National Responsibility and Global Justice

by David Miller

Oxford Political Theory presents the best new work in contemporary political theory. It is intended to be broad in scope, including original contributions to political philosophy, and also work in applied political theory. The series will contain works of outstanding quality with no restriction as to approach or subject matter.
Series Will Kymlicka, David Miller, and Alan Ryan.

This book presents a non-cosmopolitan theory of global justice. In contrast to theories that seek to extend principles of social justice, such as equality of opportunity or resources, to the world as a whole, it argues that in a world made up of self-determining national communities, a different conception is needed. The book presents and defends an account of national responsibility which entails that nations may justifiably claim the benefits that their decisions and policies produce, while also being held liable for harms that they inflict on other peoples. Such collective responsibility extends to responsibility for the national past, so the present generation may owe redress to those who have been harmed by the actions of their predecessors. Global justice, therefore, must be understood not in terms of equality, but in terms of a minimum set of basic rights that belong to human beings everywhere. Where these rights are being violated or threatened, remedial responsibility may
fall on outsiders. The book considers how this responsibility should be allocated, and how far citizens of democratic societies must limit their pursuit of domestic objectives in order to discharge their global obligations.

The book presents a systematic challenge to existing theories of global justice without retreating to a narrow nationalism that denies that we have any responsibilities to the world's poor. It combines discussion of practical questions such as immigration and foreign aid with philosophical exploration of, for instance, the different senses of responsibility, and the grounds of human rights.

Genres: Philosophy, Politics

308 pages, Hardcover

First published November 22, 2007

About the author

David Miller is professor of political theory and official fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford. He is a fellow of the British Academy and the author or editor of fifteen books, including On Nationality and Principles of Social Justice.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Mi...

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Reviews

[Tony · Rating 3 out of 5]

Miller identifies two type of responsibility: (1) outcome responsibility (basically you made the mess, you clear it up) and (2) remedial responsibility (some other poor blighter is starving, through not fault of yours or his, and you have food to spare so you must feed him). Miller then goes on to argue that a nation can be held accountable for its wrong-doings both present and historic and its citizens are liable to pay compensation regardless of whether or not they directly participated in the wrong-doing on the basis of shared membership. Miller largely relies on analogy to establish this: if I participate in a riot then I am liable for all the damage caused during the riot even if I didn't myself do it. Or if I am shareholder in a company and I vote against a policy which is adopted and causes damage then I am liable despite my opposition. But the trouble with arguing by analogy is that you can change the analogy and get a different answer. Presumably a rioter could decide to stay at home or a share holder sell her shares; can some one quit her country in the same way?
Miller's argument for justifying historical liability is that a contemporary citizen enjoys benefits that have been derived from a historic wrong-doing and so they accept the associated liability. Again he tries to demonstrate why this should be so through analogy which leaves him fundamentally exposed. In deed at one point he concedes that if someone doesn't share his fundamental intuition (that the rich have a duty to help the poor) then he has no way of convincing them that he is right. Miller ends up hoping that everyone is as nice as he is.
Two other flaws: Miller doesn't consider the practicalities of deciding what harm has been done and the amount of damages due (and whether damages can be mitigated by some other good); he admits that this is difficult. Secondly he ignores the effect of fostering a sense of entitlement and victimhood has on an individual;

[nin. · Rating 2 out of 5]

my dude forgot how interconnected and overarching issues of development and climate are.

[David · Rating 3 out of 5]

Wrong, but very smart.

(Feb 09) I re-read the chapter on immigration for a paper I'm writing and it's really problematic. Had to cut a star.