This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1882 edition. Excerpt: ...Again, the fallacy of denying the antecedent is equivalent to the illicit process of the major. Our former example (p. 163) may thus be represented: "A science which furnishes the mind with a multitude of useful facts deserves cultivation; but Logic is not such a science; therefore Logic does not deserve cultivation." This apparent syllogism is of the mocd AEE in the first figure, which breaks the fourth rule of the syllogism, because the major term, deserving cultivation, is distributed in the negative conclusion, but not in the affirmative major premise. We now pass to the consideration of the disjunctive proposition, which instead of a single predicate has several alternatives united by the disjunctive conjunction or, any one of which may be affirmed of the subject. "A member of the House of Commons is either a representative of a county, or of a borough, or of a University," is an instance of such a proposition, containing three alternatives; but there may be any number of alternatives from two upwards. The disjunctive syllogism consists of a disjunctive major premise with a categorical proposition, .either affirmative or negative, forming the minor premise. Thus arise two moods, of which the affirmative mood is called by the Latin words modus ponendo tollens (the mood which by affirming denies), and may be thus stated: A is either B or C, But A s; Therefore A is not C. This form of argument proceeds on the supposition that if one alternative of a disjunctive proposition be held true, the others cannot also be true. Thus " the time of year must be either spring, summer, autumn or winter," and if it be spring it cannot be summer, autumn or winter; and so on. But it has been objected by Whately, Man-sel, Mill, as well as many...
William Stanley Jevons, LL.D., MA, FRS was an English economist and logician.
Irving Fisher described Jevons' book A General Mathematical Theory of Political Economy (1862) as the start of the mathematical method in economics. It made the case that economics as a science concerned with quantities is necessarily mathematical. In so doing, it expounded upon the "final" (marginal) utility theory of value. Jevons' work, along with similar discoveries made by Carl Menger in Vienna (1871) and by Léon Walras in Switzerland (1874), marked the opening of a new period in the history of economic thought. Jevons' contribution to the marginal revolution in economics in the late 19th century established his reputation as a leading political economist and logician of the time.
Jevons broke off his studies of the natural sciences in London in 1854 to work as an assayer in Sydney, where he acquired an interest in political economy. Returning to the UK in 1859, he published General Mathematical Theory of Political Economy in 1862, outlining the marginal utility theory of value, and A Serious Fall in the Value of Gold in 1863. For Jevons, the utility or value to a consumer of an additional unit of a product is inversely related to the number of units of that product he already owns, at least beyond some critical quantity.
It was for The Coal Question (1865), in which he called attention to the gradual exhaustion of the UK's coal supplies, that he received public recognition, in which he put forth what is now known as the Jevons paradox, i.e. that increases in energy production efficiency leads to more not less consumption. The most important of his works on logic and scientific methods is his Principles of Science (1874), as well as The Theory of Political Economy (1871) and The State in Relation to Labour (1882). Among his inventions was the logic piano, a mechanical computer.
Jevons goes to through lengthy and in depth analyses of the principles of logic. Insightful and a book that can be used for teaching. Supplementary reading and practice is needed, it's a great book to use as a reference and or workbook.
This was a very good book, especially its treatment of intension and extension. One wonders why any Englishman became enamored of sense and reference instead. Also, I finally got an explanation of predicate logic that I could understand. It allows the quantification of the predicate. Now, that is exactly what other texts show, but do not say, in the usual examples they give of why it is necessary. Examples such as, London is a city.