Crítica de la moral afirmativa

by Julio Cabrera

Al preguntar filosóficamente por el valor de la vida humana, se debe preguntar por el valor del "ser mismo" en cuanto tal, en su surgir, en su venir-a-ser, y no por el valor de este o aquel ente en particular. Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Heidegger y Wittgenstein son los guías indispensables del autor en esta tentativa de pensamiento radical. Habermas, Tugendhat y Hare, algunos «afirmativos» afectados por la crítica. Lo «afirmativo» criticado en este libro se manifiesta en la convicción de que la teoría ética debe preguntar directamente por el cómo-ser (cómo vivir bien, cómo ser feliz, etc.), dando por ya respondida la pregunta más fundamental acerca del valor del ser mismo. En este sentido, tanto teorías éticas kantianas como utilitaristas, eudemonistas o ascéticas, con independencia de sus contenidos específicos, han sido, sin excepción, afirmativas. Por el carácter no radical de su reflexión queda sistemáticamente fuera del alcance crítico de las éticas afirmativas una inmensa parte de la inmoralidad que inunda hoy nuestro mundo, inmoralidad que no se basa en la transgresión de la norma moral, sino en su aplicación secundaria, en su cumplimiento estricto en áreas restringidas de acción. De acuerdo a una ética negativa, una aceptación plenaria del ser sólo podría defenderse en un sentido no argumentativo ―como lo hace Nietzsche― fuera de la ética. Si la filosofía debe conducir necesaria e inevitablemente ―de Platón a Schopenhauer― a la desvalorización radical de la vida, la respuesta de la vida ―de acuerdo con Nietzsche― no consistirá en mostrar que la filosofía está equivocada, sino en mostrar que la vida puede desvalorizar radicalmente a la propia filosofía que la desvaloriza. Pero, por otro lado, al escribir (en Humano, demasiado humano II): «El hombre que sufre no tiene derecho al pesimismo», se puede transformar la negación, con Nietzsche, en una pasión exuberante, en una poderosa forma de vida.

Genres: Philosophy

240 pages, Paperback

First published May 1, 1996

Reviews

[VII · Rating 4 out of 5]

July 2018
After rereading part of this, I have a few additions to make. I was kind of wrong in my comments about the second part of the book. Existing "heroically" It's just a second best option and he clearly states what is best. More importantly, even though I still think the structural vs the intra-world distinction is interesting, it's important to note that our valuation always comes from the intra-world matters. I believe that I was too excited by this distinction and the fact that someone actually challenged one of the most common humans dogmas that I forgot to look at the arguments that form these valuations more closely.

Cabrera states the fundamental ethical articulation (FEA) as following: behaving in such way that it is not the case that only the defense without restrictions of the own interests matters, being disposed –in case the consideration of other‟s interests so demands –to go against our own interests (132). Then he believes that it's impossible to follow this command because physical pain can always makes us violate it. He expresses the second part more clearly but I won't expand on that because I don't disagree with it. My problem is that the FEA is too demanding and that his arguments, because of the focus on ethics have much less force than they would had if they were focused on well-being. He does have some arguments for the latter too, but I think they are just not enough.

Another thing is that if we say that non-existence is inherently good or not bad then we have to accept the possibility that existence is also inherently good. But I believe that this is exactly what we should fight against. Valuation of existence or life should be based by its contents. It's simply a vessel of experiences and not something inherently good or bad. But note that this is not a comment towards Cabrera. He is trying to reach this conclusion in the appropriate way, by making arguments about existence in our world.

I keep my 4 stars because of the radical character of the book, particularly its first part.

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I found his book after reading his criticism of Benatar's Better never to have been and I was hooked immediately by his distinction between intra-world and structural suffering. Basically, a structural evaluation of the world has to do with the "mechanics" of the world, while an intra-world evaluation has to do with matters that can be changed with "progress". Hardware vs software if you want. For example, having to satisfy your hunger is a structural need, while hunger in Africa is an intra-world problem. His goal is to evaluate the structural aspects of existence in order to compare it with non-existence.

So far, so good. The book is relatively easy to read and I find the arguments of the first part of the book very convincing and quite important. The second part however, bored me. He is absolutely committed to the idea that personal choice has priority over good (the opposite leads to more interesting but of course preposterous conclusions) and all his analysis is focused in that. All this analysis seems irrelevant to me. You identified the problem and you know the solution. Analyzing the second-best way to live, especially when it borders in the "heroic pessimist" approach is just a cope out.

I will reread this soon though and add some notes. It is a very important book for me.

[Pedro · Rating 1 out of 5]

li o primeiro capitulo, muito, muito ruim

[Imaginarium · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very interesting book. Cabrera evaluates not the things in life that happen to us (goods things like pleasure or virtue, bad things like pain and vice), but life itself. He asks, does life has value in intself? Further, he questions, whether life could be considered to be a good in itself, considering various structural problems with being alive. By being alive we are subjected to decay, getting old and decrepid, dying, the lack of guarantee of satisfaction of our preferences and desires, and the inherent impossibility of living a moral life as we're struggling against the interests of other people (and even space occupied by other people!). This, according to Cabrera's radical philosophy, makes life not valuable, but negative.

Yes, it is a very thought-provoking work as it pushes the ethical thought to the meta-level (but not to meta-ethics!), in asking not merely "how ought we live?" but "is life worth living (starting, continuing)?"

The book is very uneven. Sometimes it's hard to follow because of the used concepts that have a lot of baggage associated with them (Heidegger's Being and the non-being of being). Sometimes the presentation of arguments is very clear, almost analytical in exposition. So don't be surprised if you like and understand some parts, but fail to understand other parts.

I read the English language version of the book, which is horrible. It seems to be a fan (and not a professional) translation. There are many typos, grammatical errors, sometimes it's hard to understand the already difficult topic because of this.

[Valentín Serrano García · Rating 3 out of 5]

Un libro interesante, más que por el tipo de argumentación propia-de-filosofos a mitad entre la frialdad cognitiva analítica y el coqueteo con la terminología heideggeriana, por la temática que aborda.

Desde luego, Julio Cabrera da en el clavo a la hora de exponer los fallos de la moral afirmativa [sí a la vida, la vida es buena per se], heredando así el relevo de los escépticos, hegelianos y freudianos. Al tratar de modo directo el asunto, se entiende con claridad la virtud ética de su reflexión. Ello lo convierte en un autor más cuidadoso que Benatar, pese a haber cosechado éste más fama.

Sin embargo, y pese a que tiene pasajes muy valiosos, el autor peca de un excesivo racionalismo mono-filosofico (aunque menor que la esqueletizacion analítica de Benatar) donde parece que la razón es garante de todo lo que puede decirse sobre la vida. En ocasiones, Cabrera se aleja tanto de la mundanidad que parece estar jugando con números antes que con sujetos. No estoy con ello invalidando su filosofía, pues coincido en gran parte de sus tesis. Pero creo que obviar la biología y sus tribulaciones, el hardware neuronal y mental, la cuestión del deseo o del dolor psíquico y la necesidad de reconocer que las palabras y proposiciones causa-efectistas sólo reproducen un sector reducido de nuestra experiencia daría más fuerza a su propuesta.

Se puede ser "más negativo" si se incluye el apofatismo, el arte o la historia de un modo conveniente. La perspectiva de Cabrera acaba siendo árida, pareciendo más un juego de filósofo de salón que algo a tomarse en serio. Acaba siendo más recomendable leer a Cioran o a Andrés [Semper dolens], o incluso dialogar con el psicoanálisis.