Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility investigates the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications. Skepticism about free will and moral responsibility has been on the rise in recent years. In fact, a significant number of philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists now either doubt or outright deny the existence of free will and/or moral responsibility—and the list of prominent skeptics appears to grow by the day. Given the profound importance that the concepts of free will and moral responsibility hold in our lives—in understanding ourselves, society, and the law—it is important that we explore what is behind this new wave of skepticism. It is also important that we explore the potential consequences of skepticism for ourselves and society. Edited by Gregg D. Caruso, this collection of new essays brings together an internationally recognized line-up of contributors, most of whom hold skeptical positions of some sort, to display and explore the leading arguments for free will skepticism and to debate their implications.
Most of the papers in this collection dogmatically assume, without making any effort to prove, that free will is an illusion. However, the final two essays question that assumption. The penultimate essay by Susan Pockett is particularly interesting in that she claims (p. 270) that "causal determinism [predeterminism] is not an established scientific fact—and perhaps never can be." (Italics in the original.) The final essay by Maureen Sie has some very interesting reflections on the important role of the concepts of free will and moral responsibility in Western societies with large private spheres not subject to governmental coercion. Sie's approach reminded me of Aristotle, though her exact analysis is different.
Most of the rest of the book (with a few exceptions here and there) is a "dud." But for the last two essays, I would have given it a one-star rating. As it is, however, I will not rate it.