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Magic Bullets: Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs
One of the key debates in current defence policy and strategic studies is whether the world is undergoing a 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), a complete transformation in warfare. This book explores whether a genuine RMA is truly under way, and if so, what the implications are.
It explores the concept, looking at different ways in which it is understood, and reviews previous historical cases that have been seen as RMAs, including the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the industrial revolution and the period between the two World Wars. It assesses the 1991 Gulf War and the conclusions that can be drawn from it. The book then studies the current debate about the existence of an RMA and its implications, deriving a number of different perspectives on these issues. These competing viewpoints are used to examine various issues connected with the debate, including the potential impact of the RMA across different types and intensities of conflict, the competing understandings of Information Warfare, asymmetric warfare and the threat it poses around the globe, and the effect of the RMA on the major alliances in the Western world.
Based on a research project written for the UK Ministry of Defence, this book investigates the implications of the RMA for the strategy and defence policy of the United States, and also those of Britain and other countries. It emphasises the military historical and international political context of the RMA, and suggests a number of reasons why the impact of current technological and conceptual developments may not be quite as great in practice as is sometimes suggested. It concludes that an RMA probably is underway but that, just like previous cases, it does not necessarily provide an easy answer to every complex contemporary political and strategic problem.
It explores the concept, looking at different ways in which it is understood, and reviews previous historical cases that have been seen as RMAs, including the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the industrial revolution and the period between the two World Wars. It assesses the 1991 Gulf War and the conclusions that can be drawn from it. The book then studies the current debate about the existence of an RMA and its implications, deriving a number of different perspectives on these issues. These competing viewpoints are used to examine various issues connected with the debate, including the potential impact of the RMA across different types and intensities of conflict, the competing understandings of Information Warfare, asymmetric warfare and the threat it poses around the globe, and the effect of the RMA on the major alliances in the Western world.
Based on a research project written for the UK Ministry of Defence, this book investigates the implications of the RMA for the strategy and defence policy of the United States, and also those of Britain and other countries. It emphasises the military historical and international political context of the RMA, and suggests a number of reasons why the impact of current technological and conceptual developments may not be quite as great in practice as is sometimes suggested. It concludes that an RMA probably is underway but that, just like previous cases, it does not necessarily provide an easy answer to every complex contemporary political and strategic problem.
240 pages, Hardcover
First published August 1, 2004
7 people want to read
About the author
Tim Benbow
12 booksTim Benbow studied at Oxford as an undergraduate (at Brasenose College) and as a graduate (at St Antony's College). He also spent a year at Harvard University as a Kennedy Scholar and a year at King's College London.
After being awarded his doctorate he remained at Oxford, conducting a post-doctoral research project and teaching International Relations and Strategic Studies at the undergraduate and graduate levels, including one year as a Tutor in Politics at University College.
Tim spent two years teaching at Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, before joining the Defence Studies Department at King's College London in 2004. He was promoted to Senior Lecturer in 2008, and to Reader in Strategic Studies in 2016.
After being awarded his doctorate he remained at Oxford, conducting a post-doctoral research project and teaching International Relations and Strategic Studies at the undergraduate and graduate levels, including one year as a Tutor in Politics at University College.
Tim spent two years teaching at Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, before joining the Defence Studies Department at King's College London in 2004. He was promoted to Senior Lecturer in 2008, and to Reader in Strategic Studies in 2016.
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January 1, 2025
This one took me a while to finish, just so much information to absorb.
As the subtitle says, this book is about understanding the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and checking out what its effect is when it comes to actual war fighting (theoretical and practical).
Book is written in 2004, so when it comes to Western military capacities, it is full of assumptions. Lots of them.
I have to admit I have expected something more when it comes to the way RMA is to be understood. My assumption was practical development of both organization and technology and influence they have on war fighting. But, actually, RMA (at least in West, since book is about western powers and RMA they consider their brain-child (again, lots and lots of assumptions)) is looked at as philosophical subject - more in terms of throwing hundreds and hundreds of fantastic ideas (not unlike Fukuyama's end-of-history-west-is-the-peak-of-humanity talk or Kaku's sometimes equally far fetching works) and saying, we have this-and-this therefore we rule. It's like kids playing GI Joe.
I think the task author put before himself is to give all views and categorize them from can-be-done to stop-watching-tv-and-get-back-to-real-life spectrum. In all of it, we have a very good view on links between politics, international relations, and military/war and comment on the situation in the West up until 2004.
All the practical elements of RMA [again RMA as seen from Western perspective] seem to have ended with Gulf War in 1991. From then onward, RMA has become more and more obfuscated, and more and more industry commercial like. West did end on the high note - USSR was defeated and no longer an obstacle, while western military technology proved to be pretty advanced (although, as author points out not near as functional or effective as it was advertised). But again, to build ones own myth on one victory?
As said above, the book gives excellent insights into all parties involved in the discussion, from zealots (aka Visionaries) to skeptics. With some I wholeheartedly agree (western military dominance, which is not as definitive as it was expected after more than ideal 1991 war, and caution of expecting every conflict to end as was case in 1991) and some are more than obvious today (internal NATO issues and military industry capacity and in general international relations).
But some elements seem to time and time again plague the military analysts.
Like that constant talk (from times of L.Hart and Fuller) of small maneuverable troops chasing each other on the battlefield.
Or very weird and cultist like social manipulation (what will in about 7-10 years from book publication become so called Colored Revolutions that backfired in oh so many disastrous ways, which was also a warning from the author). I mean imagine that some think tanks actually thought that mass manipulation through media that is not tailored for specific area, but directly built on top of existing influence of western media will actually do all the job and the goals will be achieved without any need for troops on the ground? I mean, what? This type of manipulation failed for local populations during the events from 2020-2022 with all rigorous measures taken and enforced. But then again, if there are no repercussions from the outside, who says West can not experiment and play around, in what author constantly calls "conflicts of choice".
For all means and purposes RMA is treated in the west as luxury car operation - instead of being able to build more average, but well built products, decision is to create high price specialist small scale forces that will dominate the specific area. And this worked, to a degree, because after 1991 only opposition was light infantry type of enemy or terrorist organizations. But even these initial short-term successes were followed by failure with never-ending wrong political moves in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen.
While specialist small-scale forces are wet dream that will never perish, their main disadvantage is that they are small (ergo cheap and I guess very loyal). Once these force encounter an enemy who can inflict significant damage and casualties, guess what - in a very small period of time, small specialist forces, grown and trained through decades, will be obliterated. If one can not provide a steady influx of forces (manpower and machinery) outside of several brigades, it is game over.
This was the idea of military organization in years before WW2, and WW2 showed that this concept was idiotic from the start. But constant search for a flashy and quick resolution of even greatest problems remains. No RMA will ever fix human stupidity.
In short, the following can be taken from the book:
- RMA at the moment, while technologically progressive, is not progressive when it comes to practice and doctrine. Reason is simple - for anything military to evolve, you need a conflict where one can test all the theory. Considering that West has completely abandoned normal size armies, they have lost a lot of functions, and they will need to re-learn them, which was questionable even in 2004 due to the sheer price. In the meantime, they bit more than they can chew - and OMG, the other side does not play dead when West tells them they are superior!
- RMA is more evolutionary in nature. It is interesting how the author shows that high-tech RMA toys fail miserably if not coupled with the diplomacy and actual goals to achieve.
- RMA achievements [from 1991 onward] weren't as remarkable as advertised (author, being British, is full of pains when it comes to Balkans in the 1990s) - this just shows how current state of military is more evolutionary [technology wise] in nature.
- RMA provides means that can be thought of as an alternative to usual international relations to lazy powers - meaning it is very easy to solve every problem (including presidential adultery) with long range strikes [which basically become nothing more than terror tactics] or by starting never-ending wars for false reasons - because who is going to scorn you? If anyone asks, spin the story and say the enemy is obliterated (is it true? who will check?)
- West took the role of world policeman - author does not stop talking about so called "wars of choice" in areas of no interest to the West, they just, you know, decide to meddle in somebody else's business. I mean, what? Liberal, freedom loving democracies now have options to wage wars in areas where they.... you know, do not like the color of the buildings on the hill? This goes with the above point (ease of entering the war) - West started to behave as king-makers, nobody opposed them, and they continued.
- According to the author, the role of Western Europe was and will remain to be cannon fodder for the US military interventions. For all means and purposes US managed to implement the dream L.Hart had for UK in the inter-war period - provider of long range support (aviation, navy) while letting others bleed and lose people in the actual field of war. It is interesting how author (again, by being British and linked to Cousins over the Atlantic) is so giddy when he talks about the roles of European nations in future NATO, how they need to build their expeditionary forces and forget about worrying only about their borders (I mean imagine Montenegro, Slovenian or Croatian expeditionary forces, whole battalion each). I had to LOL after reading how the UK and France are the only serious military in the NATO after the US. Right...... Oh boy, how many things have changed in 20 years. I especially liked this view of NATO as something that must not be discarded but built on to get the force capable of acting anywhere. I have to say, the author got it all right. Now, when someone in the west mentions the expansion of NATO as a problem, others will boo and fret. But I have to ask why? Re-purpose under the same name and leadership and goals and influence is given right in this book, and the author is senior enough to know what he is talking about. So accept it.
Very interesting book, lots of things to learn and think about. While 2004 seems very far (20 years ago after all) this is what history is - tracing back from "interesting times" to see what was missed and what were the long tales told that brought the world into current state.
Highly recommended.
As the subtitle says, this book is about understanding the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and checking out what its effect is when it comes to actual war fighting (theoretical and practical).
Book is written in 2004, so when it comes to Western military capacities, it is full of assumptions. Lots of them.
I have to admit I have expected something more when it comes to the way RMA is to be understood. My assumption was practical development of both organization and technology and influence they have on war fighting. But, actually, RMA (at least in West, since book is about western powers and RMA they consider their brain-child (again, lots and lots of assumptions)) is looked at as philosophical subject - more in terms of throwing hundreds and hundreds of fantastic ideas (not unlike Fukuyama's end-of-history-west-is-the-peak-of-humanity talk or Kaku's sometimes equally far fetching works) and saying, we have this-and-this therefore we rule. It's like kids playing GI Joe.
I think the task author put before himself is to give all views and categorize them from can-be-done to stop-watching-tv-and-get-back-to-real-life spectrum. In all of it, we have a very good view on links between politics, international relations, and military/war and comment on the situation in the West up until 2004.
All the practical elements of RMA [again RMA as seen from Western perspective] seem to have ended with Gulf War in 1991. From then onward, RMA has become more and more obfuscated, and more and more industry commercial like. West did end on the high note - USSR was defeated and no longer an obstacle, while western military technology proved to be pretty advanced (although, as author points out not near as functional or effective as it was advertised). But again, to build ones own myth on one victory?
As said above, the book gives excellent insights into all parties involved in the discussion, from zealots (aka Visionaries) to skeptics. With some I wholeheartedly agree (western military dominance, which is not as definitive as it was expected after more than ideal 1991 war, and caution of expecting every conflict to end as was case in 1991) and some are more than obvious today (internal NATO issues and military industry capacity and in general international relations).
But some elements seem to time and time again plague the military analysts.
Like that constant talk (from times of L.Hart and Fuller) of small maneuverable troops chasing each other on the battlefield.
Or very weird and cultist like social manipulation (what will in about 7-10 years from book publication become so called Colored Revolutions that backfired in oh so many disastrous ways, which was also a warning from the author). I mean imagine that some think tanks actually thought that mass manipulation through media that is not tailored for specific area, but directly built on top of existing influence of western media will actually do all the job and the goals will be achieved without any need for troops on the ground? I mean, what? This type of manipulation failed for local populations during the events from 2020-2022 with all rigorous measures taken and enforced. But then again, if there are no repercussions from the outside, who says West can not experiment and play around, in what author constantly calls "conflicts of choice".
For all means and purposes RMA is treated in the west as luxury car operation - instead of being able to build more average, but well built products, decision is to create high price specialist small scale forces that will dominate the specific area. And this worked, to a degree, because after 1991 only opposition was light infantry type of enemy or terrorist organizations. But even these initial short-term successes were followed by failure with never-ending wrong political moves in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen.
While specialist small-scale forces are wet dream that will never perish, their main disadvantage is that they are small (ergo cheap and I guess very loyal). Once these force encounter an enemy who can inflict significant damage and casualties, guess what - in a very small period of time, small specialist forces, grown and trained through decades, will be obliterated. If one can not provide a steady influx of forces (manpower and machinery) outside of several brigades, it is game over.
This was the idea of military organization in years before WW2, and WW2 showed that this concept was idiotic from the start. But constant search for a flashy and quick resolution of even greatest problems remains. No RMA will ever fix human stupidity.
In short, the following can be taken from the book:
- RMA at the moment, while technologically progressive, is not progressive when it comes to practice and doctrine. Reason is simple - for anything military to evolve, you need a conflict where one can test all the theory. Considering that West has completely abandoned normal size armies, they have lost a lot of functions, and they will need to re-learn them, which was questionable even in 2004 due to the sheer price. In the meantime, they bit more than they can chew - and OMG, the other side does not play dead when West tells them they are superior!
- RMA is more evolutionary in nature. It is interesting how the author shows that high-tech RMA toys fail miserably if not coupled with the diplomacy and actual goals to achieve.
- RMA achievements [from 1991 onward] weren't as remarkable as advertised (author, being British, is full of pains when it comes to Balkans in the 1990s) - this just shows how current state of military is more evolutionary [technology wise] in nature.
- RMA provides means that can be thought of as an alternative to usual international relations to lazy powers - meaning it is very easy to solve every problem (including presidential adultery) with long range strikes [which basically become nothing more than terror tactics] or by starting never-ending wars for false reasons - because who is going to scorn you? If anyone asks, spin the story and say the enemy is obliterated (is it true? who will check?)
- West took the role of world policeman - author does not stop talking about so called "wars of choice" in areas of no interest to the West, they just, you know, decide to meddle in somebody else's business. I mean, what? Liberal, freedom loving democracies now have options to wage wars in areas where they.... you know, do not like the color of the buildings on the hill? This goes with the above point (ease of entering the war) - West started to behave as king-makers, nobody opposed them, and they continued.
- According to the author, the role of Western Europe was and will remain to be cannon fodder for the US military interventions. For all means and purposes US managed to implement the dream L.Hart had for UK in the inter-war period - provider of long range support (aviation, navy) while letting others bleed and lose people in the actual field of war. It is interesting how author (again, by being British and linked to Cousins over the Atlantic) is so giddy when he talks about the roles of European nations in future NATO, how they need to build their expeditionary forces and forget about worrying only about their borders (I mean imagine Montenegro, Slovenian or Croatian expeditionary forces, whole battalion each). I had to LOL after reading how the UK and France are the only serious military in the NATO after the US. Right...... Oh boy, how many things have changed in 20 years. I especially liked this view of NATO as something that must not be discarded but built on to get the force capable of acting anywhere. I have to say, the author got it all right. Now, when someone in the west mentions the expansion of NATO as a problem, others will boo and fret. But I have to ask why? Re-purpose under the same name and leadership and goals and influence is given right in this book, and the author is senior enough to know what he is talking about. So accept it.
Very interesting book, lots of things to learn and think about. While 2004 seems very far (20 years ago after all) this is what history is - tracing back from "interesting times" to see what was missed and what were the long tales told that brought the world into current state.
Highly recommended.
Displaying 1 of 1 review