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Stanford Nuclear Age Series
Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb
Drawing on oral testimony, previously unseen personal papers, and newly released archival information, this book provides a comprehensive account of British and American intelligence on the Soviet nuclear weapons program from 1945-1958. The book charts new territory, revising traditional accounts of Anglo-American nuclear relations and intelligence cooperation. It reveals how intelligence was collected: the roles played by defectors, aerial reconnaissance, and how novel forms of espionage were perfected to penetrate the Soviet nuclear program. It documents what conclusions were drawn from this information, and assesses the resulting estimates. Throughout the book a central theme is the Anglo-American partnership, depicting how it developed and how legal restrictions could be circumvented by cunning and guile.
316 pages, Hardcover
First published December 6, 2007
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December 8, 2020
From the journal
International Security
The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation
Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs
[Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs are Assistant Professors of Political Science at Yale University]
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First, U.S. decision makers knew that estimates of Soviet progress were “five percent information and ninety-five percent construction.”
See David Lilienthal (chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in control of U.S. nuclear weapons), quoted in Michael S. Goodman, Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb (Redwood City, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 28.
This knowledge led the military to prepare war plans as early as October 1945 and important voices in Washington to argue for a strike as early as January 1946.
See Russell D. Buhite and Wm. Christopher Hamel, “War for Peace: The Question of an American Preventive War against the Soviet Union, 1945–1955,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 14, No. 3 (July 1990), pp. 367–384, at p. 374.
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Conclusion
This article has introduced a security-based theory of nuclear proliferation focusing on the strategic interaction between a state, its enemies, and, where present, allies. We conclude that only two types of states acquire the bomb: powerful but highly threatened states; and weaker states whose territory is protected by an ally they deem unlikely to remain present in the long-term or unwilling to ensure its other core security goals. The empirical rarity of these strategic situations is responsible for the relatively low number of states—fewer than 5 percent—that have acquired the bomb during the first seven decades of the nuclear age. This anding questions frequent claims that nuclear weapons are the “weapon of the weak,” the “great equalizer” in international relations.
International Security
The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation
Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs
[Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs are Assistant Professors of Political Science at Yale University]
---
First, U.S. decision makers knew that estimates of Soviet progress were “five percent information and ninety-five percent construction.”
See David Lilienthal (chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in control of U.S. nuclear weapons), quoted in Michael S. Goodman, Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb (Redwood City, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 28.
This knowledge led the military to prepare war plans as early as October 1945 and important voices in Washington to argue for a strike as early as January 1946.
See Russell D. Buhite and Wm. Christopher Hamel, “War for Peace: The Question of an American Preventive War against the Soviet Union, 1945–1955,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 14, No. 3 (July 1990), pp. 367–384, at p. 374.
---
Conclusion
This article has introduced a security-based theory of nuclear proliferation focusing on the strategic interaction between a state, its enemies, and, where present, allies. We conclude that only two types of states acquire the bomb: powerful but highly threatened states; and weaker states whose territory is protected by an ally they deem unlikely to remain present in the long-term or unwilling to ensure its other core security goals. The empirical rarity of these strategic situations is responsible for the relatively low number of states—fewer than 5 percent—that have acquired the bomb during the first seven decades of the nuclear age. This anding questions frequent claims that nuclear weapons are the “weapon of the weak,” the “great equalizer” in international relations.
Displaying 1 of 1 review