The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth about Morality and What to Do About it

by Joshua D. Greene

Abstract

In this essay I argue that ordinary moral thought and language is, while very natural, highly counterproductive and that as a result we would be wise to change the way we think and talk about moral matters. First, I argue on metaphysical grounds against moral realism, the view according to which there are first order moral truths. Second, I draw on principles of moral psychology, cognitive science, and evolutionary theory to explain why moral realism appears to be true even though it is not. I then argue, based on the picture of moral psychology developed herein, that realist moral language and thought promotes misunderstanding and exacerbates conflict. I consider a number of standard views concerning the practical implications of moral anti-realism and reject them. I then sketch and defend a set of alternative revisionist proposals for improving moral discourse, chief among them the elimination of realist moral language, especially deontological language, and the promotion of an anti-realist utilitarian framework for discussing moral issues of public concern. I emphasize the importance of revising our moral practices, suggesting that our entrenched modes of moral thought may be responsible for our failure to solve a number of global social problems.

Genres: Philosophy

377 pages, Unknown Binding

First published January 1, 2002

About the author

Joshua D. Greene is an American experimental psychologist, neuroscientist, and philosopher. He is a Professor of Psychology at Harvard University and the director of Harvard's Moral Cognition Lab. The majority of his research and writing has been concerned with moral judgment and decision-making. His most recent research focuses on fundamental issues in cognitive science.

Reviews

[Gavin · Rating 4 out of 5]

The first PhD I ever read: a witty and authoritative piece of meta-ethics. He surveys every large approach to morals using strong naturalism as a criterion, and concludes that anti-realist utilitarianism is the least unsatisfying option.

I suppose this is only worth reading if you are both very convinced of naturalism and radically unsure about what constitutes goodness; otherwise you should just study practical ethics already.

[Here]

[Robin · Rating 4 out of 5]

If there exists a definitve book on morality, this just might be it. Fantastic read for anyone interested in academic ethical theorie.

Greene argues very strongly why there are no 'real' objective, absolute morals ('the horrible, terrible truth' about morality) and then gives a framework for ethics in a world without absolute morality (the 'what to do about it'-part).

Like all academic works, it's a bit dense at times. But the arguments are very convincing and leave one with a lot to think about on practical ethics.

[Yusuf abdi ibrahim · Rating 5 out of 5]

I like this book