France and Britain, indispensable allies in two world wars, remember and forget their shared history in contrasting ways. The book will examine key episodes in the relationship between the two countries, including the outbreak of war in 1914, the battles of the Somme and Verdun, the Fall of France in 1940, Dunkirk, and British involvement in the French Resistance and the 1944 Liberation. The contributors discuss how the two countries tend to forget what they owe to each other, and have a distorted view of history which still colours and prejudices their relationship today, despite government efforts to build a close political and military partnership.
Robert Tombs is a British-French historian best known for his writings on the history of France, the Anglo-French relationship, on Brexit, and more recently on the history of the English people.
This is an exceptional fine book about a complex and, naturally controversial, aspect of World War I and II - it's memory - or rather the memory of the British and French people of those Wars and of various incidents in them. This excellent collection of essays edited by Mr. Tombs (who has written and edited many fine books on the subject of the relationship between Britain and France for good or bad) is both highly readable and thought provoking. For example it was only because of this book that I was forced to acknowledge and understand the vast difference between the way a French and a British person, even today, would view World War I. In the UK the deaths and destruction are remembered as a terrible waste; in France as an essential, and justified, sacrifice. It is only when reminded that the first war was fought, for a French person, against an invader who was occupying and ravaging, a huge stretch of their country, that the differing memories become apparent. When you approach WWII the reasons for differing memories are even more complex.
This is a book that will be fascinating to anyone interested in the history of the world wars or of the history of the UK and France in the 20th century.
This is a collection of essays by different authors on both World Wars and the aftermath. They attempt to tell us how both countries, in their own way, experienced the wars then and now.
For the most part, the essays are dry and some are militaristic in tone – as in this division participated…, that division moved … etc. The essays on World War I were more interesting. The various authors make the point that for France, World War I was a direct experience of a German attack and occupation on French soil. For soldiers from the U.K. and elsewhere, it was more remote. Britain was never directly threatened by invasion. Unfortunately, this topic was repeated throughout many of the essays.
In retrospect, the First World War for the British came to be seen as a nihilistic waste of humanity. In France this is not so, it is still seen as a defense of France from German intrusion. They were always fearful of another German onslaught, which occurred again, twenty-two years after the end of World War I in 1940.
From the British point of view, World War II is viewed as a just and honorable cause – to liberate Europe from Nazism. It is also seen as a time when the United States became ascendant. For France, it is far more complex – France was invaded and defeated in 1940, occupied until 1944 with both resistance to and collaboration with Germany.
One writer makes a good point that the French rarely acknowledge the sacrifices the British had to make at sea. The Atlantic crossings were essential in the two wars to keep the Allies supplied with basic necessities as well as military equipment and soldiers. There was much loss of life and equipment at sea by attacking German U-boats.
One irritating essay was "Dunkirk in Military Operations, Myths, and Memories" by Martin S. Alexander. On page 103 he states that in the TV documentary series “The World at War” in the episode “France Falls” the Dunkirk evacuation was “presented as an escape from the jaws of disaster”. No, the presentation was more complex than this. A French commentator states that “it was a selfish act” meaning England had abandoned France. On page 106 of Alexander’s essay, he states that after the battle for France “the German Luftwaffe had sustained such attrition that it would be too late in the year before it had refitted and could resume large-scale air operations”. In actual fact, formidable Luftwaffe operations started in mid-July against England. Also, “German logisticians had no plan with any prospect of success for a cross-Channel invasion”. Not really accurate - several barge sites were accumulating in French and Belgian ports. It is easy to say in hind-sight that prospects for a successful invasion were dim, but in the summer and fall of 1940 it was an entirely different matter. He says that Britain did not stand alone as it had its empire, but forgetting that at this stage there was very little U.S. participation in the war (besides applause), the Soviet Union was supplying valuable resources to Germany, and all Europe was under the Nazi and Fascist yoke.
One essay I found of interest was the last one by David Reynolds. There were tidbits in some of the other essays, but not much. One author (Olivier Wieviorka) barely mentions the Canadian involvement in D-Day, who landed on Juno Beach. Instead, he refers to British forces… Thanks for the recognition.