This work puts forth clear and rigorous analyses of the different kinds of meaning. It is carefully explained how meaning in the psychological sense (as in "I meant that you should go with her") differs from meaning in the strictly linguistic sense, and it is explained how each differs from meaning in the evidential sense. The relationship between literal and understood meaning (between semantics and pragmatics) is clearly explained, and a cogent analysis of the nature of literal meaning is put forth. Kripke-Frege paradoxes are solved in an intuitive and independently corroborated manner. The nature of contextual definition is clearly explained, and it is proved that ultimately all definition, including ostensive definition, is contextual definition. It is shown that syntax is meaning-how and, therefore, that syntax is not, contrary to what advocates of the Computational Theory of Mind assume, a meaning-innocent notion. The boundary between semantics and pragmatics is clearly drawn. It is said what Conceptual Role Semantics is and why it is broken. Finally, P.F. Strawson's semantic two-dimensionalism is explained and its scope is clearly delimited.