What do you think?
Rate this book
So Close to Greatness: The Biography of William C. Bullitt
Depicts the life of the distinguished ambassador and examines his influence on the development of American foreign policy
368 pages, Hardcover
First published April 1, 1988
33 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
April 29, 2023
I sought out this book after completing Frank Costigliola's fine biography of George Kennan (George Kennan: A Life between Worlds), since Kennan spoke so highly of this man who shared so many experiences with Kennan.
As an American historian, I was aware of Bullitt before this, but had not studied him closely. He now joins the canon of "most respected statesmen" in my mind as he was clearly a brilliant and good man, albeit not without his own Achilles heel, an affliction most of us have (even if seldom acknowledged).
Like Costigliola's book on Kennan, Messers Brownell and Billings provide us with not only a masterful biography of an important figure, but in doing so also provide yet another window in the crucial decisions -- good and bad, wise and foolish -- that so shaped most of the 20th century (and with which we continue to struggle today).
Like Kennan, Bullitt, too, was entranced with Russia, and much of his attention throughout his life centered on its evolution from the Tsarist state through the revolution and into the repressive totalitarianism of Stalin. Like Kennan, he wanted the revolution to succeed because he shared the expressed idealism of so many of the early Bolsheviks. However, and also like Kennan, his service as the first American ambassador to the Soviet Union soon disenchanted him as he learned of the reality imposed by Stalin.
The book makes for fascinating reading, and reads often as if it were a spy thriller. For example, on the sly, President Wilson sent Bullitt on a secret mission to meet with Lenin in order to not only better acquaint himself with Lenin the man but also to discern, if possible, the future course of Russia after the revolution and ensuing civil war there.
Also like Kennan, Bullitt was deeply disappointed by the course of the peace conference at Versailles called to end the First World War. Like Kennan, he also hoped that the peace could be "won" by Wilson holding to the lofty ideals expressed in his public speeches, especially that of his "Fourteen Points." Unfortunately, despite the superb preparation of the American mission sent to Versailles, Wilson was repeatedly outmaneuvered by Lloyd George of Great Britain and Clemenceau of France, the latter especially determined to "make Germany pay" for the horrors of the war. He very early recognized that the "peace" settlement in reality was setting the conditions for a future war, both because it imposed financial reparations upon Germany that were beyond its ability to pay even under the best circumstances -- something entirely upset by the world crisis of the Great Depression -- and by ceding so much territory from Germany to other nations despite the fact that those lands contained significant numbers of German citizens.
Later, Bullitt was also sent to France as an ambassador, this time in the service of President Roosevelt. During the latter years of the 1930s he quickly realized how badly prepared for war were most of the Western nations, including the US, and also recognized that the repeated failure of the West and of the League of Nations -- which had signaled as early as Japan's invasion of Manchuria that it was unwilling to guard the peace against acts of aggression -- guaranteed that Hitler's appetite for "more" and his willingness to push the West would just keep growing.
It is wrenching to read again about the failure of France and Britain to guarantee Checkoslovakia's territorial integrity, and to recognize how that failure guaranteed that Hitler's next move would be against either Poland or France.
And yet, as FDR told him in private correspondence, while the president agreed with Bullitt about both sending arms and weapons to France and Britain to give them a better chance of surviving the coming blow and about the need for the US to urgently start its own war preparations, FDR faced a populace mostly sympathetic to those who railed against becoming involved once again in the quarrels of Europe.
Bullitt recognized that the evolution of aerial warfare, and the threat posed by Germany successfully conquering Britain and thus eliminating the awesome British navy, both meant that the continental US would eventually also become a realizable target by Hitler. His letters to the president at the time were nearly frantic because of this.
But Bullitt's "warts" increasingly grated those with whom he was closest. And, just as he eventually broke with Wilson over Versailles, FDR's reluctance to use him again -- at least in the ways that Bullitt thought he deserved -- began to turn him against FDR, too. As other historians have observed, the Roosevelt that traveled to the fateful conference at Yalta was visibly very ill, and his decisions there infuriated Bullitt because they seemed to him to give Stalin a wide-open road to acquire more territory in Europe.
Bullitt, like Kennan, came from a well-established family line accustomed to money and status. He was truly brilliant and, like many such folks, could quickly become impatient with, and then intolerant of, lesser beings, including those who saw things differently than themselves. The resulting arrogance and often visibly discourteous behavior made Bullitt enemies in high places, and they increasingly were able to block or deflect his advancement to another senior post.
Bullitt had guts, though, and this must be acknowledged. As ambassador to France, he stayed behind in Paris to help "save" the city from German destruction. In this position, he worked hard to parley terms with the victorious Germans to both spare the city and its residents from needless destruction. Then, years later, he returned to fight along with the free French against the German occupiers.
The authors rely on a great deal of primary material, and include significant swaths of it in this book, all of which make fascinating reading. We can see in Bullitt's own words evidence of his intelligence, idealism, willingness to work fantastically hard at his assignments, as well as his arrogance and anger.
A great man who deserved to remember as one who truly tried on every occasion to "rise" to the occasion. Yes, he sometimes was wrong, and often overbearing, but he was a great man who possessed incredible vision and an ability to perceive patterns of future likelihoods long before others could. And, much like Cassandra of legend, he suffered usually the same fate as she...unheeded.
Anyone interested in the history of the first part of the 20th century would likely find this book of interest. And it can't be beat for its insight into the diplomacy of the period, either.
As an American historian, I was aware of Bullitt before this, but had not studied him closely. He now joins the canon of "most respected statesmen" in my mind as he was clearly a brilliant and good man, albeit not without his own Achilles heel, an affliction most of us have (even if seldom acknowledged).
Like Costigliola's book on Kennan, Messers Brownell and Billings provide us with not only a masterful biography of an important figure, but in doing so also provide yet another window in the crucial decisions -- good and bad, wise and foolish -- that so shaped most of the 20th century (and with which we continue to struggle today).
Like Kennan, Bullitt, too, was entranced with Russia, and much of his attention throughout his life centered on its evolution from the Tsarist state through the revolution and into the repressive totalitarianism of Stalin. Like Kennan, he wanted the revolution to succeed because he shared the expressed idealism of so many of the early Bolsheviks. However, and also like Kennan, his service as the first American ambassador to the Soviet Union soon disenchanted him as he learned of the reality imposed by Stalin.
The book makes for fascinating reading, and reads often as if it were a spy thriller. For example, on the sly, President Wilson sent Bullitt on a secret mission to meet with Lenin in order to not only better acquaint himself with Lenin the man but also to discern, if possible, the future course of Russia after the revolution and ensuing civil war there.
Also like Kennan, Bullitt was deeply disappointed by the course of the peace conference at Versailles called to end the First World War. Like Kennan, he also hoped that the peace could be "won" by Wilson holding to the lofty ideals expressed in his public speeches, especially that of his "Fourteen Points." Unfortunately, despite the superb preparation of the American mission sent to Versailles, Wilson was repeatedly outmaneuvered by Lloyd George of Great Britain and Clemenceau of France, the latter especially determined to "make Germany pay" for the horrors of the war. He very early recognized that the "peace" settlement in reality was setting the conditions for a future war, both because it imposed financial reparations upon Germany that were beyond its ability to pay even under the best circumstances -- something entirely upset by the world crisis of the Great Depression -- and by ceding so much territory from Germany to other nations despite the fact that those lands contained significant numbers of German citizens.
Later, Bullitt was also sent to France as an ambassador, this time in the service of President Roosevelt. During the latter years of the 1930s he quickly realized how badly prepared for war were most of the Western nations, including the US, and also recognized that the repeated failure of the West and of the League of Nations -- which had signaled as early as Japan's invasion of Manchuria that it was unwilling to guard the peace against acts of aggression -- guaranteed that Hitler's appetite for "more" and his willingness to push the West would just keep growing.
It is wrenching to read again about the failure of France and Britain to guarantee Checkoslovakia's territorial integrity, and to recognize how that failure guaranteed that Hitler's next move would be against either Poland or France.
And yet, as FDR told him in private correspondence, while the president agreed with Bullitt about both sending arms and weapons to France and Britain to give them a better chance of surviving the coming blow and about the need for the US to urgently start its own war preparations, FDR faced a populace mostly sympathetic to those who railed against becoming involved once again in the quarrels of Europe.
Bullitt recognized that the evolution of aerial warfare, and the threat posed by Germany successfully conquering Britain and thus eliminating the awesome British navy, both meant that the continental US would eventually also become a realizable target by Hitler. His letters to the president at the time were nearly frantic because of this.
But Bullitt's "warts" increasingly grated those with whom he was closest. And, just as he eventually broke with Wilson over Versailles, FDR's reluctance to use him again -- at least in the ways that Bullitt thought he deserved -- began to turn him against FDR, too. As other historians have observed, the Roosevelt that traveled to the fateful conference at Yalta was visibly very ill, and his decisions there infuriated Bullitt because they seemed to him to give Stalin a wide-open road to acquire more territory in Europe.
Bullitt, like Kennan, came from a well-established family line accustomed to money and status. He was truly brilliant and, like many such folks, could quickly become impatient with, and then intolerant of, lesser beings, including those who saw things differently than themselves. The resulting arrogance and often visibly discourteous behavior made Bullitt enemies in high places, and they increasingly were able to block or deflect his advancement to another senior post.
Bullitt had guts, though, and this must be acknowledged. As ambassador to France, he stayed behind in Paris to help "save" the city from German destruction. In this position, he worked hard to parley terms with the victorious Germans to both spare the city and its residents from needless destruction. Then, years later, he returned to fight along with the free French against the German occupiers.
The authors rely on a great deal of primary material, and include significant swaths of it in this book, all of which make fascinating reading. We can see in Bullitt's own words evidence of his intelligence, idealism, willingness to work fantastically hard at his assignments, as well as his arrogance and anger.
A great man who deserved to remember as one who truly tried on every occasion to "rise" to the occasion. Yes, he sometimes was wrong, and often overbearing, but he was a great man who possessed incredible vision and an ability to perceive patterns of future likelihoods long before others could. And, much like Cassandra of legend, he suffered usually the same fate as she...unheeded.
Anyone interested in the history of the first part of the 20th century would likely find this book of interest. And it can't be beat for its insight into the diplomacy of the period, either.
October 27, 2025
For most of the book, I was uncertain what the title meant. Was Bullitt "close to greatness" because of his potential or the actions he took, or was he "close to greatness" because he was in close contact and influential with those who were great - Woodrow Wilson, FDR, and a host of other significant historical figures? The last page answers the question: "Bullitt came close to greatness, for he had the promise of greatness; that he failed to realize that promise was a tragedy."
He had a varied career - journalist, novelist, the first US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and US Ambassador to France up to the Nazi occupation of Paris. He had the ear of Presidents. He knew just about every major player on the scene in the US from the start of the first World War to the end of the second. He dealt with both Lenin and Stalin. He co-wrote a book about Woodrow Wilson with Sigmund Freud. He was a friend and neighbor of Chiang Kai-shek. He married the widow of John Reed and had an affair with one of FDR's secretaries. If there was a novel with a main character who knew and was close to so many historical figures, people would find it not credible.
He went to Moscow with a high opinion of the Bolsheviks (or at least, a high opinion of what they could accomplish). He left Moscow with a deep distrust and hatred of the Bolsheviks, and, in fact, ended his life as a most virulent anti-Communist.
He had some foresight. He correctly predicted the European wars that the Treaty of Versailles enabled. In August of 1944, he said the Nazis would be defeated in six or eight months. He predicted Stalin's control of Eastern Europe and made recommendations to FDR that FDR ignored.
He also made predictions that didn't pan out - he had a high opinion of Petain at the formation of the Vichy regime and through his dealings with Bao Dai, set the stage for America's involvement in Vietnam.
A most interesting character, his life makes for a great story. But he was deeply flawed, and almost all of those great people he knew and who carried great responsibilities recognized those flaws. I think the book makes clear that those flaws prevented his rise to greatness.
He had a varied career - journalist, novelist, the first US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and US Ambassador to France up to the Nazi occupation of Paris. He had the ear of Presidents. He knew just about every major player on the scene in the US from the start of the first World War to the end of the second. He dealt with both Lenin and Stalin. He co-wrote a book about Woodrow Wilson with Sigmund Freud. He was a friend and neighbor of Chiang Kai-shek. He married the widow of John Reed and had an affair with one of FDR's secretaries. If there was a novel with a main character who knew and was close to so many historical figures, people would find it not credible.
He went to Moscow with a high opinion of the Bolsheviks (or at least, a high opinion of what they could accomplish). He left Moscow with a deep distrust and hatred of the Bolsheviks, and, in fact, ended his life as a most virulent anti-Communist.
He had some foresight. He correctly predicted the European wars that the Treaty of Versailles enabled. In August of 1944, he said the Nazis would be defeated in six or eight months. He predicted Stalin's control of Eastern Europe and made recommendations to FDR that FDR ignored.
He also made predictions that didn't pan out - he had a high opinion of Petain at the formation of the Vichy regime and through his dealings with Bao Dai, set the stage for America's involvement in Vietnam.
A most interesting character, his life makes for a great story. But he was deeply flawed, and almost all of those great people he knew and who carried great responsibilities recognized those flaws. I think the book makes clear that those flaws prevented his rise to greatness.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews