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Breaking the Mold: Tanks in the Cities
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Contains five case studies from World War II to the present war in Iraq analyzing the utility of tanks and heavy armored forces in urban combat.
Breaking the Mold provides an up-to-date analysis of the utility of tanks and heavy armored forces in urban combat. The case studies in this monograph are high-intensity battles in conflicts ranging from limited interventions to major combat operations. As the intensity of the operation decreases, the second and third order effects of using tanks in cities can begin to outweigh their utility. The damage to infrastructure caused by their sheer weight and size is just one example of what can make tanks unsuitable for every mission. Even during peace operations, however, the ability to employ tanks and other heavy armored vehicles quickly can be crucial.
These cases demonstrate that tanks must do more than merely “arrive” on the battlefield to be successful in urban combat. From Aachen in 1944 to Fallujah in 2004, the absolute need for specialized training and the use of combined arms at the lowest tactical levels are two of the most salient lessons that emerge from this study. When properly employed, well-trained and well-supported units led by tanks are decisive in urban combat. The reverse is also true.
Related
TARDEC Sixty-Five Years of Innovation, 1946-2010 --Hardcover format can be found
Mounted Combat in Vietnam --Paperback format- -can be found
Other products produced by the U.S. Army, Combat Studies Institute can be found
Contains five case studies from World War II to the present war in Iraq analyzing the utility of tanks and heavy armored forces in urban combat.
Breaking the Mold provides an up-to-date analysis of the utility of tanks and heavy armored forces in urban combat. The case studies in this monograph are high-intensity battles in conflicts ranging from limited interventions to major combat operations. As the intensity of the operation decreases, the second and third order effects of using tanks in cities can begin to outweigh their utility. The damage to infrastructure caused by their sheer weight and size is just one example of what can make tanks unsuitable for every mission. Even during peace operations, however, the ability to employ tanks and other heavy armored vehicles quickly can be crucial.
These cases demonstrate that tanks must do more than merely “arrive” on the battlefield to be successful in urban combat. From Aachen in 1944 to Fallujah in 2004, the absolute need for specialized training and the use of combined arms at the lowest tactical levels are two of the most salient lessons that emerge from this study. When properly employed, well-trained and well-supported units led by tanks are decisive in urban combat. The reverse is also true.
Related
TARDEC Sixty-Five Years of Innovation, 1946-2010 --Hardcover format can be found
Mounted Combat in Vietnam --Paperback format- -can be found
Other products produced by the U.S. Army, Combat Studies Institute can be found
148 pages, Paperback
First published July 12, 2006
About the author
Kendall D. Gott
18 books4 followersRetired Team Chief/Senior Historian at Combat Studies Institute Current Gentleman-Farmer in Kickapoo, KS
Kendall D. Gott is a retired army officer and as well as a retired senior historian of the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth Kansas. He is the author of several studies on American military history and the book Where the South Lost the War: An Analysis of the Fort Henry-Fort Donelson Campaign February 1862. Mr. Gott resides in Leavenworth County with his high school sweetheart, Julia.
Kendall D. Gott is a retired army officer and as well as a retired senior historian of the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth Kansas. He is the author of several studies on American military history and the book Where the South Lost the War: An Analysis of the Fort Henry-Fort Donelson Campaign February 1862. Mr. Gott resides in Leavenworth County with his high school sweetheart, Julia.
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Displaying 1 - 1 of 1 review
May 27, 2022
In his book, Kendall D. Gott attempts to prove that, contrary to what is widely believed, tanks are essential to urban warfare. Being a layman in military analysis, I initially found his arguments persuasive. However, now that I am reading different accounts of the battle for Hue, one of the battles that the author mentions to prove the tanks' invaluable contribution to the good performance of the Americans, a different picture emerges.
According to accounts of participants in the battle, the tanks were "just too damned slow" for urban warfare. While Gott argues that they helped cover the infantry, soldiers complained that it took them too much time to drive down the street and shoot. The M-48 tank, which the author praises for its effectiveness, was lumbering and ineffective on its own. Then what helped the Marines turn the tide of the battle?
As it turned out, Gott has drawn the wrong conclusion from the Marines' success: they had indeed prevailed over the North Vietnamese thanks to their armored vehicles, but not thanks to their tanks in particular. The decisive vehicles were the small, fast Ontos that could drive over clear terrain faster than forty-five miles per hour. Although they had their disadvantages – their armor was not thick enough and could be pierced an enemy armor-piercing round, and a well-armed rocket could destroy an Ontos with its crew inside – its power was still enough to blow down any house. This is where the M-48 tanks came into play.
As the Marines realized, when teamed up with an M-48 tank, the Ontos made a huge difference in the house-to-house fighting inside Hue. The Ontos used their speed and machine gun fire to get into position, quickly fire all six rounds, and then get back to safety. The cumbersome tanks, meanwhile, protected the Ontos from getting targeted by a North Vietnamese rocket. It was this effective combination that dramatically reversed the course of the battle. The North Vietnamese were caught completely unprepared by this innovative approach Although they tried to respond with some small-arms fire, the Ontos and tank crews remained virtually unharmed.
This deadly tactic proved to be a major asset for the Marines throughout the rest of the battle. Although the North Vietnamese Army defenders eventually adjusted to this tactic and attempted to blow away the tanks and Ontos, they were often caught out off guard because of the speed of the Ontos and the great combined firepower of the armored vehicles and the tanks, so the Marines were usually one step ahead of them.
All in all, the Marines' performance in the battle of Hue proves that Gott's conclusions were not completely erroneous, but not fully correct either. Contrary to what is widely believed, tanks are not something to be discarded from future urban battles. However, they will not, as he claims, pave the way toward victory. Being slow and lumbering, they cannot advance fast enough to back up the infantry at all times. Urban warfare, as the author rightfully points out, is tricky because every building and ruble provides coverage for the enemy. In such terrain, vehicles more mobile than tanks are required. On the other hand, due to the limited visibility in the city, smaller armored vehicles need a strong shield against the enemy fire that they cannot see on time. This is where tanks come in handy. Although they were developed by Germany and France for the single purpose of beating a path for the infantry in frontal attacks against an entrenched enemy with rifles and machine guns, with the advance of urban warfare, this function of theirs has become obsolete.
Otherwise, Gott argues persuasively that urban warfare is the future. According to him, future military leaders will not have the luxury to avoid Sun Tzu's axiom, "The worse policy is to attack cities. . . . Attack cities only when there is no alternative." One advantage of his work is the author's graspable language, which makes a topic that is challenging for lay readers easier to understand.
BREAKING THE MOLD is, in my opinion, a misleading study. I think that Gott should not have built his argument around tanks only. His work would have been more accurate if he had focused on all armored vehicles. This book's main flaw is that it puts the quick employment of tanks in urban battles above the quick employment of other armored vehicles, which, as the battle of Hue has demonstrated, can be decisive for their outcome.
According to accounts of participants in the battle, the tanks were "just too damned slow" for urban warfare. While Gott argues that they helped cover the infantry, soldiers complained that it took them too much time to drive down the street and shoot. The M-48 tank, which the author praises for its effectiveness, was lumbering and ineffective on its own. Then what helped the Marines turn the tide of the battle?
As it turned out, Gott has drawn the wrong conclusion from the Marines' success: they had indeed prevailed over the North Vietnamese thanks to their armored vehicles, but not thanks to their tanks in particular. The decisive vehicles were the small, fast Ontos that could drive over clear terrain faster than forty-five miles per hour. Although they had their disadvantages – their armor was not thick enough and could be pierced an enemy armor-piercing round, and a well-armed rocket could destroy an Ontos with its crew inside – its power was still enough to blow down any house. This is where the M-48 tanks came into play.
As the Marines realized, when teamed up with an M-48 tank, the Ontos made a huge difference in the house-to-house fighting inside Hue. The Ontos used their speed and machine gun fire to get into position, quickly fire all six rounds, and then get back to safety. The cumbersome tanks, meanwhile, protected the Ontos from getting targeted by a North Vietnamese rocket. It was this effective combination that dramatically reversed the course of the battle. The North Vietnamese were caught completely unprepared by this innovative approach Although they tried to respond with some small-arms fire, the Ontos and tank crews remained virtually unharmed.
This deadly tactic proved to be a major asset for the Marines throughout the rest of the battle. Although the North Vietnamese Army defenders eventually adjusted to this tactic and attempted to blow away the tanks and Ontos, they were often caught out off guard because of the speed of the Ontos and the great combined firepower of the armored vehicles and the tanks, so the Marines were usually one step ahead of them.
All in all, the Marines' performance in the battle of Hue proves that Gott's conclusions were not completely erroneous, but not fully correct either. Contrary to what is widely believed, tanks are not something to be discarded from future urban battles. However, they will not, as he claims, pave the way toward victory. Being slow and lumbering, they cannot advance fast enough to back up the infantry at all times. Urban warfare, as the author rightfully points out, is tricky because every building and ruble provides coverage for the enemy. In such terrain, vehicles more mobile than tanks are required. On the other hand, due to the limited visibility in the city, smaller armored vehicles need a strong shield against the enemy fire that they cannot see on time. This is where tanks come in handy. Although they were developed by Germany and France for the single purpose of beating a path for the infantry in frontal attacks against an entrenched enemy with rifles and machine guns, with the advance of urban warfare, this function of theirs has become obsolete.
Otherwise, Gott argues persuasively that urban warfare is the future. According to him, future military leaders will not have the luxury to avoid Sun Tzu's axiom, "The worse policy is to attack cities. . . . Attack cities only when there is no alternative." One advantage of his work is the author's graspable language, which makes a topic that is challenging for lay readers easier to understand.
BREAKING THE MOLD is, in my opinion, a misleading study. I think that Gott should not have built his argument around tanks only. His work would have been more accurate if he had focused on all armored vehicles. This book's main flaw is that it puts the quick employment of tanks in urban battles above the quick employment of other armored vehicles, which, as the battle of Hue has demonstrated, can be decisive for their outcome.
Displaying 1 - 1 of 1 review