What do you think?
Rate this book
From War to Cold War, 1942-1948
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 of 1 review
April 27, 2021
American Historical Review
This is an excellent book that probably will not receive the attention it merits. A work written for scholars, it constains no sensational disclosures and is totally devoid of the chatty anecdotes that make for a good read. It is an important contribution to the literature on the origins of the Cold War, however, and it should be read by anyone interested in the subject. Well-researched and tightly argued, this book by a British scholar can best be described as post-Orthodox.
Roy Douglas's starting point is that Josef Stalin was implacably hostile toward, and suspicious of, 'all' the Western powers. His attitude was shaped by a combination of Maxist dogma, Russia's historical experience, and his own nature. Stalin has no blueprint for world domination
Indeed, as Douglas points out, there is little evidence that he would willingly "sacrifice one soldier or one kopek for the cause of anybody else's revolution." (page 180) What he did mean to do was advance Russia's national interests as he defined them by any means available.
These included Popular Front tactics during one period, the Nazi-Soviet Pact during another, collaborating with Great Britain and the United States when it was profitable, and trying to drive a wedge between them when that promised even greater rewards.
Douglas daws a strong indictment against both Churchill and Roosevelt in their dealing with the Soviet Union. For different reasons, he believes, both men succumbed to the 'hubris' of thinking they personally could convert Stalin to their views about the nature of the postwar world. Permitting their homes to govern their actions, they ignored or discounted the abundant evidence that indicted that Stalin intended to achieve his objectives by any device short of war.
Still, he claims, the situation was fluid as late as 1946, and greater unity and determination on the part of their successors could have prevented much of what happened subsequently. Russia did not succeed in eastern and central Europe because of its power but because Russia exploited Western irresolution. The strong response to the Berlin blockage marked the turning point, according to Douglas, for it showed the Soviet Union that the West could back off no longer. He believed that response was critiacl for the security of Western Europe and for halting the drift of events that 'inevitably' would have led to an 'all-out shooting war at a later date. (page 194)
If Douglas presses his case too strongly, and this reviewer thinks he does, his book cannot be dismissed as just another tract by a cold warrior. Trying to compress his views in a short review makes them appear simplistic, which they definately are not. There is much to argue with in this work, but it should be taken very seriously.
Robert James Maddox
Pennsylvania State University
This is an excellent book that probably will not receive the attention it merits. A work written for scholars, it constains no sensational disclosures and is totally devoid of the chatty anecdotes that make for a good read. It is an important contribution to the literature on the origins of the Cold War, however, and it should be read by anyone interested in the subject. Well-researched and tightly argued, this book by a British scholar can best be described as post-Orthodox.
Roy Douglas's starting point is that Josef Stalin was implacably hostile toward, and suspicious of, 'all' the Western powers. His attitude was shaped by a combination of Maxist dogma, Russia's historical experience, and his own nature. Stalin has no blueprint for world domination
Indeed, as Douglas points out, there is little evidence that he would willingly "sacrifice one soldier or one kopek for the cause of anybody else's revolution." (page 180) What he did mean to do was advance Russia's national interests as he defined them by any means available.
These included Popular Front tactics during one period, the Nazi-Soviet Pact during another, collaborating with Great Britain and the United States when it was profitable, and trying to drive a wedge between them when that promised even greater rewards.
Douglas daws a strong indictment against both Churchill and Roosevelt in their dealing with the Soviet Union. For different reasons, he believes, both men succumbed to the 'hubris' of thinking they personally could convert Stalin to their views about the nature of the postwar world. Permitting their homes to govern their actions, they ignored or discounted the abundant evidence that indicted that Stalin intended to achieve his objectives by any device short of war.
Still, he claims, the situation was fluid as late as 1946, and greater unity and determination on the part of their successors could have prevented much of what happened subsequently. Russia did not succeed in eastern and central Europe because of its power but because Russia exploited Western irresolution. The strong response to the Berlin blockage marked the turning point, according to Douglas, for it showed the Soviet Union that the West could back off no longer. He believed that response was critiacl for the security of Western Europe and for halting the drift of events that 'inevitably' would have led to an 'all-out shooting war at a later date. (page 194)
If Douglas presses his case too strongly, and this reviewer thinks he does, his book cannot be dismissed as just another tract by a cold warrior. Trying to compress his views in a short review makes them appear simplistic, which they definately are not. There is much to argue with in this work, but it should be taken very seriously.
Robert James Maddox
Pennsylvania State University
Displaying 1 of 1 review