Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology

by Colin Allen, Marc Bekoff

The heart of this book is the reciprocal relationship between philosophical theories of mind and empirical studies of animal cognition. Colin Allen (a philosopher) and Marc Bekoff (a cognitive ethologist) approach their work from a perspective that considers arguments about evolutionary continuity to be as applicable to the study of animal minds and brains as they are to comparative studies of kidneys, stomachs, and hearts. Cognitive ethologists study the comparative, evolutionary, and ecological aspects of the mental phenomena of animals. Philosophy can provide cognitive ethology with an analytical basis for attributing cognition to nonhuman animals and for studying it, and cognitive ethology can help philosophy to explain mentality in naturalistic terms by providing data on the evolution of cognition. This interdiscipinary approach reveals flaws in common objections to the view that animals have minds. The heart of the book is this reciprocal relationship between philosophical theories of mind and empirical studies of animal cognition. All theoretical discussion is carefully tied to case studies, particularly in the areas of antipredatory vigilance and social play, where there are many points of contact with philosophical discussions of intentionality and representation. Allen and Bekoff make specific suggestions about how to use philosophical theories of intentionality as starting points for empirical investigation of animal minds, and they stress the importance of studying animals other than nonhuman primates.

Genres: Philosophy, Science, Biology, Animals, Physics, Anthropology

232 pages, Paperback

First published October 10, 1997

Reviews

[Roger Paine]

I borrowed this book from the library and although the cover is faded, the pages look like they have never been turned! First published in 1997, this book sets out an argument for the viability of cognitive ethology as a science.
It is, for me, couched in rather technical language which makes it fall well outside of the popular science genre (I don't think it was ever intended to fall within that genre). The first few chapters lay out the philosophical ground rules for the various discussions that follow. The discussions there-in were entertaining.
The importance of clearly defined terms and observational rigour are stressed through-out the book, as being of paramount importance to any succeeding conclusion.
I get the distinct impression that the authors take a rather dim view of laboratory experimentation/observation, preferring by far the natural habitat of the creatures they wish to study. On that account, behaviourism gets left in the lab.
As an introduction to the beginnings of cognitive ethology, I found it informative; as an example of scientific writing, it was a particularly interesting demonstration of technique.

[Jack]

This book concerns itself with in depth analysis of the benefits of an interdisciplinary approach to cognitive ethology as it relates to the question of animal cognition. My only complaint with it is the decision of how the first two chapters were ordered. I felt that a better understanding of the first chapter was afforded by the definitions laid out in the second chapter. However, being a college student I was not necessarily the intended audience of the text who would most likely not be in need of the definitions in the second chapter and would merely find them redundant.

This book was extremely intensive, without alienating someone who was willing to put in some mental effort to understand what was being said. I would recommend this to anyone who was about to embark upon field research regarding animal cognition and/or someone who was seriously curious as to learning where this field could potentially be heading.

[Ole Jørgen]

Used this book in my Philosophy and Psychology class. It discusses the mind of species based on research and interesting experiments. They give necessary and good criticism to the aspects too, their naturalistic views are also well defended! Absolutely an useful book in the discussion of consciousness.

[Larry]

The chapter on play is interesting. The idea that mammals reissue play signals to defuse risks of misinterpretation of their (playful) behavior is interesting: they are constantly monitoring the reception of their communicative acts. The general theory towards the end, that consciousness is defined, at least operationally, by the capacity for error detection, overlaps with other approaches in Phil of mind like phenomenal intentionality (Loar, Kriegel, Horgan, and to some extent, Searle) and interactivism (Bickhard). But the general feeling is one of vagueness and superficiality. Too impressionistic, too vanilla.