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The Study of Man
The Study of Man [paperback] Michael Polanyi [Jun 01, 1963]
- GenresPhilosophyAnthropology
102 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1958
About the author
Michael Polanyi
31 books131 followersMichael Polanyi was a Hungarian-British polymath, who made important theoretical contributions to physical chemistry, economics, and philosophy.
His wide-ranging research in physical science included chemical kinetics, x-ray diffraction, and adsorption of gases.
He argued that positivism supplies a false account of knowing, which if taken seriously undermines humanity's highest achievements.
He pioneered the theory of fibre diffraction analysis in 1921, and the dislocation theory of plastic deformation of ductile metals and other materials in 1934. He emigrated to Germany, in 1926 becoming a chemistry professor at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, and then in 1933 to England, becoming first a chemistry professor, and then a social sciences professor at the University of Manchester. In 1944 Polanyi was elected to the Royal Society.
His wide-ranging research in physical science included chemical kinetics, x-ray diffraction, and adsorption of gases.
He argued that positivism supplies a false account of knowing, which if taken seriously undermines humanity's highest achievements.
He pioneered the theory of fibre diffraction analysis in 1921, and the dislocation theory of plastic deformation of ductile metals and other materials in 1934. He emigrated to Germany, in 1926 becoming a chemistry professor at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, and then in 1933 to England, becoming first a chemistry professor, and then a social sciences professor at the University of Manchester. In 1944 Polanyi was elected to the Royal Society.
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
January 25, 2013
Short and not especially hard to understand, Polanyi blends scholarship with readability in this text. Though not his most popular work (which was Personal Knowledge), this one is still quite good. It compares history and science, arguing for Polanyi's concept of "tacit knowledge." If you're looking for an intelligent read that can still be accomplished in a single sitting, this is a good place to start.
September 17, 2026
These lectures offer a particularly dense analysis of the human mind’s propensity towards internal, unarticulated, perception and its consequential impacts on our grand ideas of knowledge and history. Many other topics and criticisms are touched upon briefly, but the chief takeaway from this writing is the intuitive nature of the human mind and its under-emphasized impact on both the science and humanities - which he also highlights as deeply interconnected bodies of knowledge, a theory that today seems much more commonplace in the era of interdisciplinary research. A very informative and worthwhile read.
October 15, 2024
THREE ESSAYS THAT EXTEND HIS IDEAS FROM “PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE”
Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) was a Hungarian-British chemist and philosopher; he wrote other books such as 'Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy,' 'The Tacit Dimension,' 'Knowing and Being,' 'The Logic of Liberty,' 'Science, Faith, and Society,' etc.
He wrote in the Preface to this book [which were the 1958 Lindsay Memorial Lectures given at the University College of North Staffordshire], “These lectures were intended to form an extension of the enquiry undertaken in my recently published volume on ‘Personal Knowledge.’ But since it proved impossible to proceed from the point reached in that book without first recapitulating the relevant parts of its argument, the first two lectures had to be used largely for this purpose. The whole series can accordingly be read as an introduction to ‘Personal Knowledge.’”
He says in the first lecture, “What is usually described as knowledge, as set out in written words or maps, or mathematical formulae, is only one kind of knowledge; while unformulated knowledge, such as we have of something we are in the act of doing, is another form of knowledge. If we call the first kind explicit knowledge, and the second, tacit knowledge, we may say that we always know tacitly that we are holding our explicit knowledge to be true. If, therefore, we are satisfied to hold a part of our knowledge tacitly, the vain pursuit of reflecting ever again on our own reflection no longer arises. The question is whether we can be satisfied with this… Tonight I shall try to transmit this conviction to you … that tacit knowing is in fact the dominant principle of all knowledge, and that its rejection would, therefore, automatically involve the rejection of any knowledge whatever.” (Pg.12-13)
He explains, “purely tacit operations of the mind are processes of understanding… the understanding of words and other symbols is also a tacit process. Words can convey information… but neither words nor symbols nor maps can be said to communicate an understanding of themselves. Though such statements will be made in a form which best induces an understanding of their message, the sender of the message will always have to rely for the comprehension of his message on the intelligence of the person addressed. Only by virtue of this act of comprehension, of this tacit contribution of his own, can the receiving person be said to acquire knowledge when he is presented with a statement.” (Pg. 21-22)
He states, “Though the intellectual superiority of man over the animal remains due to his use of symbols, this utilization itself… is now seen to be a tacit, a-critical process. It is a performance, like understanding or meaning something, which can be done only in our heads and not by operating with signs on paper. Our whole articulate equipment turns out to be merely a tool-box, a supremely effective instrument for deploying our inarticulate faculties.” (Pg. 25)
He argues, “All human knowledge is now seen to be shaped and sustained by the inarticulate mental faculties which we share with the animals. This view entails a decisive change in our ideal of knowledge. The participation of the knowing in shaping his knowledge, which had hitherto been tolerated only as a flaw… is now recognized as the true guide and master of our cognitive powers… The ideal of a knowledge embodied in strictly impersonal statements now appears self-contradictory, meaningless, a fit subject for ridicule. We must learn to accept as our ideal a knowledge that is manifestly personal. Such a position is obviously difficult; for we seem to define here as knowledge something that we could determine at will, as we think fit…
"I have argued that personal knowledge is fully determined, provided that it is pursued with unwavering universal intent. I have expounded the belief that the capacity of our minds to make contact with reality and the intellectual passion with impels us towards this contact will always suffice so to guide our personal judgment that it will achieve the full measure of truth that lies within the scope of our particular calling.” (Pg. 26-27)
In the second lecture, he says, “The theory of Personal Knowledge offers an interpretation of meaning. It says that no meaningful knowledge can be acquired, except by an act of comprehension which consists in merging the awareness of their joint significance. Such an act is necessarily personal, for it assimilates the particulars in question to our bodily equipment; we are aware of them only in terms of the things we are focally observing.” (Pg. 44)
He outlines, “First, I shall show that the two levels of personal knowledge, that of a comprehensive entity and that of its particulars... represent two different levels of reality; and second, that there obtains between two such levels a peculiar logical relationship, derived from the distinction between subsidiary and focal awareness… I shall proceed to erect on top of these a consecutively rising set of levels, right up to that of responsible human personhood. Within this framework it will appear possible by man to exercise a responsible choice, even though he admittedly remains rooted in lower forms of existence in which there is no room for such choices.” (Pg. 46)
He asserts, “a Laplacean Universal Mind would know little that means anything. For though it could admittedly advance from its knowledge of atomic configurations… it could never attain any knowledge of such truly meaningful objects as living beings and the things essentially related to the interests of living beings. The mathematical monster which was thought capable of reading off the future of all human endeavors from the atomic configuration of a primordially incandescent universe, appears actually restricted to a range of predictions that are of negligible interest to man.” (Pg. 49-50)
He concludes, “The mind is a comprehensive feature of man… A comprehensive entity is something else than its particulars known focally, in themselves. Behaviorism, which suggests that these particulars should be studied in themselves, is totally impracticable. First, because the particulars, if observed in themselves, would be meaningless; second, because they cannot be so observed at all, since they form parts of a physiognomy and are therefore unspecifiable in the stronger sense of being largely unknown; and third, because it is impossible to keep track, even roughly, of a man’s mental manifestations, except by reading them as pointers to the mind from which they originate. It is always the mind itself that we know primarily; any knowledge of its workings is derivative, vague and uncertain.” (Pg. 65)
He concludes, “In this light the historian will see every historical person as necessarily dependent for his effectiveness on accepting a given cultural medium an on grasping accidental opportunities that are never free of degrading temptations… Never will the historian admit that such circumstances can irresistibly determine a sane man’s deliberate actions. He will avoid then all three fallacies as follows: (1) the rationalist fallacy---by admitting the indispensable biological and cultural rootedness of al free actions; (2) the relativist fallacy, by acknowledging that each man has some measure of direct access to the standards of truth and must limit for their sake at some point his subjection to given circumstances, and (3) the determinist fallacy---by committing himself to a personal knowledge of the human mind as a seat of responsible action.” (Pg. 89) Later, he adds, “We have now arrived once more, by extrapolating the series of studies which led from physics to historiography, at the point where our possession of knowledge is seen to consist in an act of understanding and submission.” (Pg. 99)
This short book would make an excellent introduction to Polayni’s thought, or even as a “refresher” for someone who read Personal Knowledge some time ago.
Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) was a Hungarian-British chemist and philosopher; he wrote other books such as 'Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy,' 'The Tacit Dimension,' 'Knowing and Being,' 'The Logic of Liberty,' 'Science, Faith, and Society,' etc.
He wrote in the Preface to this book [which were the 1958 Lindsay Memorial Lectures given at the University College of North Staffordshire], “These lectures were intended to form an extension of the enquiry undertaken in my recently published volume on ‘Personal Knowledge.’ But since it proved impossible to proceed from the point reached in that book without first recapitulating the relevant parts of its argument, the first two lectures had to be used largely for this purpose. The whole series can accordingly be read as an introduction to ‘Personal Knowledge.’”
He says in the first lecture, “What is usually described as knowledge, as set out in written words or maps, or mathematical formulae, is only one kind of knowledge; while unformulated knowledge, such as we have of something we are in the act of doing, is another form of knowledge. If we call the first kind explicit knowledge, and the second, tacit knowledge, we may say that we always know tacitly that we are holding our explicit knowledge to be true. If, therefore, we are satisfied to hold a part of our knowledge tacitly, the vain pursuit of reflecting ever again on our own reflection no longer arises. The question is whether we can be satisfied with this… Tonight I shall try to transmit this conviction to you … that tacit knowing is in fact the dominant principle of all knowledge, and that its rejection would, therefore, automatically involve the rejection of any knowledge whatever.” (Pg.12-13)
He explains, “purely tacit operations of the mind are processes of understanding… the understanding of words and other symbols is also a tacit process. Words can convey information… but neither words nor symbols nor maps can be said to communicate an understanding of themselves. Though such statements will be made in a form which best induces an understanding of their message, the sender of the message will always have to rely for the comprehension of his message on the intelligence of the person addressed. Only by virtue of this act of comprehension, of this tacit contribution of his own, can the receiving person be said to acquire knowledge when he is presented with a statement.” (Pg. 21-22)
He states, “Though the intellectual superiority of man over the animal remains due to his use of symbols, this utilization itself… is now seen to be a tacit, a-critical process. It is a performance, like understanding or meaning something, which can be done only in our heads and not by operating with signs on paper. Our whole articulate equipment turns out to be merely a tool-box, a supremely effective instrument for deploying our inarticulate faculties.” (Pg. 25)
He argues, “All human knowledge is now seen to be shaped and sustained by the inarticulate mental faculties which we share with the animals. This view entails a decisive change in our ideal of knowledge. The participation of the knowing in shaping his knowledge, which had hitherto been tolerated only as a flaw… is now recognized as the true guide and master of our cognitive powers… The ideal of a knowledge embodied in strictly impersonal statements now appears self-contradictory, meaningless, a fit subject for ridicule. We must learn to accept as our ideal a knowledge that is manifestly personal. Such a position is obviously difficult; for we seem to define here as knowledge something that we could determine at will, as we think fit…
"I have argued that personal knowledge is fully determined, provided that it is pursued with unwavering universal intent. I have expounded the belief that the capacity of our minds to make contact with reality and the intellectual passion with impels us towards this contact will always suffice so to guide our personal judgment that it will achieve the full measure of truth that lies within the scope of our particular calling.” (Pg. 26-27)
In the second lecture, he says, “The theory of Personal Knowledge offers an interpretation of meaning. It says that no meaningful knowledge can be acquired, except by an act of comprehension which consists in merging the awareness of their joint significance. Such an act is necessarily personal, for it assimilates the particulars in question to our bodily equipment; we are aware of them only in terms of the things we are focally observing.” (Pg. 44)
He outlines, “First, I shall show that the two levels of personal knowledge, that of a comprehensive entity and that of its particulars... represent two different levels of reality; and second, that there obtains between two such levels a peculiar logical relationship, derived from the distinction between subsidiary and focal awareness… I shall proceed to erect on top of these a consecutively rising set of levels, right up to that of responsible human personhood. Within this framework it will appear possible by man to exercise a responsible choice, even though he admittedly remains rooted in lower forms of existence in which there is no room for such choices.” (Pg. 46)
He asserts, “a Laplacean Universal Mind would know little that means anything. For though it could admittedly advance from its knowledge of atomic configurations… it could never attain any knowledge of such truly meaningful objects as living beings and the things essentially related to the interests of living beings. The mathematical monster which was thought capable of reading off the future of all human endeavors from the atomic configuration of a primordially incandescent universe, appears actually restricted to a range of predictions that are of negligible interest to man.” (Pg. 49-50)
He concludes, “The mind is a comprehensive feature of man… A comprehensive entity is something else than its particulars known focally, in themselves. Behaviorism, which suggests that these particulars should be studied in themselves, is totally impracticable. First, because the particulars, if observed in themselves, would be meaningless; second, because they cannot be so observed at all, since they form parts of a physiognomy and are therefore unspecifiable in the stronger sense of being largely unknown; and third, because it is impossible to keep track, even roughly, of a man’s mental manifestations, except by reading them as pointers to the mind from which they originate. It is always the mind itself that we know primarily; any knowledge of its workings is derivative, vague and uncertain.” (Pg. 65)
He concludes, “In this light the historian will see every historical person as necessarily dependent for his effectiveness on accepting a given cultural medium an on grasping accidental opportunities that are never free of degrading temptations… Never will the historian admit that such circumstances can irresistibly determine a sane man’s deliberate actions. He will avoid then all three fallacies as follows: (1) the rationalist fallacy---by admitting the indispensable biological and cultural rootedness of al free actions; (2) the relativist fallacy, by acknowledging that each man has some measure of direct access to the standards of truth and must limit for their sake at some point his subjection to given circumstances, and (3) the determinist fallacy---by committing himself to a personal knowledge of the human mind as a seat of responsible action.” (Pg. 89) Later, he adds, “We have now arrived once more, by extrapolating the series of studies which led from physics to historiography, at the point where our possession of knowledge is seen to consist in an act of understanding and submission.” (Pg. 99)
This short book would make an excellent introduction to Polayni’s thought, or even as a “refresher” for someone who read Personal Knowledge some time ago.
April 23, 2022
Academic and professional life can seem fragmented at times. After receiving a course of general education, we specialize and then sub-specialize. (Will we sub-sub-specialize in the future?) In particular, the humanities can seem vastly different from the natural sciences, which can seem vastly different from engineering. Into this fragmentation, Polanyi offers a comprehensive philosophy with humans at the center. Polanyi, a physical chemist with economic and philosophical interests, can speak with authority on such broad matters due to his broad erudition.
Of course, Polanyi is most well-known for his book Personal Knowledge. This book can be read as a short introduction to that seminal work. Here, he introduces the concept that all objective knowledge relies on “tacit knowledge” based in human practices. We do not simply memorize our environment but take part in a social inquiry. This rightly notes that there is a human component to all studies. At its core, all studies of the outside are a way to teach ourselves how to live.
This means that all academic inquiry is ultimately a way to study humans and our place in the universe. By mastering endeavors of the mind, we master ourselves, and by mastering our subject matter, we find our place in human history. For Polanyi, this aim of mastery is equally true for the humanities, the natural sciences, and applied fields like engineering.
This work has had great impact in the second-half of the twentieth century. I find Polanyi’s approach liberating from those who just view the sciences as a way to earn money. Instead, they can involve the human soul and spirit as much as the humanities. And they also give scientists a reason to explore inquiry into what it means to be human. In the twenty-first century, this uniting vision is still needed, both on campus and in society, where fragmentation abounds along political lines.
Of course, Polanyi is most well-known for his book Personal Knowledge. This book can be read as a short introduction to that seminal work. Here, he introduces the concept that all objective knowledge relies on “tacit knowledge” based in human practices. We do not simply memorize our environment but take part in a social inquiry. This rightly notes that there is a human component to all studies. At its core, all studies of the outside are a way to teach ourselves how to live.
This means that all academic inquiry is ultimately a way to study humans and our place in the universe. By mastering endeavors of the mind, we master ourselves, and by mastering our subject matter, we find our place in human history. For Polanyi, this aim of mastery is equally true for the humanities, the natural sciences, and applied fields like engineering.
This work has had great impact in the second-half of the twentieth century. I find Polanyi’s approach liberating from those who just view the sciences as a way to earn money. Instead, they can involve the human soul and spirit as much as the humanities. And they also give scientists a reason to explore inquiry into what it means to be human. In the twenty-first century, this uniting vision is still needed, both on campus and in society, where fragmentation abounds along political lines.
June 26, 2024
Michael Polanyi writes of the important place of humans in the universe because of our mental faculties which allow us to do more than any other creatures, and this bent towards progress is what should occupy our best efforts.
Reading this book is a good way of seeing that he was right in that respect, that we can develop further ideas and get past our existing 'personal knowledge'. 18 years after these lectures, Dawkins established meme theory, which would have helped Polanyi further along his intended path. Systems science, complexity theory, the idea of emergence itself gained a lot more ground in the second half of the 20th century. Sadly, Polanyi's work itself seems more like 'normal science' in retrospect, and not the 'revolutionary science' that Kuhn wrote about, inspired by Polanyi.
The book comes off as quaint, inspired, but of an earlier time... too sure of itself and not interested enough in the possibilities of it being shortsighted.
Sure, if you are trying to trace the history of ideas, read the book. But if you're only interested in updating your 'personal knowledge', then you're probably too far along culturally to benefit from this glance back into the distant past of premature ideas.
Reading this book is a good way of seeing that he was right in that respect, that we can develop further ideas and get past our existing 'personal knowledge'. 18 years after these lectures, Dawkins established meme theory, which would have helped Polanyi further along his intended path. Systems science, complexity theory, the idea of emergence itself gained a lot more ground in the second half of the 20th century. Sadly, Polanyi's work itself seems more like 'normal science' in retrospect, and not the 'revolutionary science' that Kuhn wrote about, inspired by Polanyi.
The book comes off as quaint, inspired, but of an earlier time... too sure of itself and not interested enough in the possibilities of it being shortsighted.
Sure, if you are trying to trace the history of ideas, read the book. But if you're only interested in updating your 'personal knowledge', then you're probably too far along culturally to benefit from this glance back into the distant past of premature ideas.
August 14, 2025
From part 3: “Napoleons’s figure has served as an ideal of ruthless greatness in Continental literature and philosophy ever since his day. Stendhal’s Julien Sorel, Balzac’s Rastignac, Pushkin’s Herrman (in the queen of spades), Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov— they are so many portraits of the Napoleon struck youths of France and Russia. In Germany the movement culminated in the popular influence of Nietzsche, who described Napoleon in the Geneology of Morals as the embodiment of the noble ideal uniting the brutish with the more human. From Nietzsche the cult passed on to our own days, right down to the drown of Mussolini and the forelock of Hitler.”
September 9, 2023
Written in the 50’s this is a book written in a different style to what you will encounter today but it is readable and erudite. It was a harbinger of the current thought that we cannot truly distance ourselves from our subject matter. We are intrinsically bound up with our subject matter because of who we are but that does not mean we cannot know things. Well worth contemplating in today’s world.
May 30, 2026
Short intro into Polanyi's ideas about "indwelling" and knowing more than we can tell. I reread this to get back a sense of some of his interesting understandings. It is worth the effort to follow his train of thought and here it doesn't take long. The second to last page refers to self-education as apprenticing ourselves. "By recognizing our heroes and masters, we accept our particular calling." I'm spurred on by the final lecture to read Collingwood's The Idea of History soon.
February 6, 2020
Maybe subjectivity and objectivity can get along after all. Perhaps they have all this time and reductionism can be reduced to absurdum...
January 6, 2024
I strongly resonated with the premises, not as much with some of the conclusions. Exceedingly interesting read regardless.
December 13, 2022
This is a wonderful book.
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews