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Truth and Meaning: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language
This lucid and wide-ranging volume constitutes a self-contained introduction to the elements and key issues of the philosophy of language.
- GenresPhilosophy
415 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1991
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June 27, 2026
The first chapter explores Frege’s thinking. It explains how words have a sense (or mode of presentation) and a reference, and how sentences equivalently express a thought (sense) and refer to their truth conditions. An alternative idea for the reference of sentences is explored, in that perhaps they refer to ‘states of affairs’ in the world. That idea has the benefit of making the meaning of a sentence seem more similar to the meaning of a word, but it is unclear what a ‘state of affairs is.’ Is it some kind of thing, in which case there are some serious ontological questions…
One of the features of chapter 1 is that it gives an extended discussion of Frege’s wrestling with the problem of empty names (or non-referring terms) like ‘Santa Claus.’ Frege thinks those kinds of terms have a sense, instead of a reference. But then what are we to make of indexical terms like ‘this’ or ‘I’. Does the word ‘I’ (somehow) have a different sense when it is spoken by different people? That seems implausible, and Frege’s account drifts into unresolved tensions.
Next, the book takes us through Russell’s attempts to improve upon Frege with empty terms as ‘descriptions.’ The twists and turns of that approach are narrated clearly, with its eventual demise in the more (currently) popular idea that names are rigid designators (referents without a sense). Whatever the merits of that way of looking at things, it is still puzzlilng ‘how’ indexical terms (like ‘today’) can actually refer to different things and in different ways.
Perhaps the answer is to be found in the intentionality of those using words, and so the next couple of chapters explore the extent to which words and sentences can have an ‘aboutness.’ Or perhaps they just have a (Wittgensteinian) usage? The sympathies of the author are clearly with the intentionality account and a Gricean suggestion that what communication is all about is communicators sharing tacit understandings, and it is that that drives the usage. Thus a usage account is not necessarily wrong. Its just radically incomplete.
Textually this is a complex book, which uses the tools of logic and linguistic analysis. The text is also relatively dense, although chapters are broken up into helpful chunks.
Overall, this is detailed analysis of trends in the philosophy of logic. The complexity of the text means that readers will enjoy it most if they have background knowledge in the issues and in the tools of logical analysis.
One of the features of chapter 1 is that it gives an extended discussion of Frege’s wrestling with the problem of empty names (or non-referring terms) like ‘Santa Claus.’ Frege thinks those kinds of terms have a sense, instead of a reference. But then what are we to make of indexical terms like ‘this’ or ‘I’. Does the word ‘I’ (somehow) have a different sense when it is spoken by different people? That seems implausible, and Frege’s account drifts into unresolved tensions.
Next, the book takes us through Russell’s attempts to improve upon Frege with empty terms as ‘descriptions.’ The twists and turns of that approach are narrated clearly, with its eventual demise in the more (currently) popular idea that names are rigid designators (referents without a sense). Whatever the merits of that way of looking at things, it is still puzzlilng ‘how’ indexical terms (like ‘today’) can actually refer to different things and in different ways.
Perhaps the answer is to be found in the intentionality of those using words, and so the next couple of chapters explore the extent to which words and sentences can have an ‘aboutness.’ Or perhaps they just have a (Wittgensteinian) usage? The sympathies of the author are clearly with the intentionality account and a Gricean suggestion that what communication is all about is communicators sharing tacit understandings, and it is that that drives the usage. Thus a usage account is not necessarily wrong. Its just radically incomplete.
Textually this is a complex book, which uses the tools of logic and linguistic analysis. The text is also relatively dense, although chapters are broken up into helpful chunks.
Overall, this is detailed analysis of trends in the philosophy of logic. The complexity of the text means that readers will enjoy it most if they have background knowledge in the issues and in the tools of logical analysis.
Displaying 1 of 1 review