The Revenge of History: Marxism and the East European Revolutions

by Alex Callinicos

Callinicos's new book is a frontal assault on the widely accepted idea that the East European revolutions of 1989 mark the death of socialism. In an attempt to vindicate the classical Marxist tradition, Callinicos argues that socialism in this tradition can only come from below, through the self-activity of the working class. Stalinism from this standpoint was a 'counter-revolution', erecting at the end of the 1920s a state capitalist regime on the ruins of the radically democratic socialism briefly achieved in October 1917. He further argues that the collapse of Stalinism at the end of the 1980s was only one aspect of a world-wide transition from nationally organized to globally integrated capitalism. The result is likely to be greater economic and political instability. Against this background socialism - in Marx's sense - is all the more necessary. He concludes that the collapse of Stalinism should be less the moment to abandon socialism than to resume unfinished business.

176 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1989

About the author

Alexander Theodore Callinicos, a descendant through his mother of Lord Acton, is a political theorist and Director of the Centre for European Studies at King's College London. He holds both a BA and a DPhil from Oxford University.

Reviews

[Brecht Rogissart · Rating 4 out of 5]

A decent analysis of the state of politics and economics in the 1990s, closing the Soviet chapter theoretically, and looking ahead for Marxist politics in the 21st century. At times (annoyingly?) a cliché-Trotskyist, but there is real good stuff in here. In the introduction and first chapter, he criticizes the notion that, with the fall of the USSR, socialism has failed. He replies that the USSR was more capitalist than socialist. Instead, the USSR was "Stalinism", and that it should not be juxtaposed to Western capitalism, but rather seen as drawn into the same orbit that has nothing to do with a real socialist alternative. In the second chapter, he discusses in depth what it means to define the USSR as "stalinist", and there are some pretty good insights here. Starting from a true revolution, opposing the "weakest link in the imperial chain", the bolsheviks overthrew the tsar and hoped for a world revolution. Drawn in socialist isolation, they were pushed into competition with a hostile outer world: not because of competition between capitals turning violent, nor because of foreign trade, but because of *military* competition. First in opposition to fascism, later in opposition to the US. It defined industrialisation, and militarisation until 1989. The production for self-expansive industries were in essence producing the same outcomes as capitalist expansion, including the exploitation. This time not by an economic elite, but a bureaucratic elite. However, after the extensive growth that started in the 1920s - the USSR "catching up" - the Stalinist potential was slowed down in the 1970s and 1980s. The Stalinist push had ceased to create the dynamism it wanted. Why? because further growth in the West was created by internationalisation: they could still grow because of productivity growths inherent in integrating in the global market. This led to a stranded Stalinist isolated economy, that still needed to compete militarily. The nomenklatura in East European countries estranged from the disfunctional economy that originated. When Gorbachov dropped the USSR Empire, these elites could finally just pursue what they wanted: marketisation.

However, if you would think it would lead to capitalist triumph, think again! In the third chapter, Callinicos makes a great evaluation of the deep crisis Western capitalism is in. There are some obvious mistakes that I will forgive him for writing in 1994 (and that are very similar to Arrighi's mistakes around that period!), for example the great focus on competition from Japan and Germany as new competing hegemons (no mention of China whatsoever!), or the fact that he explains everything from a falling rate of profitability. But overall this is a good analysis of the Western world in the 1990s. He argues that the notion that Western capitalism will triumph after the fall of the USSR is highly questionable. First, global capitalism also hurt the statism of Keynesianism: globalisation hurt the social contract and growth strategies that were implemented after 1945. Moreover, for the US is also greatly weakened by the 70s crisis, the new competitors, and the high costs of militarism. The 'twin deficits' already pushed the USA to pursue protectionist policies. More importantly, the symbiosis in the Western capitalist sphere are now loose. Until the 1980s, the USA provided the military and nuclear umbrella for the West, in which West-Germany and Japan could thrive economically. This is now gone: both the need for NATO, as well as the bigger economic competition will upset this division of tasks. It will lead to more political assertiveness of other Western countries (for example in European unification, as the Financial Times apparently quoted in October 1989: "Europe already has a central bank. It is called the Bundesbank and it is located in Frankfurt."), and more economic mercantilism. Here, the author has made some assumptions, for the division of tasks remained intact for quite a while, and US Hegemony is actually (quasi) unmatched even today. However, I think he has a point when he says: "The Cold War turned out to be a long sluggish match between two heavyweights. In the last round, the weaker has collapsed under the punishment he suffered, but the battered victor stands reeling over him, eying the new contenders waiting outside the ring." (p. 80). It seems like there was only one new contender: China. He also makes references to the World now as the World of Great Powers before 1914, which is frightening - and unfortunately realistic - idea.

The last chapter and conclusion are somewhat boring. Apparently the real alternative to that which comes ahead is decentralised soviet democracy. OK! (I shouldn't be too cynical here, he does have a good explination over what socialism, communism, freedom and democracy mean!)

PS1, apparantly André Gunder Frank's bon mot is: "The Cold War is over. Japan and Germany won it." (p.79)

PS2: Apparently the Financial Times compared Mitterand to Thatcher in 1990 and received sardonic praise!