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The Memoirs of Baron Von Muffling: A Prussian Officer in the Napoleonic Wars
Müffling's memoirs provide an exceptional first-hand account of the Napoleonic Wars by one of Prussia's finest general staff officers.
Müffling is best known in the English-speaking world as General Blücher's liaison officer in Wellington's headquarters during the Waterloo campaign, and as such he was one of the architects of the final victory over Napoleon. However, his military career involved much more than this, proving him a brilliant general staff officer, although not always popular with his contemporaries. He made a major contribution to the development of the Prussian General Staff - the first to exist in the modern sense - and was also fascinated by military topography and cartography.
Müffling covers everything from his early posts in 1805 and his account of the battle of Jena in 1806 through to the Waterloo campaign in 1815 and his diplomatic role at the Congress of Aix-la-Chappelle at the end of the wars. His memoirs are a valuable primary source, as they are one of the few accounts written by a senior Prussian officer in the Napoleonic Wars to be translated into English.
Peter Hofschröer's Introduction to this new edition gives comprehensive biographical details for Müffling and examines the accuracy of certain parts of the memoirs. Müffling has attracted adverse criticism from historians at times; this new edition of his work allows the current generation of readers to make a balanced judgement.
Senior Prussian staff officer's account of the Napoleonic Wars.
Battles and campaigns from Jena to Waterloo.
Müffling's personal accounts of Blücher, Gneisenau, Wellington and other major figures of the period.
The Napoleonic Library is an outstanding collection of seminal works on the Napoleonic Wars. It features evocative contemporary memoirs and makes available once again the classic works on the subject by military historians.
Müffling is best known in the English-speaking world as General Blücher's liaison officer in Wellington's headquarters during the Waterloo campaign, and as such he was one of the architects of the final victory over Napoleon. However, his military career involved much more than this, proving him a brilliant general staff officer, although not always popular with his contemporaries. He made a major contribution to the development of the Prussian General Staff - the first to exist in the modern sense - and was also fascinated by military topography and cartography.
Müffling covers everything from his early posts in 1805 and his account of the battle of Jena in 1806 through to the Waterloo campaign in 1815 and his diplomatic role at the Congress of Aix-la-Chappelle at the end of the wars. His memoirs are a valuable primary source, as they are one of the few accounts written by a senior Prussian officer in the Napoleonic Wars to be translated into English.
Peter Hofschröer's Introduction to this new edition gives comprehensive biographical details for Müffling and examines the accuracy of certain parts of the memoirs. Müffling has attracted adverse criticism from historians at times; this new edition of his work allows the current generation of readers to make a balanced judgement.
Senior Prussian staff officer's account of the Napoleonic Wars.
Battles and campaigns from Jena to Waterloo.
Müffling's personal accounts of Blücher, Gneisenau, Wellington and other major figures of the period.
The Napoleonic Library is an outstanding collection of seminal works on the Napoleonic Wars. It features evocative contemporary memoirs and makes available once again the classic works on the subject by military historians.
517 pages, Hardcover
First published May 1, 1997
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
January 4, 2024
Baron Carl von Muffling is known to Waterloo buffs as the fatty with a bit part in the great 1971 film, when as liason officer between the British and Prussian armies Wellington keeps saying things like “I’m afraid I must ask you to ride out again Muffling…”. There was a lot more to Muffling than a sweatily obese messenger boy – in fact, the film version is fiction, as Muffling himself didn’t canter back on forth on the battlefield but had teams of despatch riders to do all of that for him; presumably leaving him free to sit at his desk and cram down ever greater quantities of bratwurst and beer (according to another historian he was “the fattest officer in the Prussian army” although he doesn’t look too gross in the portraits I have seen).
This is a handsomely produced volume which is a reprint of an 1853 translation of Muffling’s memoirs, with a brief modern introduction. It is valuable as an eyewitness account of the author’s involvement in the wars between Prussia and France from 1806 to 1815. He was an excellent cartographer and a distinguished staff officer who was at one time Governor of Paris and eventually a field marshal. He was also prickly, difficult, and – although undoubtedly talented – not quite the genius he thought he was.
Wellington pulled the wool over his eyes quite a lot in the Waterloo campaign, and Muffling was well aware of this, although he covers it up. He also claims he ordered the famous charge of the British heavy cavalry – though no one else records him doing so. (He probably gesticulated in their direction, but I am quite certain they took no notice of him). In the 1853 preface the English editor notes his “especial satisfaction at the military skill and moral qualities” which Muffling expressed about Wellington – but this is only because if Muffling had told the truth, he would have admitted that Wellington had deceived and outsmarted him – as the modern introduction makes clear.
Muffling went on a diplomatic mission to Constantinople in the 1820’s and had great success in brokering better relations between Turks and Russians. Unfortunately, although I would have found this section fascinating, it is entirely omitted because the stupid 1853 editor states “it scarcely possesses sufficient interest for English readers” – the editor wrongly presuming that all other English readers, like himself, are incapable of interesting themselves in anything which does not directly concern Englishmen. Nevertheless the book we have contains plenty of fascinating information, although it is a pity there are no maps or illustrations.
This is a handsomely produced volume which is a reprint of an 1853 translation of Muffling’s memoirs, with a brief modern introduction. It is valuable as an eyewitness account of the author’s involvement in the wars between Prussia and France from 1806 to 1815. He was an excellent cartographer and a distinguished staff officer who was at one time Governor of Paris and eventually a field marshal. He was also prickly, difficult, and – although undoubtedly talented – not quite the genius he thought he was.
Wellington pulled the wool over his eyes quite a lot in the Waterloo campaign, and Muffling was well aware of this, although he covers it up. He also claims he ordered the famous charge of the British heavy cavalry – though no one else records him doing so. (He probably gesticulated in their direction, but I am quite certain they took no notice of him). In the 1853 preface the English editor notes his “especial satisfaction at the military skill and moral qualities” which Muffling expressed about Wellington – but this is only because if Muffling had told the truth, he would have admitted that Wellington had deceived and outsmarted him – as the modern introduction makes clear.
Muffling went on a diplomatic mission to Constantinople in the 1820’s and had great success in brokering better relations between Turks and Russians. Unfortunately, although I would have found this section fascinating, it is entirely omitted because the stupid 1853 editor states “it scarcely possesses sufficient interest for English readers” – the editor wrongly presuming that all other English readers, like himself, are incapable of interesting themselves in anything which does not directly concern Englishmen. Nevertheless the book we have contains plenty of fascinating information, although it is a pity there are no maps or illustrations.
June 3, 2025
First, kudos to The Napoleonic Library for keeping this memoir in print. It would have been nice if maps had been included, but that would have involved quite a number of them, so I do understand.
I will, I realize, need to reread the campaign sections with a map in hand, to follow the details of strategy in both the 1813-14 campaign and the 1815 campaign. If Goodreads had been around when this was published, I might be taking a star from the author for some examples of mendacity, where he's clearly arguing back at rivals and critics. But this volume will go onto my Napoleonic Shelf as an essential source, so his egotism and his withholding of some criticisms of his friends, is just part of the interest.
I found the editorial notes useful.
What I particularly noted was that Müffling is one of the officers who had a keen eye for logistics (which is why he keeps being used as a chief-of-staff or quartermaster). Countless times in his recording of events he explains strategy based on the supply lines, when other officers only seem to be looking at the map. He remembers when lines got snarled because units were moved for political reasons rather than practical ones. I have come to believe that awareness of supply above all is the theme of nineteenth-century generalship. The list of those who had it foremost in mind: Wellington, Lee, Sheridan, Sherman, Grant, Scott -- is a lesson in itself. And Napoleon's tragedy is that he had been aware of it, but ignored his Master of Horse's explicit prohibition against marching into Russia due to logistical impossibilities.
I was intrigued to read Müffling's take on Bernadotte during the post-Moscow campaigns. In his view Bernadotte was angling to be made King of France once Napoleon was removed; so he wasn't eager to actually engage against French troops. Müffling is always noting how Bernadotte never shows up on the day of battle, always wants to fight the Dutch or the Belgians or anybody that Sweden might control in the post-war world, but never actually the main enemy. His frustration screams from the page. (And I hadn't realized that Bernadotte had insisted he be put in charge of the whole campaign, or at least the northern half of it.)
Müffling hints at certain weaknesses and problems with Blücher, but doesn't usually lay that part out fully. There is one sentence that indicates that Blücher was no longer really competent in 1815, but that his heart was in the right place; but then that disappears from the rationale for specific choices. Blücher was generally for going forward rather than stalling, and he used what would later be Patton's trick of using tactical situations to excuse strategic advances, and trying to force the rest of the allies keep up. I was also fascinated by the dissensions among the Allies over what we now think of as the obvious themes of the campaigns. Austria just wanted Italy back, and would let Napoleon survive if they got it. Russia mostly wanted to crush Napoleon, but they kept hedging. The Prussian generals wanted him dead, but the King kept wanting to negotiate, and the King of Sweden wanted Napoleon's job.
The assessment of Wellington is interesting. His generalship is admired above all others, but Müffling was clearly discomfited by Wellington's refusal to tell anybody what the plan really was. Apparently some historians insist that Wellington was "lying" to the Prussians, promising to be places at times that were impossible. Müffling thinks that the British simply forgot that troops marching at night aren't as fast as troops marching during the day. (I have not read up on this debate in detail, so I can't yet offer an opinion.) I am aware that Wellington had learned that a shared plan is a leaked plan, and so he avoided it. Luckily he didn't die mid-battle, leaving an army with no plan at all.
Müffling likes to detail the court intrigues and feuds, and it's interesting learning about it. One of the features of the age was the ease with which one could change countries. Tired of the Prussian army? Work for the Tsar, work for the Austrians, work for some other German state. It's musical chairs in those generalships. Seems almost bizarre.
Important primary source, so recommended.
I will, I realize, need to reread the campaign sections with a map in hand, to follow the details of strategy in both the 1813-14 campaign and the 1815 campaign. If Goodreads had been around when this was published, I might be taking a star from the author for some examples of mendacity, where he's clearly arguing back at rivals and critics. But this volume will go onto my Napoleonic Shelf as an essential source, so his egotism and his withholding of some criticisms of his friends, is just part of the interest.
I found the editorial notes useful.
What I particularly noted was that Müffling is one of the officers who had a keen eye for logistics (which is why he keeps being used as a chief-of-staff or quartermaster). Countless times in his recording of events he explains strategy based on the supply lines, when other officers only seem to be looking at the map. He remembers when lines got snarled because units were moved for political reasons rather than practical ones. I have come to believe that awareness of supply above all is the theme of nineteenth-century generalship. The list of those who had it foremost in mind: Wellington, Lee, Sheridan, Sherman, Grant, Scott -- is a lesson in itself. And Napoleon's tragedy is that he had been aware of it, but ignored his Master of Horse's explicit prohibition against marching into Russia due to logistical impossibilities.
I was intrigued to read Müffling's take on Bernadotte during the post-Moscow campaigns. In his view Bernadotte was angling to be made King of France once Napoleon was removed; so he wasn't eager to actually engage against French troops. Müffling is always noting how Bernadotte never shows up on the day of battle, always wants to fight the Dutch or the Belgians or anybody that Sweden might control in the post-war world, but never actually the main enemy. His frustration screams from the page. (And I hadn't realized that Bernadotte had insisted he be put in charge of the whole campaign, or at least the northern half of it.)
Müffling hints at certain weaknesses and problems with Blücher, but doesn't usually lay that part out fully. There is one sentence that indicates that Blücher was no longer really competent in 1815, but that his heart was in the right place; but then that disappears from the rationale for specific choices. Blücher was generally for going forward rather than stalling, and he used what would later be Patton's trick of using tactical situations to excuse strategic advances, and trying to force the rest of the allies keep up. I was also fascinated by the dissensions among the Allies over what we now think of as the obvious themes of the campaigns. Austria just wanted Italy back, and would let Napoleon survive if they got it. Russia mostly wanted to crush Napoleon, but they kept hedging. The Prussian generals wanted him dead, but the King kept wanting to negotiate, and the King of Sweden wanted Napoleon's job.
The assessment of Wellington is interesting. His generalship is admired above all others, but Müffling was clearly discomfited by Wellington's refusal to tell anybody what the plan really was. Apparently some historians insist that Wellington was "lying" to the Prussians, promising to be places at times that were impossible. Müffling thinks that the British simply forgot that troops marching at night aren't as fast as troops marching during the day. (I have not read up on this debate in detail, so I can't yet offer an opinion.) I am aware that Wellington had learned that a shared plan is a leaked plan, and so he avoided it. Luckily he didn't die mid-battle, leaving an army with no plan at all.
Müffling likes to detail the court intrigues and feuds, and it's interesting learning about it. One of the features of the age was the ease with which one could change countries. Tired of the Prussian army? Work for the Tsar, work for the Austrians, work for some other German state. It's musical chairs in those generalships. Seems almost bizarre.
Important primary source, so recommended.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews