Ever since its creation, the Indian Constitution has been a deeply studied document. It has been discussed and dissected by citizens, scholars, lawyers and politicians.
The Indian Constitution: A Conversation with Power takes a new approach in discussing the Constitution: as a document that creates, shapes, channels and constrains power. It shows how the seventy-five years of constitutionalism in India have been characterized by a drift towards centralized and homogenous power located within the union executive. It also examines how certain Supreme Court judgments, especially in recent years, have accelerated this drift towards centralization.
However, it is for us citizens to decide, ultimately, what vision(s) of constitutional power we want to adopt and give to ourselves.
A timely and critical interrogation of the Constitution through the lens of power, this book asks certain fundamental, first-principle questions about the Indian Constitution that all Indian citizens need to think about.
Gautam Bhatia is an Indian science fiction writer.
He is the author of the SF Duology, The Wall and The Horizon, both of which featured on Locus Magazine's Recommended Reading Lists in 2021 (Best Debut Novel) and 2022 (Best Science Fiction Novel). The Wall was a finalist for the 2021 Valley of Words Best English Language Novel Prize. Bhatia was long-listed for the Astounding Award for Best New Writer at both the 2021 World Science Fiction Convention (WorldCon), and the 2022 WorldCon.
Bhatia is also the co-ordinating editor of Strange Horizons, a weekly online magazine of fantasy and science fiction, which won the British Fantasy Award in 2021, and has been a finalist for the Hugo Awards every year since 2013. In 2022, he was nominated for a World Fantasy Award for his work with the magazine.
His reviews and essays on science fiction and fantasy have appeared in Strange Horizons, The Hindustan Times, Scroll, and The Wire.
At a time when the Constitution is constantly in the news and is being sanctified in public discourse, Gautam Bhatia's book urges a more reflective and critical engagement. It highlights the many structural and functional shortcomings in the Indian constitutional framework that deserve scrutiny—especially in light of evolving democratic expectations.
The book's core argument, as articulated by Bhatia, rests on three mutually reinforcing pillars:
1. The Indian Constitution, like any other, is a terrain of contestation between different and competing visions of power.
2. The Constitution has exhibited a 'centralizing drift'—a movement toward a statist, homogenous, unitary, concentrated and executive-oriented vision of power, often at the expense of a more decentralized, federal, plural, and distributed model.
3. This centralizing drift is embedded in the text and design of the Constitution itself and has been accelerated through key Supreme Court judgments at various inflection points in India’s constitutional history.
The book contends that, in many crucial respects, the power architecture of the Indian Constitution mirrors elements of colonial constitutionalism:
*Weak mechanisms of accountability and oversight over the executive, where the opposition lacks constitutional empowerment for effective checks and balances within parliamentary democracy.
*A thin concept of representation, with participatory democracy not extending meaningfully beyond the symbolic invocation of "We the People" in the Preamble.
*A homogenizing vision that stands in tension with India's pluralistic and diverse reality, resisting meaningful decentralization of authority.
A particularly insightful contribution of the book is its discussion of 'constitutional common sense'—a term used to describe the prevailing interpretive logic that has guided the Supreme Court. Rather than challenging centralized power, this common sense has often reinforced it, resisting progressive readings of constitutional or statutory provisions that diverge from presumed populist viewpoints.
Throughout its exploration of federalism, parliamentarianism, pluralism, institutions, rights, and the people, the book demonstrates how the Court's interpretive approach has frequently avoided confronting the underlying dynamics of power. It shows how Indian constitutionalism is shaped by politics, and how politics, in turn, shapes the Constitution.
Gautam Bhatia introduces the term 'FrankenConstitution', derived from the idea of a Frankenstate, to describe the intricate interlinkages between different axes of power embedded in the constitutional framework. This is illustrated through compelling examples such as the Maharashtra political crisis and the abrogation of Article 370 in Kashmir.
In essence, the book argues that human action is deeply shaped by constitutional structures and institutional architecture. Rather than limiting critique to individuals or parties, Gautam advocates for a deeper, structural conversation—about constitutional design, historical choices, and the 'power map' that continues to define India’s democracy today.