Peace in Aceh: A Personal Account of the Helsinki Peace Process

by Damien Kingsbury

Following nearly three decades of conflict and a series of failed ceasefire agreements, on 15 August 2005, the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia reached an historic peace agreement to end the fighting and to give Aceh a high degree of genuine autonomy. The catalyst for the talks that produced this agreement was the devastating tsunami of 26 December 2004, which left almost 170,000 dead or missing in Aceh and destroyed most of the populated low-lying areas. Despite the massive destruction, the peace talks were conducted under an intensified military campaign. GAM made a major concession to the talks by announcing early that it was prepared to negotiate an outcome other than complete independence. The Indonesian side, however, under pressure from the military and "nationalists" in Jakarta, pressed for GAM to accept a minor reworking of the status quo. The international community, meanwhile, just pressed for a settlement. In the end, the Indonesian government also compromised, and the two parties reached an agreement that was intended to end the fighting and to address many, if not all, of GAM's outstanding claims. Despite opposition to the talks process, and to compromise, the outcome was increasingly seen both in Jakarta and in Aceh as a "win-win" situation, and as a further significant step in Indonesia's continuing process of reform and democratization. Peace in Aceh offers an insider's personal account of that peace process and is required reading for anyone wishing to understand this troubled province. DR. DAMIEN KINGSBURY is Associate Professor in the School of International and Political Studies and Director of International and Community Development at Deakin University, Victoria, Australia. He was political adviser to GAM for the peace talks and assisted in drafting and negotiating key elements of the peace agreement. Dr. Kingsbury has published extensively on Indonesian politics, the military and regional security issues, including The Politics of Indonesia (3rd edition 2005), Violence in Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia (2005), and Power Politics and the Indonesian Military (2003).

236 pages, Paperback

First published June 29, 2006

Reviews

[Yong Jack Chew · Rating 2 out of 5]

As the title suggests, Peace in Aceh is a personal account by Dr Damien Kingsbury [1] of the Helsinki Peace talks between the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) and the Government of Indonesian (GoI) which eventually produced a peace settlement signed by both sides on 15 Aug 05. Kingsbury was an informal advisor to GAM leaders who were in exile in Sweden and had acted in that capacity throughout the peace negotiations which began in January 2005 following the Indian Ocean tsunami. Kingsbury’s involvement with GAM as an informal advisor came after five years of interaction with GAM and that he initially gravitated towards them because he personally disapproved of the behaviour of the Tentera Negara Indonesia (TNI) and “the enemy [ie. GAM] of my enemy [ie. TNI] is my friend”(p. 19).

The author made it clear at the onset that he did no intend for his book to be an objective account of the peace process since his status as a participant would inevitably bring an element of subjectivity (p. xii). Possibly out of respect to GAM, he even explained his usage of the spelling “Aceh” due to the rebel group’s rejection of the spelling – they preferred to spell it as either “Atjeh” or “Acheh” (p. iv). What he did promise was to reveal his insider knowledge of GAM’s thinking and actions during the negotiations. As an advisor to the GAM leaders in exile, Kingsbury was obviously in a position to do that. He did so by way of providing rich details of his interaction with and observations of members of the GAM and GoI negotiation teams. He also copiously reproduced GAM documents on its positions at each and every turn of the negotiations.

The chapters in Peace in Aceh are largely structured according to the number of rounds of negotiations (five in total between January and July 2005 – titled “Round One” to “Round Five”) with two other chapters devoted to GAM internal positions (“Plan A and Plan B” and “Security Issues”). The other chapters cover his thoughts on the efficacy of negotiations (“On Negotiations”), the origins of the conflict and peace talks (“Background to the Conflict” and “How the Peace Talks Came About”) and resolution (“The Signing”) and his concluding thoughts (“Epilogue”).

Published in June 2006, only some nine months after the signing of the Helsinki MoU, the book has obvious flaws in terms of editing standards – the inaccurate indexing of keywords (in “Index”, p. 215 to 218) being the most glaring error. His deference to GAM in the spelling of the restive province also created chances for mishaps whereby “Aceh” might inadvertently appear in GAM documents. The sub-par editing was probably due to the book being published so soon after the peace settlement – though this should be seen as sufficient reason. However, precisely because of the timing of its publishing and the fact that it contained many GAM documents as well as Kingsbury’s personal views, we can see Peace in Aceh as a pseudo primary document. As a partisan account however, the book should be read in conjunction with Peace in Aceh: Notes on the Peace Process between the Republic of Indonesia and the Aceh Freedom Movement (GAM) in Helsinki (2009) which was written by GoI head negotiator Hamid Awaludin (currently Indonesian ambassador to Russia who was Minister of Justice and Human Rights during the negotiations). [2]

Peace in Aceh excels in providing interesting snippets on the GAM negotiating team (p. 24 - 25) and its GoI counterparts (p. 28) and Kingsbury’s insider knowledge of the concerns of GAM negotiators during the talks. What the author did particularly well was in the way he explained how the position of GAM negotiators evolved as the talks proceeded. One good example would be how GAM adjusted its opening position from rejection of autonomy on GoI’s terms under a parliament-passed law in 2001 (Undang-Undang No. 18 / 2001 Tentang Otonomi Khusus Bagi Provinsi Daerah Istimewa Aceh Sebagai Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam) to being willing to accept autonomy on the condition that the terms would negotiated (p. 27 to 34).

Kingsbury also did well to highlight the concerns of GAM negotiators regarding the possible obstruction to the peace process due to the nationalistic position and rhetoric of the TNI and the Indonesian parliament, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR). In fact, if there were to be a central thesis to this book, it would be that GAM’s persistence and political courage allowed a peace deal to be reached despite these obstacles.

However, what the author did not address, as was to be expected due to his partisan status, was the internal divisions between the Sweden-based GAM leaders and GAM military commanders on the ground. In Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia (2009) [3], Kingsbury’s fellow-Australian academic Edward Aspinall cited one GAM commander as saying that GAM forces on the ground wanted to continue the rebellion and was only looking for a ceasefire agreement with GoI. However, Kingsbury’s account only covered the perspective of the GAM negotiation team and that of the Sweden-based leaders. We can see this weakness as possibly stemming from his possible personal loyalty to the leaders in exile and his lack of access to GAM military commanders – he was not allowed to travel to Indonesia due to Indonesian authority’s suspicions that he was an Australian spy. As it was, with regard to the conclusive end to the negotiations, Kingsbury only wrote that GAM commanders were “furious” with the number of TNI personnel allowed for deployment under the MoU “but accepted this unpalatable outcome” (p. 157).

In sum, there should be no misconception that Peace in Aceh could be read as an objective and comprehensive book to the separatist conflict in Aceh. The author’s personal stance in support of GAM and his emphasis on the perspectives of the GAM negotiation team are signposts that mark this book as a partisan account of the Helsinki peace negotiations. Nevertheless, if we viewed it in its proper context, the book can be of use as a pseudo primary document for researchers interested in studying how the Aceh separatist conflict was brought to a peaceful conclusion.

Notes:

[1] He was at that time an academic at the School of International and Political Studies in Deakin University in Victoria, Australia and still is at the time of this review.

[2] Awaludin, Hamid. Peace in Aceh: Notes on the Peace Process between the Republic of Indonesia and the Aceh Freedom Movement (GAM) in Helsinki. Jakarta: CSIS, 2009.

[3] Aspinall, Edward. Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia. Singapore: NUS Press, 2009.

[Rachel · Rating 3 out of 5]

Well this book is interesting mostly because of where we are living right now. Although Kingsbury does a good job of showing how difficult it is to get parties to conflicts to come together and to work toward a reasonable and acceptable solution. And of course it is super cool that I work in an office with one of the primary negotiators for GAM, whom the author speaks well of often (he is a really nice and sweet man). One annoying draw back is that the book has more than a few errors in spelling and such - but who am I to speak?

[Hudi]

Buku ini merupakan catatan proses perdamaian di Aceh melalui MOU Helsinski. Penulisnya merupakan penasihat politik dari GAM. Jadi jelas bahwa seluruh proses perdamaian yang dipaparkan dari buku ini berasal dari orang yang terlibat langsung di dalamnya.

[Kenny Kurniadidarma · Rating 3 out of 5]

*****

[Dharma Agastia · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interesting personal account of the complicated yet crucial peace process that finally ended a 30-year long insurgency in Indonesia. Kingsbury shows how the actors in the peace process were involved in a contest of wits during the negotiation process in Helsinki.