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Marcos and Martial Law in the Philippines
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315 pages, Hardcover
First published June 1, 1979
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January 4, 2025
"A study by the Rand Corporation reported that the Philippine political system appeared to be stable and responsive; that the economy was performing well; that crime and violence were concentrated in only a few areas; and that dissident groups were not a serious threat to the country. Why, then, was martial law deemed necessary?" (p. 14)
This was the question that the contributors to this book tried to answer. Even in their dispassionate, copiously referenced essays, the unitive thread among them was that Marcos declared Martial Law because he wanted to stay in power, which was also similar to Alex Brillantes's conclusion in Dictatorship and Martial Law.
One of the reasons that Martial Law was declared by Marcos was due to the oligarchies, which he referred to in Today's Revolution: Democracy. Behind this treatise, however, it should be pointed out that "until the eve of martial law, the anti-Marcos delegates were able to prevent approval of draft constitutional provisions that would allow the continuation of Marcos' power in any form of government." (p. 37) Marcos in 1972 was approaching his final year of presidency, and he wanted changes in the constitution to allow his perpetuation in power. Without Martial Law, however, this was difficult.
Upon the declaration of Martial Law, he would fast-track the ratification of the new constitution and explicitly allowed the continuation of his rule through the transitory provisions in it. "In 1973, Marcos hastily called a referendum on the new constitution through citizen assemblies, instead of through the plebiscite required under the then existing 1935 constitution ... The 1973 constitution was proclaimed ratified by the president on the basis of a report that 95 percent of voters had favored it." (p. 38) Studies performed by the University of the Philippines identified that the 1973 referendums were "managed affairs that gave a semblance of citizen participation in public affairs which was necessary to provide legitimacy to the martial law regime." (p. 48) However, there was a lack of adequate procedural safeguards to "maintain the privacy and sanctity of the ballot." (p. 48)
After the ratification, the Supreme Court couldn't muster resistance to the already-ratified constitution due to fait accompli. It could only declare that there was no further obstacle to the new constitution. The new constitution highly favored the current chief executive, who was Marcos. Although he created a semblance of a legislative body in the interim Batasang Pambansa, "the body cannot remove the prime minister-president, ratify treaties, or repeal or modify any decree or edicts of the president." Just like the Supreme Court, the "legislature" was a rubber stamp.
The constitutionality of the 1973 constitution would later be addressed in an essay by del Carmen with the same critique that was provided by Abueva. Two justices would later state: "In short, the constitutional and statutory qualifications were not considered in the determination of who should participate. No official ballots were used in the voting; it was done mostly by acclamation or open show of hands." (p. 93)
The tentacular power of the Marcos family and his cronies after his illegitimate seizure of power with the aid of the military would also color the Philippines' mass media. Because Marcos had become sensitive to criticism, even imprisoning his smartest and most vocal critics, what remained of the press were second-rate sycophants that didn't do him favors in his quest for legitimacy. Stauffer, in fact, in the book's final essay, likens the martial law regime to refeudalization: there became only one "lord," Marcos, and the rest had become his vassals. The United States were also complicit in this: quoting Roosevelt, Marcos was "a son of a bitch. But at least he's our son of a bitch.'' Marcos prohibited strikes and allowed transnational companies free rein in this country to the detriment of local industries and small and medium-sized enterprises.
Overall, the book essays the same conclusion that other well-researched books on Marcos possess: Marcos declared Martial Law to consolidate his hold on power that would have been illegitimate, and then proceeded to decimate the Philippines economically.
This was the question that the contributors to this book tried to answer. Even in their dispassionate, copiously referenced essays, the unitive thread among them was that Marcos declared Martial Law because he wanted to stay in power, which was also similar to Alex Brillantes's conclusion in Dictatorship and Martial Law.
One of the reasons that Martial Law was declared by Marcos was due to the oligarchies, which he referred to in Today's Revolution: Democracy. Behind this treatise, however, it should be pointed out that "until the eve of martial law, the anti-Marcos delegates were able to prevent approval of draft constitutional provisions that would allow the continuation of Marcos' power in any form of government." (p. 37) Marcos in 1972 was approaching his final year of presidency, and he wanted changes in the constitution to allow his perpetuation in power. Without Martial Law, however, this was difficult.
Upon the declaration of Martial Law, he would fast-track the ratification of the new constitution and explicitly allowed the continuation of his rule through the transitory provisions in it. "In 1973, Marcos hastily called a referendum on the new constitution through citizen assemblies, instead of through the plebiscite required under the then existing 1935 constitution ... The 1973 constitution was proclaimed ratified by the president on the basis of a report that 95 percent of voters had favored it." (p. 38) Studies performed by the University of the Philippines identified that the 1973 referendums were "managed affairs that gave a semblance of citizen participation in public affairs which was necessary to provide legitimacy to the martial law regime." (p. 48) However, there was a lack of adequate procedural safeguards to "maintain the privacy and sanctity of the ballot." (p. 48)
After the ratification, the Supreme Court couldn't muster resistance to the already-ratified constitution due to fait accompli. It could only declare that there was no further obstacle to the new constitution. The new constitution highly favored the current chief executive, who was Marcos. Although he created a semblance of a legislative body in the interim Batasang Pambansa, "the body cannot remove the prime minister-president, ratify treaties, or repeal or modify any decree or edicts of the president." Just like the Supreme Court, the "legislature" was a rubber stamp.
The constitutionality of the 1973 constitution would later be addressed in an essay by del Carmen with the same critique that was provided by Abueva. Two justices would later state: "In short, the constitutional and statutory qualifications were not considered in the determination of who should participate. No official ballots were used in the voting; it was done mostly by acclamation or open show of hands." (p. 93)
The tentacular power of the Marcos family and his cronies after his illegitimate seizure of power with the aid of the military would also color the Philippines' mass media. Because Marcos had become sensitive to criticism, even imprisoning his smartest and most vocal critics, what remained of the press were second-rate sycophants that didn't do him favors in his quest for legitimacy. Stauffer, in fact, in the book's final essay, likens the martial law regime to refeudalization: there became only one "lord," Marcos, and the rest had become his vassals. The United States were also complicit in this: quoting Roosevelt, Marcos was "a son of a bitch. But at least he's our son of a bitch.'' Marcos prohibited strikes and allowed transnational companies free rein in this country to the detriment of local industries and small and medium-sized enterprises.
Overall, the book essays the same conclusion that other well-researched books on Marcos possess: Marcos declared Martial Law to consolidate his hold on power that would have been illegitimate, and then proceeded to decimate the Philippines economically.
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