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The Purge of Thirtieth Division
The Purge of the Thirtieth Division by Major General Henry Dozier Russell is the only known written work by any of the eighteen National Guard division commanders mobilized in1940 and 1941. It chronicles from a National Guard perspective many of the challenges and growing pains experienced by the Army in the critical months leading up to its entry into World War II. Through Russell, the reader gains insight into the vast cultural differences between the Regular Army and the National Guard at the time.
Russell’s memoir offer an invaluable source of a commander’s first-hand account of how his division trained and fared during the 1940 Louisiana Maneuvers, and 1941 Tennessee and Carolina Maneuvers, respectively, in its preparation for overseas deployment. The narrative also contains a compelling account of the relations and tensions between Regulars and National Guardsmen. It was a scathing indictment of the Regular Army high command for what he perceived to be unfair treatment of National Guard officers during World War II. He cited many examples to bolster his claims, and contended that the U.S. Army, under Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, was out to “get” the Thirtieth Division and other National Guard divisions. He further contended that the Army believed that a non-Regular officer should not advance beyond the grade of lieutenant colonel. His memoir, which he privately printed, pulled no punches. His first-hand account was very critical of how a number of senior Regular Army officers handled affairs with his division that led to his relief as the division commander.
Russell completed his memoir in 1947 and subsequently printed 500 copies, which he distributed to senior National Guard officers. He did not sell any of the books, nor were they intended for or made available to the general public. Although there was a demand for additional copies, he did not print any more. The republication of The Purge of the Thirtieth Division is intended to expand the scholarship on the history of World War II and the history of the U.S. Army.
Russell’s memoir offer an invaluable source of a commander’s first-hand account of how his division trained and fared during the 1940 Louisiana Maneuvers, and 1941 Tennessee and Carolina Maneuvers, respectively, in its preparation for overseas deployment. The narrative also contains a compelling account of the relations and tensions between Regulars and National Guardsmen. It was a scathing indictment of the Regular Army high command for what he perceived to be unfair treatment of National Guard officers during World War II. He cited many examples to bolster his claims, and contended that the U.S. Army, under Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, was out to “get” the Thirtieth Division and other National Guard divisions. He further contended that the Army believed that a non-Regular officer should not advance beyond the grade of lieutenant colonel. His memoir, which he privately printed, pulled no punches. His first-hand account was very critical of how a number of senior Regular Army officers handled affairs with his division that led to his relief as the division commander.
Russell completed his memoir in 1947 and subsequently printed 500 copies, which he distributed to senior National Guard officers. He did not sell any of the books, nor were they intended for or made available to the general public. Although there was a demand for additional copies, he did not print any more. The republication of The Purge of the Thirtieth Division is intended to expand the scholarship on the history of World War II and the history of the U.S. Army.
- GenresWorld War II
242 pages, Kindle Edition
First published November 15, 2014
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
December 7, 2022
The abstract for the book describes the substance of Major General Henry Dozier Russell’s jeremiad perfectly. Those of us who served in the National Guard even recently know well the contempt of the Regulars for the “militia.” I personally served in one of the descendant formations of the 30th Division and witnessed the same treatment meted out to my fellow Guardsmen in 1990 during the mobilization for the Kuwait War.
In that purge, where the Regular Army precipitously jettisoned its doctrine of bringing Regular Army divisions to war strength by using meticulously trained National Guard brigades and instead sent Regular Army training brigades from the Infantry School in order to secure promotions, decorations and glory against a far weaker enemy, Henry Russell’s hopes for an American military establishment free of professional arrogance and dirty tricks were clearly dashed. My brigade, which had trained at the National Training Center in late 1989 and received a high rating, was compelled to return in 1990 and was unceremoniously declared unfit for combat. The astute reader will find in the book the parallel example for the 30th Division in early 1942, just a few months after the division distinguished itself in the Carolina Maneuvers of September 1941. Dirty tricks indeed.
In his examination of the personalities of the Regular Army “hatchet men” who worked to eviscerate the National Guard establishment, Russell provides an exceptionally valuable historical service. While some of his persecutors were clearly incompetent at the time, their careers demonstrating that even their comrades in the Regular Army could not cover up their stupidity, others managed to use the war as a means to create wholly undeserved reputations for themselves. Under Russell’s scathing criticism and detailed observations, George C. Marshall himself comes out looking like a crooked used car salesman, despite the hagiographical retinue that attends his reputation to this day. That disgraceful character of senior regular Army officers remains essentially unchanged to this day. It is a truism that one becomes general officer in the U.S. Army only through the most convincing display of ruthless cunning, tempered by a complete absence of human decency and lack of a moral compass.
Looking back at American military history since 1945, at the string of strategic stalemates, the ignominious flights from overrun capitals, and the endless wastage of incompetent counterinsurgencies, the true role and legacy of professional arrogance become appallingly clear. In this gruesome trail of pointless carnage and colossal squandering of resources and the flower of America’s youth, Russell’s frustrations, disgust and indignant fury receive complete vindication.
In conclusion, if you find this work a compelling examination of an Army that besmirched itself, you should consider reading Russell’s other published book on the Army Pearl Harbor Board, on which he sat in judgment of the Army officers who allowed the disaster of December 7th, 1941, to happen.
In that purge, where the Regular Army precipitously jettisoned its doctrine of bringing Regular Army divisions to war strength by using meticulously trained National Guard brigades and instead sent Regular Army training brigades from the Infantry School in order to secure promotions, decorations and glory against a far weaker enemy, Henry Russell’s hopes for an American military establishment free of professional arrogance and dirty tricks were clearly dashed. My brigade, which had trained at the National Training Center in late 1989 and received a high rating, was compelled to return in 1990 and was unceremoniously declared unfit for combat. The astute reader will find in the book the parallel example for the 30th Division in early 1942, just a few months after the division distinguished itself in the Carolina Maneuvers of September 1941. Dirty tricks indeed.
In his examination of the personalities of the Regular Army “hatchet men” who worked to eviscerate the National Guard establishment, Russell provides an exceptionally valuable historical service. While some of his persecutors were clearly incompetent at the time, their careers demonstrating that even their comrades in the Regular Army could not cover up their stupidity, others managed to use the war as a means to create wholly undeserved reputations for themselves. Under Russell’s scathing criticism and detailed observations, George C. Marshall himself comes out looking like a crooked used car salesman, despite the hagiographical retinue that attends his reputation to this day. That disgraceful character of senior regular Army officers remains essentially unchanged to this day. It is a truism that one becomes general officer in the U.S. Army only through the most convincing display of ruthless cunning, tempered by a complete absence of human decency and lack of a moral compass.
Looking back at American military history since 1945, at the string of strategic stalemates, the ignominious flights from overrun capitals, and the endless wastage of incompetent counterinsurgencies, the true role and legacy of professional arrogance become appallingly clear. In this gruesome trail of pointless carnage and colossal squandering of resources and the flower of America’s youth, Russell’s frustrations, disgust and indignant fury receive complete vindication.
In conclusion, if you find this work a compelling examination of an Army that besmirched itself, you should consider reading Russell’s other published book on the Army Pearl Harbor Board, on which he sat in judgment of the Army officers who allowed the disaster of December 7th, 1941, to happen.
December 13, 2023
A very sad book about how the active duty destroyed careers and blocked leadership advancement of the National Guard as the American nation entered WWII. Some of this was business, in that they wanted to maximize the opportunites of active duty officers to lead and advance their careers after working with that goal in mind for their whole careers. Some of it was belief American didn't need a part time National Guard and ensure they couldn't produce great leaders for people to look up to helped protect that interest. As a result, great leaders were fired to make way for poor leaders based merely on status on not on merit. National Guard leaders with WWI combat leadership experience were sidelined for active duty leaders who went to the right school but only had academic experience versus combat experience.
This is a sad book and I don't know that I want to read it again in the future.
This is a sad book and I don't know that I want to read it again in the future.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews