The book is important as it fills a void which has not been covered until now with regards to South Africa's Border War. The author was instrumental in writing the doctrine of mechanized warfare for the SADF.
Writing a doctrine is akin to the work of a musical composer, who is influenced and inspired by previous works, de Vries states that his primary influence was that of Basil Liddel-Hart and the German general Heinz Guderian. It is interesting that he did not mention the work of JFC Fuller who was a contemporary of Liddel Hart, nor does he mention any study of the Soviet doctrines of Operational Art and Deep Battle, mainly by Tukachevsky, Isserson, Varfolomeev and others.
The latter doctrine caters for an army of 250 divisions but many of its principles could and should have been applied to the SADF. The book highlights certain central failures of the SADF in the border war (most of these, unintentionally).
Firstly, when the author designed the mechanized battalion he and his colleagues did not include a reconnaissance platoon built into the unit. The little reconnaissance ever done (mainly consisting of merely leading the 250 vehicle, 55 km long column, through Angola to its objective) were given to a couple of platoon commanders who were sharp navigators. This is not the role of an infantry platoon commander. A reconnaissance screen was never deployed ahead of the unit and basic tasks of reconnaissance were never given. The author shows no understanding of reconnaissance as a military profession or how to use it, and neither do other SADF officers. The noisy mechanized column was used to crash through the bush and storm SWAPO and FAPLA positions. These troops, not being suicidal, simply melted away long before the vehicle borne force arrived. The metaphor is using a short sighted elephant to hunt a jackal.
SAAF preparatory air strikes were also largely ineffective and only served to warn the enemy of the impending attack. The next failure is repeatedly mentioned by the author throughout - it is that of field intelligence, which was non-existent. The SADF was often thwarted and frustrated by a severe lack of intelligence and relied on artillery spotter officers (FOO/FAO) and reports from small infantry squads, mainly from 32 Battalion. It is not the role of the artillery spotting officer to collect, compile and report intelligence, though he may well make incidental contributions here and there. Here again, the failure is linked to the lack of reconnaissance units or an understanding of their role as well as no existing SADF field intelligence units at the time. Field intelligence is also a military profession all unto itself, and it didn't exist in the SADF. No effort was ever made to cultivate HUMINT sources among the Angolan population or even within SWAPO and FAPLA. The South Africans paid dearly for this.
Thirdly, the author showed some understanding of the components of Soviet Deep Battle, such as striking the enemy support and rear echelons, their logistical effort, command and control, using vertical (and/or amphibious) envelopment and extensive deception (Maskirovka), but this was never used by him, at least until Operation Meebos II and never properly by the SADF. The only deception used by the SADF took the form of not attacking from the south as the enemy expected, once using a feint attack during Operation Hooper and some localized psyops with loudspeakers, here and there. To be effective, all these measures of Deep Battle need to be used simultaneously, in order to maximize their effect, create chaos and to harm the main effort at the front. Command and control nodes aren't only attacked, but their capacity for processing information is overwhelmed and paralyzed by multiple simultaneous strikes, throughout the enemy echelons and to their rear as well. A great negative example would be Operations Hooper and Packer where a half-hearted effort was made to attack the logistics route between Cuito Cunivale and Menongue, but it was not done simultaneously or in coordination with the main SADF effort.
De Vries constantly laments the lack of air-superiority experienced from the mid '80's and onward and describes how the skies were abandoned to the Cuban and Soviet MiGs and SAMs. This in turn emboldened the Cubans overall and was a contributing factor to their aggressive action against the SADF in 1988. It is inexplicable why the outstanding SADF Special Forces were never used to attack enemy radar, SAM batteries and airfields. This should have been done immediately prior to, or at the H Hour of every operation. At times artillery was used against SAMs and was planned against airfields, but was never actually undertaken. This in itself is a significant strategic failure of the senior SADF leadership.
Lastly, an organizational failing of the SADF would render those armed forces stricken, when all operations had to be halted or ended prior to the discharge of national servicemen. This stemmed from the SADF using two recruitment intakes a year for its servicemen. The simple solution would have been to adjust to four intakes a year, every quarter. This way, each intake would provide a company to a particular battalion. Thus, only one company of each battalion would have to be replaced (a new company would rotate in after its basic training, as the old company demobilized) and the battalion (or brigade, etc) could then maintain a continuum of operations. There are other variations to this solution - it's just a matter of some planning and implementation.
All of these errors show a glaring lack of imagination and thought on the part of not only the author himself at times, but of the SADF leadership as a whole. The author does however describe much ability, competence, effectiveness and bravery throughout the book. Much of the adaptation and formulation of conventional mechanized warfare for the Southern African theater is to be commended and provides very interesting reading.
The book overall makes for engaging reading, but at times is a little tedious, which is why I gave it four and not five stars.