In this provocative book, Peter Gries directly challenges the widely held view that partisan elites on Capitol Hill are out of touch with a moderate American public. Dissecting a new national survey, Gries shows how ideology powerfully divides Main Street over both domestic and foreign policy and reveals how and why, with the exception of attitudes toward Israel, liberals consistently feel warmer toward foreign countries and international organizations, and desire friendlier policies toward them, than conservatives do. And because most Congressional districts have become hyper-partisan, many politicians today cater not to the "median voter" in their districts, but to the primary voters who elect them. The perverse incentives of the U.S. electoral system, therefore, are empowering the ideological extremes, contributing to elite partisanship over American foreign policy. The Politics of American Foreign Policy weaves seamlessly together in-depth examinations of the psychological roots and foreign policy consequences of the liberal-conservative divide, the cultural, socio-racial, economic, and political dimensions of American ideology, and the moral values and foreign policy orientations that divide Democrats and Republicans. Within this context, the book explores in detail why American liberals and conservatives disagree over US policy relating to Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, East Asia, and international organizations such as the UN.
This is a compelling and well-researched book, so it's sad to see it hasn't received much attention on goodreads (plus, one of the 2 reviews below willfully misrepresents the book's arguments). Gries builds on and unifies many different threads of scholarship in this readable and interesting book, one which happened to be perfect for the research I am doing now. Gries starts by critiquing several established views on public opinion and foreign policy. The main one is that there is broad consensus in the public about the US global role/FP, and the other is the Stephen Walt argument that the American people want a restrained FP whereas the FP establishment wants a liberal hegemonic one. He also disagrees with the idea that because the American people don't know much about foreign affairs or world politics that they have very malleable views on these subjects, ones that can be shaped by elites or psychological manipulation.
Gries instead argues, borrowing from cognitive psych and Jonathan Haidt-type research, that people use affect heuristics to substitute out complicated questions (what do I think about Trump's trade policies with China) in favor of easy, more emotional ones (How do I feel about China in general). He shows that liberals and conservatives actually differ widely in their views on foreign policy because they "reason" from dramatically different moral foundations. Liberals care much more about harm and equality as the bases of their morality, and while conservatives care about these things too, they care much more about loyalty, purity, and authority. Conservatives are more hierarchy-oriented, more sensitive to threat, generally less open to new experiences or ways of thinking, and all of this (and their liberal inverses) shape the way they see foreign policy. These are not stereotypes but deeply research and repeatedly demonstrated tendencies among people on the right and left (tendencies only: there is huge variation within each group). For example, when liberals think of France, they think both of the cultural experiences they may value as well a more left-leaning politics and welfare state that they wish could be brought to the US. Conservatives, however, think about a threatening libertine culture, hostility to USFP, and creeping big state socialism. BOTH sides rely on stereotypes and images, but they react quite differently to different aspects of FP and rely more on moral intuition than actual knowledge. In short, the culture war divisions of our domestic politics are alive and well in our views on USFP.
So how does this all affect foreign policy and the politics of FP? Gries has a clear mechanism here as well: our politics is not receptive to the median voter but to the more extreme sides, especially on the right. Gerrymandering, social media siloes, the geographical sorting of the population into more homogenous areas, big campaign financing, and other factors have distorted our politics by making too many COngressional seats essentially secure for one party. This pushes the political action into the primaries, where we know that more partisan and less centrist voters are more likely to be engaged. Politicians are often more afraid of being primaried than losing the general, and all of these factors incentivize politicians to cater to the extremes. Thus we see GOP Congressmen filibustering UN treaties protecting the disabled or blocking nominations of rather uncontroversial, even obscure, nominees for federal posts. They aren't playing to the median voter but to the more extreme segment of their base. This is a brilliant structural explanation for how political dysfunction and polarization at the domestic level has increasingly crept into our foreign affairs.
The first half of the book lays out this argument in detail. The second half runs through case studies to illustrate these points regarding Europe, international institutions, the use of force, Latin America, etc. The author nicely mixes in historical evidence, stats, and cartoons that illustrate his larger points. Overall, this is a brilliant mixed-methods study that I think pretty much any political scientist or historian studying the relationship between ideology, politics, and foreign policy will benefit from reading.
Wretchedly biased screed in which a liberal partisan extols all things "little l" liberal as over-the-top praiseworthy and all things conservative as reproachable, misguided, bigoted, sexist, and immoral all based on their own cowardice and fear of people not like them - whom Gries boldy declares as WASPs. It was clear through Chapter 4 that Gries is a liberal partisan who cannot honestly describe Conservatives and the reasons they hold their beliefs. Gries actually teaches at the University of Oklahoma as well. If the bias he carries in this book is a measure of the bias in his classroom, then I truly feel sorry for his students and the absconding of their education on political discourse.
Want an example? Here is a direct quote from the very first chapter: "First, conservatives tend to be less tolerant of ambiguity than liberals, scoring higher on psychological scales measuring the Need for Closure, which taps desires for simplicity and certainty. Interestingly, when liberals are put in situations where they are forced to think in more simple ways, such as when they are under cognitive load or even drunk, they tend to become more conservative. Liberals also score higher on psychological measures such as the Need for Cognition, which taps the enjoyment of thinking" (Gries 37).
Want another? In Chapter 6, here is a direct quote from Gries: "Radio talk show host Rush Limbaugh, also of German decent, has targeted much of his nativism against Mexicans. "You're a foreigner," Limbaugh declared of Mexicans on his April 6, 2006 show. "You shut your mouth or you get out, and if you come here illegally, you go straight to jail and we're going to hunt you down 'til we find you." (Gries 143). Gries took this out of context to declare Limbaugh - and conservatives in general - as WASP racists and nativists. What Gries failed to do was inform his gentle, naive readers that Limbaugh was quoting MEXICAN immigration laws. These things Limbaugh said were a parody of what the MEXICAN government was telling to those who immigrate TO Mexico. But, just like the biased surveys his people conducted as the basis of this entire book, Gries only sees and hears what he wanted to see and hear. How can someone who wishes to be taken seriously make such an awful and bigoted attack on Limbaugh - and conservatives as emblematic of Limbaugh - unless they were certain that they would get away with it?
This horrid bias is reflective of every single chapter in this book... and it goes on and on. I see why this book has so few reviews, despite being out for about 8 years now. If you are liberal and want to revel in confirmation bias, this book is for you. You'll get heavy doses of that. If you are conservative and want to see why you cannot trust a liberal to be honest in any manner when it comes to conservatives or conservatism in general, this book demonstrates it clearly and will provide plenty of ammunition in showing how liberals seek to indoctrinate with bias and half-truths.
Untrustworthy in the highest degree, I cannot recommend this book. You would be better served by studying Kenneth Walz's Theory of International Politics.
Very interesting examination of how morality and ideology influence the discord between Republicans and Democrats. Focuses primarily on foreign affairs topics, but his findings can be readily abstracted to other fields, and are incredibly useful to understanding our current American political situation. Highly recommended.