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To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine
U.S. national security policy is at a critically important crossroads. The Bush Doctrine of unilateralism, pre-emptive war, and the imposition of democracy by force has proven disastrous. The United States now finds itself vilified abroad, weakened at home, and bogged down in a seemingly endless and unwinnable war.
In To Lead the World , Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro bring together eleven of America's most esteemed writers and thinkers to offer concrete, historically grounded suggestions for how America can regain its standing in the world and use its power more wisely than it has during the Bush years. Best-selling authors such as David Kennedy, Niall Ferguson, Robert Kagan, Francis Fukuyama, and Samantha Power address such issues as how the US can regain its respect in the world, respond to the biggest threats now facing the country, identify reasonable foreign policy goals, manage the growing debt burden, achieve greater national security, and successfully engage a host of other problems left unsolved and in many cases exacerbated by the Bush Doctrine. Representing a wide range of perspectives, the writers gathered here place the current foreign-policy predicament firmly in the larger context of American and world history and draw upon realistic appraisals of both the strengths and
the limits of American power. They argue persuasively that the kind of leadership that made the United States a great--and greatly admired--nation in the past can be revitalized to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
Written by prize-winning authors and filled with level-headed, far-sighted, and achievable recommendations, To Lead the World will serve as a primary source of political wisdom in the post-Bush era and will add immeasurably to the policy debates surrounding the 2008 presidential election.
In To Lead the World , Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro bring together eleven of America's most esteemed writers and thinkers to offer concrete, historically grounded suggestions for how America can regain its standing in the world and use its power more wisely than it has during the Bush years. Best-selling authors such as David Kennedy, Niall Ferguson, Robert Kagan, Francis Fukuyama, and Samantha Power address such issues as how the US can regain its respect in the world, respond to the biggest threats now facing the country, identify reasonable foreign policy goals, manage the growing debt burden, achieve greater national security, and successfully engage a host of other problems left unsolved and in many cases exacerbated by the Bush Doctrine. Representing a wide range of perspectives, the writers gathered here place the current foreign-policy predicament firmly in the larger context of American and world history and draw upon realistic appraisals of both the strengths and
the limits of American power. They argue persuasively that the kind of leadership that made the United States a great--and greatly admired--nation in the past can be revitalized to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
Written by prize-winning authors and filled with level-headed, far-sighted, and achievable recommendations, To Lead the World will serve as a primary source of political wisdom in the post-Bush era and will add immeasurably to the policy debates surrounding the 2008 presidential election.
320 pages, Paperback
First published June 13, 2008
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About the author
Melvyn P. Leffler
18 books30 followersMelvyn Paul is an American historian and educator, currently Edward Stettinius Professor of History at the University of Virginia
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June 13, 2015
At the time this book came out, it could have been one of the most important books written on foreign policy. The book included some of the biggest names in foreign policy, and the policy advice contained in this volume spanned the theoretical and political spectrum. The book is still interesting and relevant today and its insights should surely be evaluated based on what has happened inbetween 2008 and today.
More importantly, volumes like this should be published regularly: soon we should have another volume with similar names entitled "To Lead the World: American Strategy after Obama."
Leffler and Legro organize this book partially as a review of American grand strategy and the Bush Doctrine, but also as a way of learning from this strategy and moving toward a renewal of American power. As the two authors note, Bush’s emphasis on preventive and pre-emptive intervention has largely been discredited (although Kagan gives a staunch historical defense of why the US has not seen the last of pre-emption or unilateralism). Though the authors note how moral issues such as fighting disease, poverty, and tyranny were part of the rhetorical aspect of this strategy, Van Evera’s chapter demonstrates how Bush’s divisive unilateralism has set this agenda back.
According to Van Evera the threats to the global commons—nuclear proliferation, climate change, pandemic disease, and terrorism—can only be fought through deep cooperation facilitated by a “concert” of powers. Leffler and Legro at the end of their introduction, by invoking the example of Wilson, frame their exercise as a balancing of idealism with realpolitik that is able to bring the necessary modes of power to bear on world order.
Van Evera’s argument for a concert of great states ready to fight threats to the global commons rests on a fundamental debunking of the China threat. The US should not pour resources into a future competition with China because 1) China’s rise is still decades away 2) this rise—because of nuclear weapons and the nature of post-industrial economies—will likely not resemble the threat of imperial expansion as it did in the 1930s and earlier and 3) the rising power of nationalism suggests that any Chinese attempt to take over its neighbors will lead it into a Vietnam-like morass. On top of this, I would add that China’s rising economic power will lead to demands from its citizens for greater accountability and living standards (if not full-scale democracy).
At least one of Van Evera's premises failed to hold true. China's rise was accelerated by the global recession, and Chinese actions in the South China seem to suggest that the world still works on power politic rules. Thus, even if great power interest converge on a number of key subjects, cooperation on these issues remains hampered by great power competition.
Kagan’s article represents a counterpoint to Van Evera and many of the other articles in this volume that argue for a return to multilateralism, argue against focusing on deterring peer competition, and argue for a return to building US soft power. Kagan argues that regime change, preemptive military action, and unilateral action are impossible to revoke a priori, and forms an impressive list of examples where disparate presidents have resorted to these strategies. Kagan also argues that the US’s main responsibility is staving off peer competition; this is not only a pragmatic stance but also a moral one because the US “stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world” (p. 41). The next big clash Kagan believes will be that between liberal democracies on the one hand and autocracies on the other.
At the time, this essay seemed like one of the weaker essays. However, much of Kaplan's arguments have been validated by recent events. It seems that a retreat of US military power has been met by challenges by new threats ranging from Islamofacism to Putanism (with Chinese nationalism threatening from the margins). This essay serves as an important reminder that even in a new century, realipolitik (and other forms of realist theory) are still essential.
Maier on the other hand locates a growing threat both internationally and domestically to US legitimacy located in large numbers of people abroad who are denied the benefits of market capitalism and globalization. This he links with the stagnating middle classes and poor in the US. Though Maier suggests that states are not sufficient tools for dealing with the large amounts of misery and discontent seen around the world, the state apparatus nonetheless is the only tool there is to deal with it. Thus, the US should raise its development assistance and give up its focus on a Washington consensus that asks countries to devalue safety nets and social programs. This is the hardest essay to respond to and evaluate. While Maier's assessment is poignant, he fails to find a key narrative that would capture the solution to this problem. In many ways, this is the same problem with the US political system -- where free-floating anger over economic inequality gets harnessed into everything from cultural conservatism, to nationalism, to militarism.
Ikenberry’s article, following from his usual structural liberal model, argues that the US should reinvest in the liberal world order, reinvigorate existing institutions and create new ones when necessary to help incorporate rising states and deal with problems to the global commons. The theoretical base for his argument is what he calls “neo-Rawlsian”: i.e. create the kind of order you would want if you had no way of predicting what kind of power you would have in the future; in this way, Ikenberry’s suggestion hedges against a fall in US power in the future.
Kurth’s article draws a grand strategy which he calls the “boss of bosses.” The central ideas of his work is that the greatest threat to the US will be from nuclear terrorism, that something like a concert strategy that Van Evera suggests can be created with China, India, and Russia as the other great powers, and that, despite Kagan’s warnings, this strategy can be effective because all of these countries can at least agree to concentrate on fighting terrorism. In defining his different forms of government-- autocracy, illiberal democracy, and liberal undemocracy--Kurth argues that what the US wants to avoid the most is a lack of order: “failed states, turbulent frontiers, and anarchy.” Thus, the US should support strong autocratic states if it involves creating some semblance of order that can be managed from afar.
I found this essay one of the most thought-provoking because it challenges a key diplomatic agenda of the US: democracy promotion. The spread of democracy -- especially in societies with weak foundations for such a change, will likely cause more disorder. The US is probably too emotionally invested in democracy promotion to ever take the question seriously, and yet it might be one of the most essential questions of the 21 century: Should the US abandon its democracy program for a stability program? (Or at the very least a more sophisticated democracy promotion program -- in other words, only promote democracy in places that meet certain rigorous conditions).
Another interesting aspect of Kurth's essay is that it asks the US military to focus exclusively on conventional strategy and to shy away from its savage wars of peace—this works with his idea that the US should manage regional orders as best it can from afar. Though there is a lot in this article that needs commenting on, suffice it to say, much of what Kurth argues goes against the fundamental moral grain of US foreign policy: democracy promotion, the extension of US rule through liberalism, and the US’s history (however tenuously it is remembered) as a revolutionary power. Much of this article, like others, however, depends on a threat assessment of the likelihood of nuclear terrorism.
The conclusion by Leffler and Legro brings up several important points that were either missed by the other authors or were only briefly discussed. One, is the need to sub-optimize in preparing for threats; in other words, the US needs to focus not on a few highly probable conflicts, but instead prepare for a large number of potential threats--some of which, however unlikely,must be prepared for because of their catastrophic consequences. The authors thus cite the 9/11 report and its admonishment of failures of imagination. Another issue is the consequences of large trade imbalances, government deficits, and rising Medicare and social benefit costs for baby boomers on military spending. This has been and will continue to be one of the defining issues of the next decade.
Overall, a fantastic book, a useful book, and an exercise in imaginative foreign policy writing that should be repeated regularly.
More importantly, volumes like this should be published regularly: soon we should have another volume with similar names entitled "To Lead the World: American Strategy after Obama."
Leffler and Legro organize this book partially as a review of American grand strategy and the Bush Doctrine, but also as a way of learning from this strategy and moving toward a renewal of American power. As the two authors note, Bush’s emphasis on preventive and pre-emptive intervention has largely been discredited (although Kagan gives a staunch historical defense of why the US has not seen the last of pre-emption or unilateralism). Though the authors note how moral issues such as fighting disease, poverty, and tyranny were part of the rhetorical aspect of this strategy, Van Evera’s chapter demonstrates how Bush’s divisive unilateralism has set this agenda back.
According to Van Evera the threats to the global commons—nuclear proliferation, climate change, pandemic disease, and terrorism—can only be fought through deep cooperation facilitated by a “concert” of powers. Leffler and Legro at the end of their introduction, by invoking the example of Wilson, frame their exercise as a balancing of idealism with realpolitik that is able to bring the necessary modes of power to bear on world order.
Van Evera’s argument for a concert of great states ready to fight threats to the global commons rests on a fundamental debunking of the China threat. The US should not pour resources into a future competition with China because 1) China’s rise is still decades away 2) this rise—because of nuclear weapons and the nature of post-industrial economies—will likely not resemble the threat of imperial expansion as it did in the 1930s and earlier and 3) the rising power of nationalism suggests that any Chinese attempt to take over its neighbors will lead it into a Vietnam-like morass. On top of this, I would add that China’s rising economic power will lead to demands from its citizens for greater accountability and living standards (if not full-scale democracy).
At least one of Van Evera's premises failed to hold true. China's rise was accelerated by the global recession, and Chinese actions in the South China seem to suggest that the world still works on power politic rules. Thus, even if great power interest converge on a number of key subjects, cooperation on these issues remains hampered by great power competition.
Kagan’s article represents a counterpoint to Van Evera and many of the other articles in this volume that argue for a return to multilateralism, argue against focusing on deterring peer competition, and argue for a return to building US soft power. Kagan argues that regime change, preemptive military action, and unilateral action are impossible to revoke a priori, and forms an impressive list of examples where disparate presidents have resorted to these strategies. Kagan also argues that the US’s main responsibility is staving off peer competition; this is not only a pragmatic stance but also a moral one because the US “stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world” (p. 41). The next big clash Kagan believes will be that between liberal democracies on the one hand and autocracies on the other.
At the time, this essay seemed like one of the weaker essays. However, much of Kaplan's arguments have been validated by recent events. It seems that a retreat of US military power has been met by challenges by new threats ranging from Islamofacism to Putanism (with Chinese nationalism threatening from the margins). This essay serves as an important reminder that even in a new century, realipolitik (and other forms of realist theory) are still essential.
Maier on the other hand locates a growing threat both internationally and domestically to US legitimacy located in large numbers of people abroad who are denied the benefits of market capitalism and globalization. This he links with the stagnating middle classes and poor in the US. Though Maier suggests that states are not sufficient tools for dealing with the large amounts of misery and discontent seen around the world, the state apparatus nonetheless is the only tool there is to deal with it. Thus, the US should raise its development assistance and give up its focus on a Washington consensus that asks countries to devalue safety nets and social programs. This is the hardest essay to respond to and evaluate. While Maier's assessment is poignant, he fails to find a key narrative that would capture the solution to this problem. In many ways, this is the same problem with the US political system -- where free-floating anger over economic inequality gets harnessed into everything from cultural conservatism, to nationalism, to militarism.
Ikenberry’s article, following from his usual structural liberal model, argues that the US should reinvest in the liberal world order, reinvigorate existing institutions and create new ones when necessary to help incorporate rising states and deal with problems to the global commons. The theoretical base for his argument is what he calls “neo-Rawlsian”: i.e. create the kind of order you would want if you had no way of predicting what kind of power you would have in the future; in this way, Ikenberry’s suggestion hedges against a fall in US power in the future.
Kurth’s article draws a grand strategy which he calls the “boss of bosses.” The central ideas of his work is that the greatest threat to the US will be from nuclear terrorism, that something like a concert strategy that Van Evera suggests can be created with China, India, and Russia as the other great powers, and that, despite Kagan’s warnings, this strategy can be effective because all of these countries can at least agree to concentrate on fighting terrorism. In defining his different forms of government-- autocracy, illiberal democracy, and liberal undemocracy--Kurth argues that what the US wants to avoid the most is a lack of order: “failed states, turbulent frontiers, and anarchy.” Thus, the US should support strong autocratic states if it involves creating some semblance of order that can be managed from afar.
I found this essay one of the most thought-provoking because it challenges a key diplomatic agenda of the US: democracy promotion. The spread of democracy -- especially in societies with weak foundations for such a change, will likely cause more disorder. The US is probably too emotionally invested in democracy promotion to ever take the question seriously, and yet it might be one of the most essential questions of the 21 century: Should the US abandon its democracy program for a stability program? (Or at the very least a more sophisticated democracy promotion program -- in other words, only promote democracy in places that meet certain rigorous conditions).
Another interesting aspect of Kurth's essay is that it asks the US military to focus exclusively on conventional strategy and to shy away from its savage wars of peace—this works with his idea that the US should manage regional orders as best it can from afar. Though there is a lot in this article that needs commenting on, suffice it to say, much of what Kurth argues goes against the fundamental moral grain of US foreign policy: democracy promotion, the extension of US rule through liberalism, and the US’s history (however tenuously it is remembered) as a revolutionary power. Much of this article, like others, however, depends on a threat assessment of the likelihood of nuclear terrorism.
The conclusion by Leffler and Legro brings up several important points that were either missed by the other authors or were only briefly discussed. One, is the need to sub-optimize in preparing for threats; in other words, the US needs to focus not on a few highly probable conflicts, but instead prepare for a large number of potential threats--some of which, however unlikely,must be prepared for because of their catastrophic consequences. The authors thus cite the 9/11 report and its admonishment of failures of imagination. Another issue is the consequences of large trade imbalances, government deficits, and rising Medicare and social benefit costs for baby boomers on military spending. This has been and will continue to be one of the defining issues of the next decade.
Overall, a fantastic book, a useful book, and an exercise in imaginative foreign policy writing that should be repeated regularly.
Displaying 1 of 1 review