Uncertain Allies looks at the U.S. military’s experience in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater during World War II through the eyes of Joseph Stilwell, the commanding general of all American forces in those three countries. Accomplished historian Eric Setzekorn, focuses on two key uncertain allies and ambiguous missions.
Despite being allies, relationships between the Americans and Chinese, as well as the Americans and the British, were marked by a profound lack of trust in the CBI theater. This was particularly problematic because most combat personnel under Stilwell’s command were Chinese. As a result, the lack of trust directly impacted tactical and operational planning. The second reoccurring theme, ambiguous missions, refers to the poorly defined goals for the theater. The CBI’s mission was vague, and Stilwell lacked clear objectives or benchmarks of success.
Underlying both themes is the key flaw in Stilwell’s conduct in the CBI a failure to understand the American political context in which he operated. Stilwell advocated for a transactional military and political relationship despite clear indications that President Roosevelt, other political leaders, and the American public at large desired a long-term cooperative relationship. In this context of deep and widespread public support for forging a close and lasting alliance with China, Stilwell’s proposals to make military aid and American support on a quid pro quo basis was an isolated position that inevitably ran into staunch opposition. The result was a dangerous disconnect between American military operations and national policy.
Setzekorn, who is fluent in Chinese, relied on a wide variety of sources when writing this penetrating account of the U.S. military’s time in the CBI theater, including Chinese and Japanese language archival material. The declassification of numerous U.S. government sources over the past fifteen years also enables Setzekorn to make a full assessment and analysis of World War II-era strategic thinking and military policy.
As I understand it, the theme of this book is that American military leaders should be proactive in addressing the political issues that affect their command and mission. However, I don't believe he makes his case. He leads us through the difficulties General Joseph Stilwell faced in his command in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theatre. Stilwell had to deal with the British (who were interested in protecting India and recovering parts of their Empire, Chaing Kai Chek, the Chinese warlord, and various local groups (the Chindits, e.g.). His orders were ambiguous; he had few US troops and was tossed into a mess. To overuse the old analogy, he was herding cats. Stilwell was called 'Vinegar Joe' because of his acerbic attitude and sharp tongue. Dealing with Ciang and Clare Chenault, who knew something about delusions of adequacy, it made for a difficult 2 1/2-year tour. Dr. Setzekorn rehearses the process quite thoroughly. What he does not provide is an alternative 'political' possibility. For example, does he recommend that Chenault be given the 8th Air Force? Should Chiang be given billions to supply his forces with no accountability to pit those forces against the Japanese? No, he extrapolates that Stilwell's failings have been used to train more political officers that followed. The linkage is unclear. Military officers HAVE to be political animals, but when civilian leadership drops the ball, claiming the military is responsible is only possible if you follow Dr. Setzekorn's recommendations.