concrete way, Blake expressed some doubt as to whether God had made the tiger. But the tiger is in many ways an admirable animal. We have now to ask whether God made the tapeworm. And it is questionable whether an affirmative answer fits in either with what we know about the process of evolution or what many of us believe about the moral perfection of God. We can answer the question in three ways. We can regard the dark as well as the bright side of evolution as a manifestation of divine ingenuity… Secondly, we can go for our answer to Plato… [who] in the Republic says, “God therefore, since He is good, cannot be responsible for all things… but only for good things.’ … Or, finally, we can say that at present it does not seem necessary to postulate divine or diabolical intervention in the course of the evolutionary process. The question whether we can draw theological conclusions from the fact that the universe is such that evolution has occurred in it is quite different, and very interesting.” (Pg. 86)
He states, “I do not share the view that mind, as we know it, cannot be a product of evolution. An essential element of evolution is variation. Variation is at random in the sense that it may lead in many directions, mostly of no survival value, and that those which possess survival value for the individual may lead to degeneration and extinction of the species. But it follows chemical and biological laws, and only certain combinations will lead to mind. If we are to have mind at all, it must probably conform to certain laws. There is no need to suppose that these laws, any more than those of biochemistry, are products of natural selection. Selection no doubt accounts for certain details, but in all probability not for the general character of mind.” (Pg. 87)
He notes, “Bergson attributed evolution to an ‘elan vital,’ or vital impulse, which pushed organisms forward along the path of evolution… the main objection [to] elan vital is that it is so very erratically distributed… the usual course taken by an evolving line has been one of degradation. It seems to me altogether probable that man will take this course unless he takes conscious control of his evolution within the next few thousand years. It may very well be that mind… is not adequate for such a task, probably on account of its emotional rather than intellectual deficiencies… If I were compelled to give my own appreciation of the evolutionary process … I should say this: In the first place, it is very beautiful. In that beauty there is an element of tragedy…” (Pg. 89-90)
He concludes, “To me the beauty of evolution is far more striking than its purpose. In my moments of wilder speculation I sometimes go further. I imagine that associated with an evolving line there may be some ‘emergent,’ just as mind is associated with the brain… I question whether such an emergent should be regarded as probably mind-like… My suspicion of some unknown type of being associated with evolution is my tribute to its beauty, and to that inexhaustible queerness which is the main characteristic of the universe that has impressed itself on my mind during 25 years of scientific work.” (Pg. 90-91)
This book will be of keen interest to those studying evolutionary theory.
Darwin and Wallace announced their theories of evolution by natural selection in 1858, and the following year Darwin published his majestic book "The Origin of Species". By 1932, when British scientist J.B.S. Haldane wrote "The Causes of Evolution", evolution was firmly established as a scientific fact (although some were - and still are - willing to keep arguing the point). The mechanism of natural selection had, however, been through a harder slog towards acceptance.
Darwin wrote that evolution by natural selection depends on three things: variation, inheritance, and hyperfecundity (a fancy way of saying "plenty of offspring to select among"). In his writings he demonstrated in countless ways how these three factors ultimately lead to the evolution of new species. Unfortunately he was never able to point to good physical explanations for the sources of variation, or to explore exactly how the mechanisms - environmental, social, sexual, etc - that create selection pressure actually work. As scientists peered more closely at the theory of natural selection, they struggled to explain some of the more counter-intuitive elements, such as the persistence of non-adaptive traits.
Darwin died in 1882, and for a few decades thereafter the theory of natural selection lost some of its sheen. The fire was rekindled in the first decades of the 20th century by the discovery of genetics and the mechanisms by which genes are transmitted through chromosomes. Then in the 1920s and 1930s, scientists - Haldane prominent among them - applied statistical techniques to the distribution of genes in populations, and showed how breeding populations generate the variation that fuels natural selection.
It's sad to think that a book as important in its time as "The Causes of Evolution" should be almost unreadable now. Unless you're a professional botanist or geneticist, you won't know which observations are still technically correct, and it's hard not to apply the context of later discoveries like DNA, RNA, and the whole apparatus of molecular biochemistry. But you can get a sense of what it is like to be a scientist struggling at the edge of knowledge.