What do you think?
Rate this book
Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture, and Philosophy
The persistence of deep moral disagreements--across cultures as well as within them--has created widespread skepticism about the objectivity of morality. Moral relativism, moral pessimism, and the denigration of ethics in comparison with science are the results. Fieldwork in Familiar Places challenges the misconceptions about morality, culture, and objectivity that support these skepticisms, to show that we can take moral disagreement seriously and yet retain our aspirations for moral objectivity. Michele Moody-Adams critically scrutinizes the anthropological evidence commonly used to support moral relativism. Drawing on extensive knowledge of the relevant anthropological literature, she dismantles the mystical conceptions of "culture" that underwrite relativism. She demonstrates that cultures are not hermetically sealed from each other, but are rather the product of eclectic mixtures and borrowings rich with contradictions and possibilities for change. The internal complexity of cultures is not only crucial for cultural survival, but will always thwart relativist efforts to confine moral judgments to a single culture. Fieldwork in Familiar Places will forever change the way we think about anthropologists, psychologists, historians, and philosophers alike will be forced to reconsider many of their theoretical presuppositions. Moody-Adams also challenges the notion that ethics is methodologically deficient because it does not meet standards set by natural science. She contends that ethics is an interpretive enterprise, not a failed naturalistic genuine ethical inquiry, including philosophical ethics, is a species of interpretive ethnography. We have reason for moral optimism, Moody-Adams argues. Even the most serious moral disagreements take place against a background of moral agreement, and thus genuine ethical inquiry will be fieldwork in familiar places. Philosophers can contribute to this enterprise, she believes, if they return to a Socratic conception of themselves as members of a rich and complex community of moral inquirers.
- GenresPhilosophy
272 pages, Hardcover
First published November 20, 1997
About the author
Michele M. Moody-Adams
1 book1 followerMichele Moody-Adams is Joseph Straus Professor of Political Philosophy and Legal Theory at Columbia University and a former Dean of Columbia College and Vice President for Undergraduate Education. She is the author of numerous articles and Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture and Philosophy (1997).
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
April 25, 2026
A PROPOSAL FOR A ‘LIMITED MORAL PLURALISM’ IN CULTURAL AREAS
Michele Moody-Adams is a Professor of Political Philosophy and Legal Theory at Columbia University; she previously taught at Cornell University, Wellesley College, the University of Rochester, and Indiana University.
She wrote in the Introduction to this 1997 book, “This book seeks to provide a plausible conception of moral objectivity and to defend a cautious optimism that moral philosophy can be an aid in serious, everyday moral inquiry. It thus sets itself against two important and mutually reinforcing developments in 20th century thought that have seemed to render such efforts quixotic. The first is a pervasive deference to natural science as the arbiter of all rationalism. This stance leads many to denigrate moral inquiry because its concerns cannot fit into the ‘naturalistic’ worldview defined by science… These skepticisms have been reinforced by the rise of moral relativism, a skepticism about moral objectivity based on claims about the diversity of moral practices.” (Pg. 1-2)
She explains, “These skeptical positions… share a powerful discontent about the persistence of serious moral disagreement. In this volume I show that this discontent rests on misconceptions about the nature of moral inquiry, the requirements of objectivity, and the concept of culture. To that end, I engage in what can be called ‘fieldwork’ in the complex intellectual culture from which all of these misconceptions emerge: a scrutiny of the shared beliefs, assumptions, and methods of arguments that underwrite contemporary skepticism about moral objectivity and moral inquiry. I then provide an account of the connections between morality, culture, and philosophical moral inquiry that is rich enough to show why taking moral disagreement seriously does not require skepticism about moral objectivity or about the value of moral philosophy to everyday moral reflection.” (Pg. 2-3)
She continues, “Some moral philosophers may wonder … why a philosophical examination of the roots of skepticism about morality and moral philosophy should devote so much attention to a detailed scrutiny of the claims of empirical anthropology regarding cultural difference. My answer to this important question is fourfold. First, contemporary philosophical discussions of moral diversity and disagreement frequently appeal to conclusions from empirical anthropology that … rest on questionable non-empirical assumptions about culture, human agency, and the problems and possibilities of moral language… Second, it has become a commonplace… that taking moral diversity and disagreement seriously requires (perhaps means) taking ‘culture’ seriously---an enterprise most obviously associated with anthropology… Third, there is a powerful irony… in the fact that anthropology has succeeded in independently reinforcing skepticisms that are so closely linked with confidence in the natural sciences… the fourth reason … [is that] Anthropological claims about morality and culture will help determine the future of public moral discourse---and thus ultimately the future of public moral discourse.” (Pg. 4-6)
She summarizes, “Ultimately, I urge that moral philosophy, if it is to take moral disagreement seriously, may itself need to undertake fieldwork in familiar places. Although there is perhaps a place for continued philosophical debate about the structure of moral theories, there is often more to be learned from … the ‘workmanlike’ moral inquiries of everyday agents and inquirers than from the disengaged speculation so common in contemporary moral philosophy.” (Pg. 11)
She explains, “the notion of cultural integration is widely influential in the empirical study of cultures primarily because it is neutral between the various definitions of culture that now compete for acceptance in the social sciences… The heterodox view that I defend, by contrast, recommends rejecting the notion of cultural integration because it is incapable of generating a plausible picture of the social world, and thus prevents real understanding of the complex relation between morality and culture.” (Pg. 45)
She observes, “the practice of recognizing that an infant is in pain rests, at least in part, on ‘primitive’ and originally prelinguistic phenomena such as crying and wincing. None of this actually licenses talk about a prelinguistic ‘consciousness,’ of course, and that notion is in no way essential to the view defended so far. Unlike many contemporary philosophers, however, I am not in principle opposed to the notion of a prelinguistic consciousness; indeed, I believe it that it might plausibly explain why total institutions so often fail to crush the human spirit.” (Pg. 94)
She continues, “These considerations, taken together, help show why some people who suffer oppression do not need the ‘language of the oppressor’ (or indeed any linguistic structures at all) to be able to express their pain and suffering. Admittedly, some kinds of pain (the pain of extreme humiliation, for instance) seems to have an irreducibly linguistic component. But even for these kinds of pain, it is reasonable to suppose that a range of natural expressions may yet be all that is needed to EXPRESS such pain.” (Pg. 94-95)
She notes, “It is beyond the scope of this project to trace the paths by which the reinterpretations embodied in the criticism of slavery actually took shape. Future explorations would trace the means by which slave narratives and other testimonies of ex-slaves, along with anti-slavery tracts and novels by non-slaves, and the trans-Atlantic transfer of evangelical Protestant opposition to slavery, all worked to stimulate moral imagination. To be sure, ending slavery required far more than a rearrangement of the details of moral reflection. It is nonetheless important to understand that anti-slavery arguments embodied a fundamental reimagining and reinterpretation of the moral world… This ongoing reordering and reinterpretation of moral practices reminds us that what is new in moral reflection (in historical as well as cross-cultural reflection) is always in the details.” (Pg. 106)
She states, “Moral theories do not, indeed cannot, solve moral problems for the very simple reason that no principle or rule that might be intended to systematize moral reasoning can be self-interpreting. The task of interpreting and applying a moral rule or principle calls on skills that cannot themselves be formalized or systematized.” (Pg. 173)
She explains, “on the limited moral pluralism I describe, it will sometimes be neither irrational nor indefensible to embrace evaluative practices that one believes to eliminate moral conflict from the realm of personal decision and action---practices that are also thereby believed to limit circumstances in which moral choices inevitably occasion deep regret. Those who choose to adopt such practices may need to separate themselves from those who embrace the fragmentation of value. But some such efforts can be defended on the pluralism defined here… Attempts to eliminate serious moral conflict from the realm of decision and action become problematic, on this conception, only if the ideals and principles embodied in one’s practices entail an attempt to coerce others into an unquestioning acceptance of one’s practices. The whole moral truth, however, is likely to be a pluralism that allows for the reasonableness of some lives that seek to reject it. But this limited pluralism is a critical pluralism, a conception of the plurality of moral values that leaves room for the critical analysis and rejection of some ways of life and some practices as outside the range of moral acceptability.” (Pg. 202-203)
She suggests, “Critical multiculturalism has urgently revealed the need to renegotiate the collective identities of the societies (principally Britain and the United States) in which it has emerged. This revelation has sometimes exposed the defenders of critical multiculturalism to vituperation from opponents who, often, simply seem unwilling to scrutinize their current self-conceptions. Yet debates about the influence of multiculturalism … have raised the problem of collective cultural identity in a particularly instructive way.” (Pg. 219)
She concludes, “I have argued that moral reflection is capable of transcending cultural and historical boundaries to enrich moral imagination in extraordinary ways. The richness and complexity of moral inquiry are reflected … in the continued possibilities for interpretation and reinterpretation of the ideas of one’s predecessors. But the richness of moral reflection is also manifested in cross-cultural arguments. Thus, for instance, indigenous peoples---for whom the language of rights may be initially unfamiliar---sometimes find that the idea of rights to cultural survival helps to articulate morally relevant dimensions of their increasingly precarious predicament. All such efforts are intelligible, and indeed possible, because the community of moral inquirers extends---in principle, and sometimes in practice---to any human being capable of reflection and self-scrutiny.” (Pg. 222) She adds, “Moral philosophy intended to aid everyday moral inquiry must be a responsibly engaged and richly Socratic fieldwork in familiar places.” (Pg. 224)
This book will be of keen interest to those studying ethical and moral issues.
Michele Moody-Adams is a Professor of Political Philosophy and Legal Theory at Columbia University; she previously taught at Cornell University, Wellesley College, the University of Rochester, and Indiana University.
She wrote in the Introduction to this 1997 book, “This book seeks to provide a plausible conception of moral objectivity and to defend a cautious optimism that moral philosophy can be an aid in serious, everyday moral inquiry. It thus sets itself against two important and mutually reinforcing developments in 20th century thought that have seemed to render such efforts quixotic. The first is a pervasive deference to natural science as the arbiter of all rationalism. This stance leads many to denigrate moral inquiry because its concerns cannot fit into the ‘naturalistic’ worldview defined by science… These skepticisms have been reinforced by the rise of moral relativism, a skepticism about moral objectivity based on claims about the diversity of moral practices.” (Pg. 1-2)
She explains, “These skeptical positions… share a powerful discontent about the persistence of serious moral disagreement. In this volume I show that this discontent rests on misconceptions about the nature of moral inquiry, the requirements of objectivity, and the concept of culture. To that end, I engage in what can be called ‘fieldwork’ in the complex intellectual culture from which all of these misconceptions emerge: a scrutiny of the shared beliefs, assumptions, and methods of arguments that underwrite contemporary skepticism about moral objectivity and moral inquiry. I then provide an account of the connections between morality, culture, and philosophical moral inquiry that is rich enough to show why taking moral disagreement seriously does not require skepticism about moral objectivity or about the value of moral philosophy to everyday moral reflection.” (Pg. 2-3)
She continues, “Some moral philosophers may wonder … why a philosophical examination of the roots of skepticism about morality and moral philosophy should devote so much attention to a detailed scrutiny of the claims of empirical anthropology regarding cultural difference. My answer to this important question is fourfold. First, contemporary philosophical discussions of moral diversity and disagreement frequently appeal to conclusions from empirical anthropology that … rest on questionable non-empirical assumptions about culture, human agency, and the problems and possibilities of moral language… Second, it has become a commonplace… that taking moral diversity and disagreement seriously requires (perhaps means) taking ‘culture’ seriously---an enterprise most obviously associated with anthropology… Third, there is a powerful irony… in the fact that anthropology has succeeded in independently reinforcing skepticisms that are so closely linked with confidence in the natural sciences… the fourth reason … [is that] Anthropological claims about morality and culture will help determine the future of public moral discourse---and thus ultimately the future of public moral discourse.” (Pg. 4-6)
She summarizes, “Ultimately, I urge that moral philosophy, if it is to take moral disagreement seriously, may itself need to undertake fieldwork in familiar places. Although there is perhaps a place for continued philosophical debate about the structure of moral theories, there is often more to be learned from … the ‘workmanlike’ moral inquiries of everyday agents and inquirers than from the disengaged speculation so common in contemporary moral philosophy.” (Pg. 11)
She explains, “the notion of cultural integration is widely influential in the empirical study of cultures primarily because it is neutral between the various definitions of culture that now compete for acceptance in the social sciences… The heterodox view that I defend, by contrast, recommends rejecting the notion of cultural integration because it is incapable of generating a plausible picture of the social world, and thus prevents real understanding of the complex relation between morality and culture.” (Pg. 45)
She observes, “the practice of recognizing that an infant is in pain rests, at least in part, on ‘primitive’ and originally prelinguistic phenomena such as crying and wincing. None of this actually licenses talk about a prelinguistic ‘consciousness,’ of course, and that notion is in no way essential to the view defended so far. Unlike many contemporary philosophers, however, I am not in principle opposed to the notion of a prelinguistic consciousness; indeed, I believe it that it might plausibly explain why total institutions so often fail to crush the human spirit.” (Pg. 94)
She continues, “These considerations, taken together, help show why some people who suffer oppression do not need the ‘language of the oppressor’ (or indeed any linguistic structures at all) to be able to express their pain and suffering. Admittedly, some kinds of pain (the pain of extreme humiliation, for instance) seems to have an irreducibly linguistic component. But even for these kinds of pain, it is reasonable to suppose that a range of natural expressions may yet be all that is needed to EXPRESS such pain.” (Pg. 94-95)
She notes, “It is beyond the scope of this project to trace the paths by which the reinterpretations embodied in the criticism of slavery actually took shape. Future explorations would trace the means by which slave narratives and other testimonies of ex-slaves, along with anti-slavery tracts and novels by non-slaves, and the trans-Atlantic transfer of evangelical Protestant opposition to slavery, all worked to stimulate moral imagination. To be sure, ending slavery required far more than a rearrangement of the details of moral reflection. It is nonetheless important to understand that anti-slavery arguments embodied a fundamental reimagining and reinterpretation of the moral world… This ongoing reordering and reinterpretation of moral practices reminds us that what is new in moral reflection (in historical as well as cross-cultural reflection) is always in the details.” (Pg. 106)
She states, “Moral theories do not, indeed cannot, solve moral problems for the very simple reason that no principle or rule that might be intended to systematize moral reasoning can be self-interpreting. The task of interpreting and applying a moral rule or principle calls on skills that cannot themselves be formalized or systematized.” (Pg. 173)
She explains, “on the limited moral pluralism I describe, it will sometimes be neither irrational nor indefensible to embrace evaluative practices that one believes to eliminate moral conflict from the realm of personal decision and action---practices that are also thereby believed to limit circumstances in which moral choices inevitably occasion deep regret. Those who choose to adopt such practices may need to separate themselves from those who embrace the fragmentation of value. But some such efforts can be defended on the pluralism defined here… Attempts to eliminate serious moral conflict from the realm of decision and action become problematic, on this conception, only if the ideals and principles embodied in one’s practices entail an attempt to coerce others into an unquestioning acceptance of one’s practices. The whole moral truth, however, is likely to be a pluralism that allows for the reasonableness of some lives that seek to reject it. But this limited pluralism is a critical pluralism, a conception of the plurality of moral values that leaves room for the critical analysis and rejection of some ways of life and some practices as outside the range of moral acceptability.” (Pg. 202-203)
She suggests, “Critical multiculturalism has urgently revealed the need to renegotiate the collective identities of the societies (principally Britain and the United States) in which it has emerged. This revelation has sometimes exposed the defenders of critical multiculturalism to vituperation from opponents who, often, simply seem unwilling to scrutinize their current self-conceptions. Yet debates about the influence of multiculturalism … have raised the problem of collective cultural identity in a particularly instructive way.” (Pg. 219)
She concludes, “I have argued that moral reflection is capable of transcending cultural and historical boundaries to enrich moral imagination in extraordinary ways. The richness and complexity of moral inquiry are reflected … in the continued possibilities for interpretation and reinterpretation of the ideas of one’s predecessors. But the richness of moral reflection is also manifested in cross-cultural arguments. Thus, for instance, indigenous peoples---for whom the language of rights may be initially unfamiliar---sometimes find that the idea of rights to cultural survival helps to articulate morally relevant dimensions of their increasingly precarious predicament. All such efforts are intelligible, and indeed possible, because the community of moral inquirers extends---in principle, and sometimes in practice---to any human being capable of reflection and self-scrutiny.” (Pg. 222) She adds, “Moral philosophy intended to aid everyday moral inquiry must be a responsibly engaged and richly Socratic fieldwork in familiar places.” (Pg. 224)
This book will be of keen interest to those studying ethical and moral issues.
December 15, 2021
This is a very badly written book, with some interesting ideas that are poorly developed. It has some very very modest arguments that were probably worth saying, but I don't think they needed as much space as she gave them. It's not clear that she's always fair to her targets.
Read
October 5, 2020read just a few chapters
December 7, 2018
Incredibly frustrating. This book does what it claims, but just barely and in the least interesting way possible.
Moody-Adams is much too attached to liberalism and much too ensconced in mainstream analytic philosophy to offer a substantive challenge to the kind of relativism to which I came to this book seeking a response. That is the postmodern relativism and anti-moralism that has come to unquestioningly dominate the so-called “critical” humanities, and which is best characterized by the traditions indebted to Foucault, Derrida, and queer theory. That is the real enemy of the critically engaged, progressive/radical scholar who is committed to social justice, Moody-Adams book does little to help challenge that form of relativism and nihilism.
To be sure, her critique of cultural relativism as that concept is deployed in mainstream philosophy is compelling in that context, but there is better feminist work that addresses similar issues (eg Khader, Narayan). As for a better response to relativism, I have consistently found Margaret Urban Walker’s “Moral Understandings” to be by far the best account of what morality really is that is also attentive to power and social injustice. Save yourself the trouble, and read Walker instead.
Moody-Adams is much too attached to liberalism and much too ensconced in mainstream analytic philosophy to offer a substantive challenge to the kind of relativism to which I came to this book seeking a response. That is the postmodern relativism and anti-moralism that has come to unquestioningly dominate the so-called “critical” humanities, and which is best characterized by the traditions indebted to Foucault, Derrida, and queer theory. That is the real enemy of the critically engaged, progressive/radical scholar who is committed to social justice, Moody-Adams book does little to help challenge that form of relativism and nihilism.
To be sure, her critique of cultural relativism as that concept is deployed in mainstream philosophy is compelling in that context, but there is better feminist work that addresses similar issues (eg Khader, Narayan). As for a better response to relativism, I have consistently found Margaret Urban Walker’s “Moral Understandings” to be by far the best account of what morality really is that is also attentive to power and social injustice. Save yourself the trouble, and read Walker instead.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews