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Strategy and History
Strategy for Chaos
In this volume, Professor Colin Gray develops and applies the theory and scholarship on the allegedly historical practice of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), in order to improve our comprehension of how and why strategy 'works'.
The author explores the RMA hypothesis both theoretically and historically. The book argues that the conduct of an RMA has to be examined as a form of strategic behaviour, which means that, of necessity, it must "work" as strategy works. The great RMA debate of the 1990s is reviewed empathetically, though sceptically, by the author, with every major school of thought allowed its day in court.
The author presents three historical RMAs as case studies for his those arguably revealed in the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon; in World War I; and in the nuclear age. The focus of his analysis is how these grand RMAs functioned strategically. The conclusions that he draws from these empirical exercises are then applied to help us understand what, indeed, is - and what is not - happening with the much vaunted information-technology-led RMA of today.
The author explores the RMA hypothesis both theoretically and historically. The book argues that the conduct of an RMA has to be examined as a form of strategic behaviour, which means that, of necessity, it must "work" as strategy works. The great RMA debate of the 1990s is reviewed empathetically, though sceptically, by the author, with every major school of thought allowed its day in court.
The author presents three historical RMAs as case studies for his those arguably revealed in the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon; in World War I; and in the nuclear age. The focus of his analysis is how these grand RMAs functioned strategically. The conclusions that he draws from these empirical exercises are then applied to help us understand what, indeed, is - and what is not - happening with the much vaunted information-technology-led RMA of today.
328 pages, Hardcover
First published October 30, 2002
About the author
Colin S. Gray
95 books74 followersColin S. Gray was a British-American strategic thinker and professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, where he was the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies. In addition, he was a Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy.
Gray was educated at the University of Manchester and the University of Oxford. He worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute, before founding the National Institute for Public Policy in Washington, D.C. He also served as a defense adviser both to the British and U.S. governments. Gray served from 1982 until 1987 in the Reagan Administration's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Furthermore, he taught at the University of Hull, the University of Lancaster, York University, Toronto and University of British Columbia. Gray published 23 books on military history and strategic studies, as well as numerous articles.
Gray was educated at the University of Manchester and the University of Oxford. He worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute, before founding the National Institute for Public Policy in Washington, D.C. He also served as a defense adviser both to the British and U.S. governments. Gray served from 1982 until 1987 in the Reagan Administration's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Furthermore, he taught at the University of Hull, the University of Lancaster, York University, Toronto and University of British Columbia. Gray published 23 books on military history and strategic studies, as well as numerous articles.
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August 23, 2013
Chaos and RMAs do not equate to the end of strategy. In this book Gray takes aim at the fads in strategic thinking generated by the import of chaos theory into social sciences, and the growing belief in the transformative effects of Revolutions in Military Affairs. The case made is convincing, mainly for its well supported and constructed argumentation. After the initial explanatory chapters on chaos theory, RMAs, and and their relationship to strategy, Gray turns to exploring the supposed RMAs of Napoleon, WWI, and the nuclear age. By the time Gray concludes the book by emphasizing that Strategy is a Duel, the reader has gained a greater appreciation why chaos theory and RMA, though useful concepts for understanding and analyzing strategic history, do not equate to the end of strategy.
The starting point is Gray's simple yet effective definition of strategy as the bridge that links military means to political ends. If military operations are divorced from their political ends, the results are invariably negative: Gray draws on Napoleon and Ludendorf's ultimate failures as examples of this. This ties into the folly over reliance on RMA's as a substitute for strategy. As Gray points out, war, and by extension strategy, is a dialectic process, and "no RMA survives intact the counteracting behaviour of an alert, intelligent, and competent foe." It is therefore best to view, assess, and employ the transformative nature of RMA's as a form of strategic behaviour, not as a replacement for strategy.
Similarly, Gray sees chaos theory as providing a number of useful insights in understanding strategic behaviour and the conduct of war. But he is at pains to emphasize that "if ... 'chaos rules', strategy is impossible." Chaos theory, however, does not mean that purposeful behaviour has no roll in or impact on conflict. Gray defines the question of chaos and strategy as "Is strategy so complex, so nonlinear, and so chaotic, that purposeful strategic behaviour is impracticable?" He finds, and he uses his case studies well in supporting this finding, "that strategic behaviour generally is possible, even though the true whole structure and dynamics of strategy are literally beyond anyone's comprehension." The world is complex, and exhibits the charactersitics of a chaotic system; however, this does not preclude the development of a coherent yet adaptable strategy that optimises the employment of military force to meet the ends of policy.
In all I found this a useful book for framing and understanding relationship between chaos theory, RMAs and strategy. The argumentation was thought provoking, though Gray's usual acerbic critiques of those with whom he does not agree can annoy at times.
I would recommend this book to any reader interested in the military history, strategy, or technology. I would particularly recommend it to those who embrace the need for interdisciplinary study of strategy and strategic history.
The starting point is Gray's simple yet effective definition of strategy as the bridge that links military means to political ends. If military operations are divorced from their political ends, the results are invariably negative: Gray draws on Napoleon and Ludendorf's ultimate failures as examples of this. This ties into the folly over reliance on RMA's as a substitute for strategy. As Gray points out, war, and by extension strategy, is a dialectic process, and "no RMA survives intact the counteracting behaviour of an alert, intelligent, and competent foe." It is therefore best to view, assess, and employ the transformative nature of RMA's as a form of strategic behaviour, not as a replacement for strategy.
Similarly, Gray sees chaos theory as providing a number of useful insights in understanding strategic behaviour and the conduct of war. But he is at pains to emphasize that "if ... 'chaos rules', strategy is impossible." Chaos theory, however, does not mean that purposeful behaviour has no roll in or impact on conflict. Gray defines the question of chaos and strategy as "Is strategy so complex, so nonlinear, and so chaotic, that purposeful strategic behaviour is impracticable?" He finds, and he uses his case studies well in supporting this finding, "that strategic behaviour generally is possible, even though the true whole structure and dynamics of strategy are literally beyond anyone's comprehension." The world is complex, and exhibits the charactersitics of a chaotic system; however, this does not preclude the development of a coherent yet adaptable strategy that optimises the employment of military force to meet the ends of policy.
In all I found this a useful book for framing and understanding relationship between chaos theory, RMAs and strategy. The argumentation was thought provoking, though Gray's usual acerbic critiques of those with whom he does not agree can annoy at times.
I would recommend this book to any reader interested in the military history, strategy, or technology. I would particularly recommend it to those who embrace the need for interdisciplinary study of strategy and strategic history.
Displaying 1 of 1 review