Schrift’s exhaustive and deeply researched study was published in 1990 and in re-reading it today I am reminded of the tumultuous events surrounding the post-structuralist reception of Nietzsche, most particularly by Derrida and the “deconstruction” movement that sought to reclaim Nietzsche from both Heideggerian and analytic (Anglo) interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy. It is for this reason that Schrift moves through a detailed exegesis of both Heidegger and Derrida, which Schrift identifies as “dogmatic” in relation to the former and “relativist” in relation to the latter – hence the title’s reference to reading Nietzsche “between hermeneutics and deconstruction,” and I note that Schrift’s own well-argued and consistent interpretation (a “third way” of sorts) - spanning the last third of the book - is both hermeneutic and, one could say, somewhat “metaphysical” because it demonstrates that Nietzsche’s “perspectivism” is nothing other than a description (an interpretation!) of the limits or horizons giving structure to the human condition (as will-to-power, and nothing besides), which is viewed as a “text” for careful, creative, and just interpretation.
In Part One, the thrust of Schrift’s critique of both Heidegger and Derrida is that Nietzsche lives beyond the bounds and restrictions that both of these philosophers have placed on Nietzsche’s expansive philosophy: Heidegger seeks to systematize Nietzsche’s thought in terms of that last of the metaphysicians, and despite his goal of overturning Platonism, revaluating all values, Nietzsche remains locked within the cage of metaphysics because (according to Heidegger) Nietzsche interprets will to power as the being of humans (world) and the Eternal Return as the Being of their infinite unfolding and continued “returning” (retaining the Western ontological distinction). As opposed to a systematic Nietzsche, Derrida, according to Schrift, transforms Nietzsche’s philosophy into a futile exercise in relativism. Both Heidegger and Derrida read Nietzsche in terms consistent with their own projects – one ontological (hermeneutic-phenomenology) the other deconstructive (radical hermeneutics of suspicion). Importantly, and I agree with Schrift on this keen observation and point, namely, it is disingenuous to dismiss any sense of an organized, holistic sense of “subjectivity” in Nietzsche – for although he decries “essentialism,” he nevertheless maintains a notion of what I would term a “subject-in-transition,” a sense of evolving subject-hood requiring the tight organization of life-ascending and affirming drives and affects (along with the rejection or sublimation of drives deemed antithetical to human flourishing) through embracing the organizational schema of the “Grand Style,” wherein the notion of an ever-changing and continually developing human character emerges, the “essence” of which is continually morphing, evolving, and at times, and this is necessary for Nietzsche, devolving - requiring what is the equivalent of convalescing and recovering from illness.
Part Two contains an interesting but short analysis of the French reception of Nietzsche, but it is in Part Three, for me the most interesting and important section of the book, that Schrift establishes his unique reading of Nietzsche, and there are many crucial elements that might be discussed as drawn from his close reading of Nietzsche’s view of “perspectivism” and “interpretation”. He offers a coherent picture of Nietzsche’s interpretive project (transvaluation of values) and does so by means of a reading that is both detailed and grand in scope (covering much ground by highlighting writings drawn from Nietzsche’s published texts and unpublished essays and notes!). Below I list but a few of these insights for prospective readers with the caveat that my brief remarks cannot do justice to Schrift’s sprawling and multi-layered analysis.
There is a single mention by Schrift of the possibility that despite Nietzsche radical uniqueness, and his drive to “overturn Platonism” and “transvalue all values” – i.e., overturn or twist free from Western metaphysics, much like Heidegger’s conclusion, Schrift sees a way in which Nietzsche might be said to have remained trapped within the “metaphysical snares of grammar and the oppositional structures inherent in language [Being/becoming, Object/subject, etc.]” (p. 192). This issue continues to inspire scholars writing on Nietzsche, and in the final analysis, when discussing the persona of “Dionysus” as related to labyrinthine interpretation, Schrift seems to offer us a superior “psychological type,” which might be said to be “metaphysically removed” from the Dionysus of Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy.
Proximally and for the most part, Nietzsche’s early view of language and truth (e.g., 1872/73 “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense”) remains at the core of his transvaluation of values in his later writings, which includes Nietzsche’s critique of the traditional Correspondence Model of Truth and Referential Theory of Meaning (epistemological/hermeneutical). Schrift does an excellent job analyzing Nietzsche’s understanding of and virulent critique of traditional metaphysical notions of language somehow accurately capturing and communicating objective “truth”.
Schrift establishes an inextricable relationship between “perspectivism,” “interpretive pluralism,” and Nietzsche’s “genealogical” method. Although expansive and seemingly all-inclusive, Nietzsche’s perspectivism is limited by human physiology, psychology, and socio-historical conditions – i.e., perspectivism is grounded in finitude. All perspectival views of the world require interpretation, and this is where Nietzsche’s practice of interpretive pluralism enters the picture, which is nothing other than genealogical analysis. As the title of Schrift’s book suggests, Nietzsche’s understanding of interpretation is constantly on guard to avoid – navigate safely between the dangers posed by Charybdis and Scylla - the traps of both dogmatism and relativism in the reading of “texts”. This amounts, in one way, to retaining a standard by which to judge the superiority of multiple and often conflicting interpretations. I note that Schrift is careful to explain that “standard” in this context should be understood in terms of criteria which are semi-fluid and open to more interpretation based on the complex perspectival make-up of the human being.
To this point, Schrift writes: “By adjudicating interpretive activity in terms of value (grand style, life-enhancement vs. decadent style life-negating) rather than correctness…Nietzschean genealogy operates within the undecidability of perspectivism and philology, drawing insights from each without exclusively affirming either” (p. 180). Nietzsche incorporates his notion of will power (and its powerful and efficacious discharge) when determining the so-called “correctness” of interpretations, while retaining the view that there is no single correct or objective interpretation! “The transvalued text which is to be read well…itself remains nothing other than interpretation” (p. 168). Will to power, on Schrift’s reading, is the very name for interpretation. Nothing exists that is not interpreted; nothing is outside the interpretive process. There is supreme value for Nietzsche in keeping interpretation an open and continually developing process, “and in calling for a plurality of interpretations, this approach does ‘justice’…to the pluridimensionality and plurivocity of the text” (p. 188).
Briefly, to the Nietzschean notion of “text,” which preceded and inspired post-structural views on interpretation (e.g., Barthes & Foucault). In Nietzsche there occurs a radical expansion of the notion of “text,” and as Schrift contends, the “transvalued conception of the ‘text’ is not an independently existing object but the heuristic aggregate of all possible interpretations which can be imposed upon it” (p. 196). Text for Nietzsche can be a “literary work, a historical event, a social practice, or the world” (p. 188). For example, morality, its psychological origin and practice, serves as a “text” for Nietzsche in On the Genealogy of Morals. Nietzsche’s view of “text” also includes a reconceived relationship between reader/interpreter and interpreted text – for Nietzsche the author can no longer claim exclusive or definitive rights to the “meaning” of the text he/she has written, and Schrift examines Nietzsche’s beliefs regarding Homer as (supposed) “author” of The Iliad and Odyssey.
The summary on the back of book makes the following assertion: Schrift’s interpretations of Heidegger and Derrida are “accessible to non-specialists”. Having taught philosophy for over fifteen years, I take issue with this claim and to prospective readers I state: This book is beyond even fourth-year undergraduate philosophy majors, and in addition, it is not written for the casual, curious, philosophically-minded layperson – it is most definitely written for specialists! I hope that scholars who might not be aware of Schrift’s excellent Nietzsche study will seek it out as they will be greatly rewarded. My recommendation is that Schrift’s text be read in tandem with Tom Rockmore’s Heidegger and French Philosophy (1994). The book will be of interest and use within fields or disciplines - other than philosophy, of course - such as psychology, literary theory/critique, aesthetics, and political science.
Dr. James M. Magrini Former: Philosophy/College of DuPage
so much fun. loved it, particularly the critique of heidegger's overdetemination of the will to power as the being (qua ground) of beings. great. schrift is one of my fave nietzsche scholars