After his crushing defeat of Prussia in 1806, Napoleon marched into Poland to forestall any Russian attempts to come to the aid of their ally. There then followed the bloody battle in a blizzard at Eylau on 8 February 1807, which decimated both armies. Operations resumed in the spring and on 14 June Napoleon wrecked the Russian field army at Friedland. Napoleon and Emperor Alexander met at Tiltsit, and French mastery of northwest Europe was confirmed.This is the first book to bring together dozens of Russian letters, memoirs and diaries, with authors ranging from the commander-in-chief (Benningsen) to NCOs. We see the brutal conditions of the winter campaign at first hand, and gain fresh insight into the infamous Treaty of Tiltsit and the diplomatic maneuvering that followed it.
Alexander Mikaberidze is assistant professor of European history at Louisiana State University in Shreveport. He holds a degree in international law from Tbilisi State University (Republic of Georgia, 1999) and a Ph.D. in history from Florida State University (2003). After working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia (1996-2000), he taught European and Middle Eastern history at Florida State and Mississippi State Universities and lectured on strategy and policy for the U.S. Naval War College. For his contributions to the Napoleonic studies, he has been awarded the International Napoleonic Society's Legion of Merit Medal and La Renaissance Française's Médaille d'or du Rayonnement Culturel.
Dr. Mikaberidze specializes in the 18th-19th century Europe, particularly the Napoleonic Wars, and the military history of the Middle East. In addition to his articles, Dr. Mikaberidze has written and edited nine books, including Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: Historical Encyclopedia (2011), Napoleon's Great Escape: The Crossing of the Berezina (2010), The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon versus Kutuzov (2007), Historical Dictionary of Georgia (2007), The Russian Officer Corps in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1792-1815 (2005, winner of the 2005 Literary Prize of the International Napoleonic Society), The Czar’s General: The Memoirs of a Russian General in the Napoleonic Wars (2005).
The book is a fine collection of personal diaries and letters superbly edited into an easy flow of the dramatic events as they unfolded with multiple views presented of the same event but from different perspectives. I much prefer history presented this way, the author trusting the reader to sort the emotion from the fact. For example General Fabian von der Osten-Sacken’s (a man who intensely disliked the Army Commander General Bennigsen) diary extracts, though accurate on tactical detail have his bias to his commander emphasised by the much less emotional comments from fellow Officers. Despite his personal bias Stacken’s account of his Corps actions is an important inclusion. The book covers the events from October 1806 to June 1807 including the battles of Pultusk, Eylau and Friedland, the latter causing Russia and Prussia to sue for peace and the end of the 4th Coalition. Rather than attempt to summaries the history I will draw some interesting observations from the book.
The reader will be struck by how young junior Officers were, for example Sub-Lieutenant Pavel Grabbe commanding a troop of two cannon at the age of 15 years old. This was not extraordinary for a number of reasons; many boys were serving from aged 10 years as cadets receiving extensive education in science, literature and military studies (most of them multilingual in Russian, French, German and Latin). In addition war, and bloody war at that creates attrition meaning there were never enough Officers. As an example on the 8th February at 11.00am at Eylau, Marshal Augereau’s (French) Corps lost their bearings marching in column of attack. When the snowstorm suddenly lifted they found themselves just 30 metres in front of 40 Russian cannon loaded with grape and enfilade to a Division of Russian Infantry supported by a Division of Cossack Cavalry. In the following hour his Corps was destroyed with over 15,000 casualties including Augereau himself killed along with all 6 of his Divisional Commanders (Generals). 12 individual Regiments lost every single Officer killed or wounded. By the way many were killed by grapeshot but most were killed by bayonet or sabre in one of the largest hand to hand battles in history.
This period demonstrates once again that fear is the paramount emotion below which all other emotions are delegated. After Austerlitz some Russian units who had not been in that battle but found themselves caught up in the retreat, on hearing a rumour of French cavalry in the area (not seeing but just hearing), abandoned all their Regiments Artillery ammunition and ran. Before the next major engagement Russian units had abandoned over 140 guns and their ammunition that had never been fired in anger. Considering the carnage resulting from each battle it is a wonder that leaders in the Prussian and Russian armies kept control of their troops. All men suffer fear but not to the same degree nor for the same length of time. Wars offer us an excellent opportunity to study fear and get a better understanding of its effects.
A minor though annoying distraction in the book is the author feeling the need to present dates in the Julian calendar (old Russian) and the Gregorian calendar at the same time (eg. 4 [16] July or 11/23 November) when we today and the French and everyone else at the time use the Gregorian. It is unnecessary and distracting to list both.
This is really an excellent and informative study of important military campaigns, well written and beautifully edited. I commend it to you.
It provided a lot of color to the Polish campaign. There are excerpts from the leaders such as Bennigsen and Sacken as well as from the rank and file.
I liked the explanations of everyday life in the early 19th century. Working with horses instead of cars, written messages instead of mobile phones etc. While the technology in our lives may be more modern, people then were motivated by the same drivers as we are today. I guess that should be obvious but, nonetheless, I found it interesting to read.
Similarly reading the commanders spin on events was an eye opener as well.
If you are new to the Polish or Prussian campaign as the Russians call it, then you should probably start with a general history. By itself this book would be a bit disjointed but in the context of the campaign this is a fascinating read, especially as there is little Russian material available in English.
This is an invaluable collection of every Russian account of Napoleon's 1807 Campaign. It includes a wide range of accounts of marshals, generals,NCO's, and soldiers, some of which, though, are exaggerations of the real events. General Benningen's report, for example, is a mere attempt to demonstrate his strategic skills and to present the battle of Eylau as a Russian victory. Unfortunately, this was not the only example; many officers tried to distort events in order to maximize their own potential. On the other hand, there are many accounts of bravery, cruelty and some very touching ones, such as Denis Davidov's who gives us a full account of the battle and also his personal experience with Serugues, a French officer of the Grenadiers a cheval, who had saved Davidov'sbrother in the past. After the battle of Eylau, Serugues was severely wounded. Davidov found him at the hospital "pail, worn out and in great pain". A very touching moment would follow between the two men. In Davidov's own words : ... I approached quietly and carefully towards the bed of the wretched sufferer and told him my name. We embraced as true blood brothers. He asked about mine with genuine concern. I thanked him for having preserved him and offered my services with deep emotion. He answered me: "You see, I am in the care of a good person and don't lack anything. However you can do me a great service. Undoubtedly among the prisoners there are some wounded from my outfit; could you possibly appeal to the authorities and arrange for two or perhaps even one of my horse grenadiers to remain by my side. Let me die, still keeping to the end my eyes on the uniform of my regiment and the guard of a great man". Of course Davidov rushed to fulfill his friends last wish, and Serugues thanked him gratefully. Three days later he died in Davidov's arms. Davidov together with the two aforementioned Frrench horse grenadiers escorted Serugues' cascet to the grave. And he concludes: A deep sorrow was clearly evident on the faces of the old veterans, my companions in the possession -Iwas young-I was crying .