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On Being Human: Principles of Ethics
151 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 1978
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May 18, 2025
Andrew C. Varga’s On Being Human offers an introduction to thinking about ethics and understanding moral reasoning. He condenses many complicated matters of ethics into small chapters that are easy to read but lack the depth necessary to get much from them. He states the book’s goal is to get people to think seriously about ethics and morality, and to recognize morals are not a relative or subjective thing but have objective value. He wants people to see how they can live in a way consistent with ethics in their daily actions. I agree with these goals but don’t think they’re accomplished by the end. The book’s main value lies in its survey of moral principles and its short discussions of some schools of thought, in the chapter Criteria of Morality.
In this chapter, the longest in the book by far, Varga looks at the main principles of ethics, starting with the Emotive theory of AJ Ayer and Charles Stevenson, then investigating Intuitionism, the Moral Sense theory of Anthony Ashley Cooper, Adam Smith, Joseph Butler, and Francis Hutcheson. Then we look at moral positivism, such as social contract theories of Hobbes and Rousseau, will of the strong man as written about by Nietzsche, and various “will of God” theories. The principle of universality is examined, as expressed by Kant, and Hedonism as championed by Epicurus, and Utilitarianism as Bentham and Mill wrote about it. Plato’s and Aristotle’s views of theories of self-realization and the fulfillment of potentialities transition us eventually into theological perspectives, and finally the teleological Marxist-Leninist ethics, idealizing some fulfillment and liberation of mankind in a communist society.
Varga evaluates each of the theories he examines and shares their strengths and weaknesses, ultimately finding each lacking. His reasons aren’t always convincing, such as certain critiques that are vague, or observing that a certain theory ignores certain of his assumptions that he doesn’t bother to justify. But the insights are often smart, and his summaries of many centuries of moral thinking are very good.
After this chapter, Varga attempts to lay out how moral value can be determined and what moral reasoning ought to look like. He does a pretty good job with the latter but makes a mess of the former. After some short analysis and a pretty observant discussion of human nature, Varga somehow equates morality to pursuing human nature. He doesn’t give much more than that for the moral law. In fact, he eases into some metaphysical territory by claiming that a natural law exists, and that human nature and the natural law are the governors of moral rightness. He doesn’t justify this, which is weird, since his criticisms of other ethical theories picked them apart for much lesser failures. He doesn’t explain why acting in accord with human nature should be how we define a moral act, he takes it as a given that the reader will somehow agree with, and then builds from there a semi-competent but greatly lacking shell of a moral theory. He never bothers to look at the many ways human nature has evolved for survival, not totally ethical living. Yes, ethics evolved with us, and provided a survival benefit. But there are countless traits in human nature that are contrary to sensible and consistent morality, like selfishness, proclivity toward violence and exploitation, and our wrathful, anti-intellectual tribal natures. Since Varga recognizes that morality is an intellectual process, it is strange he would let the servicing of human nature be the measure of an act’s moral quality.
He recognizes plenty of true and useful things, like the necessity of always being open to being wrong about one’s convictions, to reconsidering one’s certainty of conscience. He doesn’t discuss how one might really investigate this conflict and resolve it other than some comments about listening to other people and their concerns — which are important, but by themselves aren’t enough. For a book so critical, and I think rightly so, of many aspects of some of the leading ethical theories throughout history, it does not offer anything better, although some of its criteria and ideas are perhaps a little bit clearer, even if unsupported.
He will often times jump from a presupposition directly to a conclusion without any argument justifying the conclusion. One example is saying that only rational beings can be bound by moral laws and respect the rights of others — therefore, animals do not have moral rights. This conclusion isn’t supported by his premise. It would take an awful lot of sloppy work to get to that conclusion, and the mental gymnastics required are obviously beyond the scope of the book. But he does this often. His reasoning leaves a lot to be desired. Questionable conclusions come from sometimes sensible premises, other times from equally questionable premises, and he builds an entire moral framework upon ideas he does not try to defend. The final product is a semi-coherent, somewhat rational, very limited and myopic, and decidedly vague system of ethics. It isn’t useful even in an abstract sense. It is difficult to find concrete applications of this moral framework, and many of the things that are “wrong” in its view, which are wrong in other moral frameworks, seem to be wrong for insensible reasons.
Varga argues for the importance of freedom of speech, religion, and opinion, and how these are necessary foundations for any moral society. He gives some time to discuss how competing interests can be resolved by examining harm, well-being, and creating a sort of hierarchy of importance regarding certain consequences and goals. He emphasizes the significance of intentionality and one’s moral culpability as related to foreseeable outcomes and unforeseen outcomes. There’s plenty that is handled well here, but most of it is too brief to be that useful to anyone who hasn’t spent time away from this book studying and thinking about the topic.
There is some value here, but most of that value can be found in better books on the subject. It’s short, so makes a decent read for an overview of some ethical theories. This, however, is done much better in books like James Rachels’ The Elements of Moral Philosophy, or The Right Thing to Do. Those provide a more comprehensive analysis of competing moral theories, and also propose a vastly superior moral logic and ethical framework as take-aways.
In this chapter, the longest in the book by far, Varga looks at the main principles of ethics, starting with the Emotive theory of AJ Ayer and Charles Stevenson, then investigating Intuitionism, the Moral Sense theory of Anthony Ashley Cooper, Adam Smith, Joseph Butler, and Francis Hutcheson. Then we look at moral positivism, such as social contract theories of Hobbes and Rousseau, will of the strong man as written about by Nietzsche, and various “will of God” theories. The principle of universality is examined, as expressed by Kant, and Hedonism as championed by Epicurus, and Utilitarianism as Bentham and Mill wrote about it. Plato’s and Aristotle’s views of theories of self-realization and the fulfillment of potentialities transition us eventually into theological perspectives, and finally the teleological Marxist-Leninist ethics, idealizing some fulfillment and liberation of mankind in a communist society.
Varga evaluates each of the theories he examines and shares their strengths and weaknesses, ultimately finding each lacking. His reasons aren’t always convincing, such as certain critiques that are vague, or observing that a certain theory ignores certain of his assumptions that he doesn’t bother to justify. But the insights are often smart, and his summaries of many centuries of moral thinking are very good.
After this chapter, Varga attempts to lay out how moral value can be determined and what moral reasoning ought to look like. He does a pretty good job with the latter but makes a mess of the former. After some short analysis and a pretty observant discussion of human nature, Varga somehow equates morality to pursuing human nature. He doesn’t give much more than that for the moral law. In fact, he eases into some metaphysical territory by claiming that a natural law exists, and that human nature and the natural law are the governors of moral rightness. He doesn’t justify this, which is weird, since his criticisms of other ethical theories picked them apart for much lesser failures. He doesn’t explain why acting in accord with human nature should be how we define a moral act, he takes it as a given that the reader will somehow agree with, and then builds from there a semi-competent but greatly lacking shell of a moral theory. He never bothers to look at the many ways human nature has evolved for survival, not totally ethical living. Yes, ethics evolved with us, and provided a survival benefit. But there are countless traits in human nature that are contrary to sensible and consistent morality, like selfishness, proclivity toward violence and exploitation, and our wrathful, anti-intellectual tribal natures. Since Varga recognizes that morality is an intellectual process, it is strange he would let the servicing of human nature be the measure of an act’s moral quality.
He recognizes plenty of true and useful things, like the necessity of always being open to being wrong about one’s convictions, to reconsidering one’s certainty of conscience. He doesn’t discuss how one might really investigate this conflict and resolve it other than some comments about listening to other people and their concerns — which are important, but by themselves aren’t enough. For a book so critical, and I think rightly so, of many aspects of some of the leading ethical theories throughout history, it does not offer anything better, although some of its criteria and ideas are perhaps a little bit clearer, even if unsupported.
He will often times jump from a presupposition directly to a conclusion without any argument justifying the conclusion. One example is saying that only rational beings can be bound by moral laws and respect the rights of others — therefore, animals do not have moral rights. This conclusion isn’t supported by his premise. It would take an awful lot of sloppy work to get to that conclusion, and the mental gymnastics required are obviously beyond the scope of the book. But he does this often. His reasoning leaves a lot to be desired. Questionable conclusions come from sometimes sensible premises, other times from equally questionable premises, and he builds an entire moral framework upon ideas he does not try to defend. The final product is a semi-coherent, somewhat rational, very limited and myopic, and decidedly vague system of ethics. It isn’t useful even in an abstract sense. It is difficult to find concrete applications of this moral framework, and many of the things that are “wrong” in its view, which are wrong in other moral frameworks, seem to be wrong for insensible reasons.
Varga argues for the importance of freedom of speech, religion, and opinion, and how these are necessary foundations for any moral society. He gives some time to discuss how competing interests can be resolved by examining harm, well-being, and creating a sort of hierarchy of importance regarding certain consequences and goals. He emphasizes the significance of intentionality and one’s moral culpability as related to foreseeable outcomes and unforeseen outcomes. There’s plenty that is handled well here, but most of it is too brief to be that useful to anyone who hasn’t spent time away from this book studying and thinking about the topic.
There is some value here, but most of that value can be found in better books on the subject. It’s short, so makes a decent read for an overview of some ethical theories. This, however, is done much better in books like James Rachels’ The Elements of Moral Philosophy, or The Right Thing to Do. Those provide a more comprehensive analysis of competing moral theories, and also propose a vastly superior moral logic and ethical framework as take-aways.
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