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296 pages, Hardcover
First published February 1, 2008
The origins of this act [Article III of the Constitution] remain somewhat obscure and for almost 200 years it lay practically dormant. But the statute suddenly came to life in the case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), in which the court held that the act complained of – torture of a Paraguayan citizen by a Paraguayan official – violated the “law of nations” and that, according to Article III of the US Constitution, the law of nations was directly incorporated into federal common law. Thus, the embryonic but clear potential for US courts of law to vindicate wrongs committed throughout the world, and thereby protect the natural rights of the individual, was given expression. Such violations of natural rights conflicting with clearly established norms of international law can happen and do happen everywhere in the world, and in theory, then, transform the United States into a forum for all the world’s grievances.
Beginning in 1996, the impressive explosion of Holocaust-related litigation provided worldwide visibility to this phenomenon. Indeed, European lawyers representing a large number of Europe-based corporations active in insurance, banking, and industry, or even European state entities (Austria, the Vatican, etc.), sued in the USA, are today involved in one capacity or another in litigation on both coasts of the United States concerning hundreds of claims based on facts of more than a half century ago. Because of the distance in time and space of the Holocaust from the United States, and because of the nature of judicial challenge to actions carried out under shadows of foreign law and politics, the Holocaust litigation is the most extreme and emblematic episode of a worldwide trend in international litigation in which US courts promote themselves as de facto judges of world history. How that is possible needs some explanation.
This posture of the US courts is now resented as a major phenomenon of legal imperialism, because of the way in which it imposes American standards not only of substantive law (which are, with respect to these appalling events, in any case largely shared by every nation in the world) but also of procedure and of legal culture. As a paradox, while offering judicial remedies against extreme episodes of historical plunder, US courts play a major role in the construction of the American legal hegemony (globally diffused as the reactive project) that legalizes current plunder.
A variety of technical factors explain why US courts attract both foreign plaintiffs and defendants to litigate in America. Such factors explain much of the way in which the US notion of rule of law has been transformed into a global conception, so they are well worth a brief description.
Even at the earliest stages of litigation, plaintiffs will ask the court to allow them some “discovery.” Discovery, in the lawyer’s lingo, is the judicially supervised activity through which lawyers can obtain information from their adversarial counterpart. Discovery includes collection of any remotely relevant documents and interrogation by aggressive lawyers of the parties and their witnesses, who are obliged to respond. The stunning reach of US discovery is one of the most important factors explaining the present hegemony of US law in worldwide litigation. American-style discovery, often experienced by defendants as a “fishing expedition,” is traditionally much resented outside of the USA because it is intrusive and practically incompatible with the presumption of innocence. In this view, American-style procedure shows the hypocrisy of a system that advertises abroad the presumption of innocence as a fundamental aspect of the rule of law, then leaving defendants (both civil and criminal) in its courts at the mercy of the overwhelming power of their opponents. In such an adversarial model, only wealthy and powerful defendants can effectively defend themselves against prosecutors or powerful plaintiff ’s firms, by “investing” enough money in legal professionals.
However, even if proved innocent, they will never recover such legal expenses, and, if guilty but wealthy, they might outspend the plaintiff and win the case: a “market for justice” highly functional to the legalization of corporate plunder.
This economic factor alone explains why poor foreign defendants (e.g. suspect Latin American or African torturers) almost invariably default in US courts, while wealthy corporations successfully resist. The former cases, highly advertised, contribute to the empowerment of the international human rights movement and NGOs exporting US notions of rule of law, while the latter allows for legalization of plunder. Once again, plunder and the rule of law walk hand in hand in maintaining the hegemonic status quo based on the prestige of US judiciary.
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Besides discovery, other difficulties exist, so that suits in US courts put high financial burdens and sometimes unfair pressure on defendants who might well be innocent. To begin with, the system of attorney’s compensation, at least in tort cases, is very attractive for plaintiffs and their attorneys, as witnessed by the impressive wealth of plaintiffs’ firms. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are usually compensated on a contingency fee basis, which means that they are only paid in case of victory with a very substantial percentage (usually more than 30%) of the “prize” recovered. Defense attorneys, on the other hand, are typically compensated on an hourly basis, which is less lucrative compared to plaintiff cases ending in a windfall, but constitutes a more certain form of compensation. For the plaintiff, such as the “class” of Holocaust survivors in the San Francisco case, suing in a US court is a “risk-free, no cash advance” enterprise. This would simply be impossible in any other jurisdiction due to restrictions in the availability of contingency fee agreements. Legal systems other than the one in the United States fear the entrepreneurial spirit of attorneys so they try to limit the possibility of attorneys organizing as a “business enterprise” by advancing the costs of litigation in the hope of substantial returns.