George Kennan and the Dilemmas of Us Foreign Policy

by David Allan Mayers

One of a select group of American foreign service officers to receive specialized training on the Soviet Union in the late 1920s and early 1930s, George Frost Kennan eventually became the American government's chief expert on Soviet affairs during the height of the Cold War.
Drawing upon a wealth of original research, David Mayers' fascinating life of George Kennan examines his high-level participation in foreign policy-making and interprets his political and philosophical development within a historical framework. Mayers presents an engaging and lucid account of Kennan's training; his rise to prominence during the late 1940s and his policy failures; and his later roles as critic of America's external policy, advocate of détente with the Soviet Union, and proponent of nuclear arms limitation. Mayers also explores Kennan's complicated relationships with such important political figures and analysts as Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, and Walter Lippmann.

416 pages, Paperback

First published December 8, 1988

Reviews

[Francis Kilkenny]

David Mayers ‘George Kennan and the Dilemmas of US Foreign Policy’ is an excellent work of research on one man’s ideas. It is not for every reader, as it is academic and a bit dry. However, for anyone interested in the complex history of US diplomacy, it is a must read. George Kennan was a policy-maker and an influential critic of US foreign policy. He helped shape perceptions across society about many topics, from the cold war, through the Vietnam War to nuclear disarmament. A complex figure who eschewed political definition, by working with, supporting and disagreeing both Democrats and Republicans, Kennan had a deeper moral code based on his Christianity, adherence to conservatism in its more traditional (and European) sense and a realism regarding international politics. While he is often tied to the containment doctrine in regards to the Soviet Union, he consistently encouraged diplomatic relations with that other superpower and defended many against the excesses of McCarthyism. He was against nuclear proliferation, called for nuclear arms reduction, advocated for ending the Vietnam war and supported traditional diplomacy. But he also disliked the loose beatnik and hippie cultures of mid-twentieth century and his ideas about the third world were out of date, to say the least. Overall, he was a fascinating figure and an interesting lense through which to view US foreign policy in the twentieth century. The book is a very even-handed survey of Kennan’s ideas, successes and failures, giving credit where he was insightful and prescient but criticizing where he fell short. A very good read for those with the right interests.