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Hitler's Fremde Heere Ost: German Military Intelligence on the Eastern Front 1942-45

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The General Staff Division of Fremde Heere Ost (Military Intelligence Service, Eastern Section) which from 1942 was led by Reinhard Gehlen, was the nerve-centre of Hitler's military reconnaissance on the Eastern Front. This department worked professionally and was operationally and tactically reliable. However, at a strategic level there were clear deficits: the industrial capacity of the Soviet arms industry, the politico-military intentions and the details of the Red Army's plans for their offensive remained for the most part hidden from the department.

When the Second World War ended, Gehlen put the documents and personnel of Fremde Heere Ost at the disposal of the Americans. With their support he was able to build a new foreign secret service which later evolved into the Federal Intelligence Service.

In this book, military historian Magnus Pahl presents a complete overview of the structure, personnel and working methods of Fremde Heere Ost based on a tremendous array of archival sources. This work includes an extensive case study of the East Pomeranian Operation 1945. Pahl's study is a significant contribution to our understanding of German strategic, operational and tactical thinking on the Eastern Front 1941-45. Contains 29 photos, 2 figures & 4 maps.

368 pages, Hardcover

First published November 15, 2015

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Magnus Pahl

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Profile Image for Shrike58.
1,520 reviews26 followers
January 21, 2022
Although there are times when this work does read like a doctoral thesis translated from the German, this appears to be an astute analysis of why German army intelligence consistently came up "small" against the Soviet Union. To Pahl, the issues are really quite basic; a lack of institutional respect for the mission, a lack of resources, bad organization (the separation between intelligence analysis and intelligence acquisition), and the reality that "Foreign Armies East" was never intended to be a tool of strategic import (even assuming the Nazi higher leadership was prepared to take the reports seriously).

Besides that, much of this story is wrapped up with the character of Reinhard Gehlen, who was brought in as a "broom" after the failures of 1941 and who then worked intensely to overcome the liabilities holding back intelligence work in the German army; up to and including dueling with the SS establishment until the very end of the war. The problem with Gehlen is that he appears to have gone into "internal immigration" early, and devoted his best efforts into surviving the war, guessing right in terms of betting on American interest: Pahl is certainly not that impressed with Gehlen's analysis in regards to the final Soviet offensive in the east. Besides that, the way that Gehlen seemed to go to seed in the last decade or so of his active career (having become head of the Federal Republic of Germany's intelligence service), makes one question how much competence the man had all along.

Also, I'd observe that this work is probably going to be inter-library loan fodder for most readers, due to the cover cost. Finally, my rating is more like 3.5; can't bring myself to give out that last half star.
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