Mental Acts

by Peter T. Geach

Geach insists, in opposition to the behaviorism of the day, that there are episodic mental acts such as acts of judgment. How to characterize such mental acts remains as problematic as it was fifty years ago, and his book still has much to teach us. He begins with an attack on the abstractionist theory of concept-formation, then goes on to criticize the relational theory of judgment propounded by Bertrand Russell. Moving from criticism to construction, Geach first offers an improved version of Russell’s analysis, then moves on to offer an alternative of his own.

Genres: Philosophy

151 pages, Paperback

First published December 1, 1957

About the author

Peter Thomas Geach was a British philosopher and professor of logic at the University of Leeds. His interests were the history of philosophy, philosophical logic, ethics, philosophy of religion, and the theory of identity.

Reviews

[Mr Siegal · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good Overview of Russell

This book provides a good overview of Russell's arguments regarding judgment (dual and multiple), though I wasn't persuaded with what Geach proposes instead.