Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism

by Torin Alter (Editor), Yujin Nagasawa (Editor)

According to Russellian monism, an alternative to the familiar theories in the philosophy of mind that combines attractive components of physicalism and dualism, matter has intrinsic properties that both constitute consciousness and serve as categorical bases for the dispositional properties described in physics.

Consciousness in the Physical World collects various works on Russellian monism, including historical selections, recent classics, and new pieces. Most chapters are sympathetic with the view, but some are skeptical. Together, they constitute the first book-length treatment of the view itself, its relationship to other theories, its motivations, and its problems.

Genres: Philosophy

472 pages, Hardcover

First published April 28, 2015

Reviews

[Gethin Down · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fascinating collection. I used this for my master's thesis and it was invaluable.

[Erik · Rating 3 out of 5]

Fascinating collection on Russellian monism in the philosophy of mind. However not everyone who works in this area is represented in this collection and many positions were left out of consideration. So when they speak about this or that option as being viable you have to understand that they are only talking about a few options and not much detail has been given to any of these positions. I had one minor quibble with Derk Pereboom's definition of a relatively intrinsic property. A relatively intrinsic property is like a "dancing pair" applied to the pair at once. Clearly being a pair is a relation but being a dancing pair is intrinsic to the pair since you couldn't remove this property from the duo without dissolving the pair. Yes, I know they could re-pair up for some other reason but that isn't the point. Yet if "being an intrinsic property" is a relational property doesn't that mean it isn't intrinsic after all to be an intrinsic property? Or maybe that the distinction isn't that important or fundamental. Myself I find the whole categorical/dispositional, intrinsic/relational distinction and excess talk about properties a little outdated. These terms and distinctions and allied logical puzzles about them have no application to real scientific discourse and should be abandoned in favor of a more realistic description of the problem.